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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
STRATEGIC RESPONCES TO TAX AND TRANSFER POLICY: WELFARE 
COMPETITION, TAX COMPETITION, AND THE ELASTICITY OF TAXABLE 
INCOME 
 
My dissertation consists of three essays focused on identifying the strategic 
responses of governments and individuals following changes in the tax and transfer 
system. Two essays contribute to the literature on fiscal competition, focusing on state 
level polices aimed at redistributing income. A third essay contributes to the literature 
estimating the responsiveness of individual’s incomes to changing marginal tax rates. A 
better understanding of these responses contributes to our ability to design an optimal tax 
and transfer system in a federalist nation. 
In essay 1 I employ a spatial dynamic approach to investigate interstate welfare 
competition across multiple policy instruments and across three distinct welfare periods - 
the AFDC regime, the experimental waiver period leading up to the reform, and the 
TANF era.  Results suggest the strategic setting of welfare policy occurs over multiple 
dimensions of welfare including the effective benefit level and the effective tax rate 
applied to recipient's earned income. Furthermore, strategic behavior appears to have 
increased over time, a finding consistent with a race to the bottom after welfare reform.  
Another form of interstate competition examined in Essay 3 is the spatial patterns 
in state level estate tax policy. My examination follows a major reform which greatly 
altered both the state and federal estate tax landscape. This study develops a model in 
which a state’s tax base and rate are simultaneously determined. Results indicate a state’s 
estate tax base is negatively influenced by its own tax rate and positively influenced by 
the tax rate set in neighboring jurisdictions. A state’s own tax rate is also found to be 
positively influenced by the tax rates set in neighboring jurisdictions.  
Last, Essay 2 uses matched panels from the Current Population Survey for survey 
years 1980-2009 to estimate the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) and how it varies in 
response to measurement of the tax rate, heterogeneity across education attainment, 
selection on observables and unobservable, and identification.  Substantial variation in 
the ETI across all key economic and statistical decisions is found. 
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1 Introduction
Understanding how economic agents react to changes in the tax and transfer system has
long been a topic of great interest to both policy makers and academics. Moreover, given
today’s fiscal climate, in which further income tax hikes and cuts to social safety net pro-
grams loom in the near future, an enhanced knowledge of such responses will be all the
more important. Economists working at the intersection of public and labor economics
have devoted much research into identifying behavioral elasticities such as the compen-
sated elasticity of labor supply with respect to marginal tax rates and more recently, the
elasticity of taxable income. Because elasticities such as these will be inversely related to
both the optimal size and progressively of the public sector, pinning them down is crucial
for deriving important tax parameters such as the revenue-maximizing rate of taxation for
high earners.
Another set of important questions studied by those interested in the design and re-
form of our tax and transfer system pertain to matters of fiscal federalism, a subfield of
public economics addressing questions related to how to delegate policies among different
levels of government. Such questions have been particularly relevant with regards to the
nations transfer system given the 1996 welfare reform created by the PRWORA legislation
which further decentralized welfare authority to the state governments and the ongoing
discussions of how to reform larger programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program (SNAP) and Medicaid. The literature on fiscal competition, which studies
how decentralized governments respond to policies set in competing jurisdictions (hori-
zontal competition) or higher levels of government (vertical competition) has been key to
understanding the economic implications of such choices. For instance, the literature has
demonstrated how inter-state competition over mobile individuals and capital can theoret-
ically lead to a situation sometimes referred to as a ‘race to the bottom,’ in which juris-
dictions compete with each other to offer the most attractive fiscal climate and in doing
so reach an equilibrium in which taxes (or the generosity of transfer programs) are lower
1
than they would have been under a centralized system. By examining the behavior of states
governments sorrounding past reforms, we can learn much about the strength of inter-state
competition and its implications for future policy.
To enhance the body of knowledge relating to the matters discussed above, this disser-
tation consists of three essays that focus on identifying the strategic responses of both state
level governments and individuals following changes in the tax and transfer system.Two
essays contribute to the literature on fiscal competition. Both of which focus on state level
polices aimed at redistributing income. A third essay contributes to the literature estimating
the responsiveness of individual’s incomes to changing marginal tax rates. As discussed
above, a better understanding of these responses contributes to our ability to design an
optimal tax and transfer system in a federalist nation. In essay 1 I use a spatial dynamic ap-
proach to investigate interstate welfare competition across multiple policy instruments and
across three distinct welfare periods - the AFDC regime, the experimental waiver period
leading up to the reform, and the TANF era. Results suggest the strategic setting of welfare
policy occurs over multiple dimensions of welfare including the effective benefit level and
the effective tax rate applied to recipient’s earned income. Furthermore, strategic behav-
ior appears to have increased over time consistent with a race to the bottom after welfare
reform. Another form of interstate competition is examined in Essay 3 which investigates
spatial patterns in state level estate tax policy following a major reform which greatly al-
tered both the state and federal estate tax landscape. This study develops a model in which a
state’s tax base and rate are simultaneously determined. Results indicate a state’s estate tax
base is negatively influenced by its own tax rate and positively influenced by the tax rate set
in neighboring jurisdictions. A state’s own tax rate is also found to be positively influenced
by the tax rates set in neighboring jurisdictions. Last, Essay 2 uses matched panels from the
Current Population Survey for survey years 1980-2009 to estimate the elasticity of taxable
income (ETI) and how it varies in response to measurement of the tax rate, heterogeneity
across education attainment, selection on observables and unobservable, and identification.
2
Substantial variation in the ETI across all key economic and statistical decisions is found.
3
2 Was there a ‘Race to the Bottom’ After Welfare Reform?
2.1 Introduction
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
abolished the federal entitlement program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and replaced it with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), a state administered
block-grant program. In doing so, the federal government granted states much greater lat-
itude in the design of their respective welfare programs. Leading up to the passage of the
reform there was much speculation and debate over the possibility that states would use
their new found freedom to “race to the bottom” in setting welfare generosity. Canonical
models of fiscal federalism have long suggested that income redistribution, specifically in
the form of assistance to the poor, should fall into the realm of responsibility of the federal
government (Stigler (1957), Musgrave (1959), Oates (1972)).1 With welfare, it has been ar-
gued that decentralized benefit-setting could trigger competition among the states. In such
a scenario, policy makers fear that they may attract poor populations from neighboring
states, or become a ‘welfare magnet,’ if relatively generous benefits are offered. To avoid
this outcome, states may strategically reduce the generosity of their welfare programs and
compete with neighbors to offer less desirable benefits.
To gauge the likelihood of this scenario, researchers began looking for evidence of
competitive behavior among states before the reform went into effect (Brueckner (2000),
Figlio et al. (1999), Shroder (1995), Rom et al. (1998), Saavedra (2000a)).2 However, little
is actually known about the extent of strategic competition after welfare reform. In effect,
the question ‘did welfare reform actually kick off a race to the bottom?’ remains unan-
swered. Understanding state behavior following the reform is especially relevant today
1While the mobility of individuals generally leads one to view local governments as constrained in the amount
of redistribution they can carry out, this normative position has not gone unchallenged. Under certain as-
sumptions, some have shown local redistribution to be efficient (Pauly (1973), Epple and Romer (1991)).
2The focus of these studies was the AFDC statutory maximum benefit level which was determined at the state
level.
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given growing political pressures to further reform the social safety net and specifically the
current proposals that would block grant funding and give states more control over addi-
tional programs including medicaid and the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program
(SNAP). Using dynamic spatial econometric methods, this paper provides the first evidence
on competition after the 1996 reform.
Because of the large array of new policies available to state policy makers (time limits,
family caps, sanctions, earnings disregards, etc.), a test of welfare competition that sim-
ply extended past methodologies over the TANF era would miss many dimensions over
which states could conceivably compete. While the statutory benefit level remains a pol-
icy instrument readily available for reform, the water is muddied by the numerous other
instruments states now have at their disposal.3 If states have in fact engaged in a “race to
the bottom”, it is entirely possible that they did so through more restrictive access, greater
policy stringency, or some combination of these and other factors. I extend the literature by
utilizing micro caseload data to construct a unique panel of state level welfare policy vari-
ables. These include the effective benefit level, the effective tax rate on recipients earned
income, state sanction use, and ease of access to benefits. Taken together these variables
more fully encompass a state’s welfare policy bundle and the channels through which they
might compete.
A second contribution of the analysis aims to more fully understand the evolution of
competitive behavior surrounding the reform. Though the PWRORA legislation marked
the official transition from AFDC to TANF, implementation was not instantaneous. The
two regimes were separated by an experimental period of ‘laboratory federalism.’4 The
3A policy instrument that states do not have at their disposal is the use of any kind of residency require-
ment. The use of such policies has been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court - once under the
AFDC regime (Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) and again following PWRORA after fifteen states attempted to
implement policies which would pay lower benefits to newcomers (Saenz v. Roe (1999).
4A provision of the Social Security Act, dating back to 1962, permitted the secretary of Health and Human
Services to waive the rules and regulations surrounding AFDC in certain contexts. Specifically, states had
the power to petition the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for such waivers allowing them
to implement experimental programs or policies designed to increase program effectiveness(Grogger and
Karoly (2005)).
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existence of such a period provides a unique opportunity for investigating changes in in-
tensity of strategic behavior. Specifically, during the experimental “waiver period,” states
had additional policy freedoms but were not yet bound by the new TANF provisions and fi-
nancing arrangements. To exploit the changing policy landscape, I analyze strategic policy
setting over a twenty-five year window (1983-2008) divided into three distinct periods: the
AFDC era (1983-1991); the experimental waiver period (1992-1996); and the post reform
TANF regime (1997-2008). Through this division I can test for changes in the intensity of
strategic behavior across the different regimes.
Finally, though the importance of dynamics has been recognized in the welfare caseload
literature (Ziliak et al. (2000), Haider and Klerman (2005)), the welfare competition litera-
ture has largely ignored the importance of dynamics in the determination of welfare policy.
To address this matter, I further extend the literature by providing the first dynamic esti-
mates of welfare competition. To do so, I adopt a spatial dynamic panel estimator which
permits both short and long run estimates of strategic policy setting. The dynamic spec-
ification can be rationalized on several grounds. First, there are likely to be lags in the
diffusion of information about changes in neighbors’ welfare policy. Second, the political
process takes time. States wishing to enact policy changes in response to their neighbors’
policies may not be able to do so immediately. Third, state welfare policies are highly
persistent (Ziliak et al. (2000), Haider and Klerman (2005)) and failing to control for last
years policies, or state dependence, may lead one to overstate the magnitude of strategic
behavior. Through the addition of dynamics, one is provided a better understanding of the
importance played by strategic behavior in the determination of state policy over time.
The static model shows that states strategically set welfare policies in conjunction with
those of their neighbors. Moreover, this strategic behavior was not limited to the statutory
benefit level examined by the past literature. Rather, it spanned multiple policy instruments
affecting the effective benefits level and tax rates faced by recipients in each state, con-
sistent with competition over the benefit base. Furthermore, it appears strategic behavior
6
intensified in the waiver and TANF periods. For instance, during the AFDC regime, es-
timates suggest states responded to a 10 percent cut in the effective benefit level of their
neighbors’ with an own cut of around eight and one half percent. This magnitude increased
to nine percent and then nine and a third percent for the waiver and TANF periods, respec-
tively. When the models are augmented to allow for asymmetrical policy responses (i.e.
states’ responses are conditioned on their relative position to their neighbors), I find that
states offering relatively generous policies are more responsive to cuts in generosity by bor-
dering states as one would expect in a “race to the bottom” scenario (Figlio et al. (1999)).
Furthermore, the three period analysis reveals that the asymmetrical response behavior is
concentrated in the waiver and TANF regimes.
Finally, the results demonstrate the importance of modeling welfare competition in a
dynamic framework. In terms of importance, lagged own state policy variables clearly
dominate those of neighbors for short run policy determination. Spatial coefficients, which
capture a state’s reaction to its neighbor’s policies, are reduced in economic importance
and in some instances lose statistical significance under the dynamic specification. Most
notable is the case of the maximum benefit level. Once controlling for a states’ lagged own
maximum benefit level, the maximum benefit level of bordering states no longer appears to
exert much influence on state policy choice. However, evidence of strategic policy setting
in both the short and long run remains for many of the new variables under consideration,
especially the effective benefit level and the effective tax rate on earned income. Long run
coefficients suggest that neighbor policy does play an important role in a state’s determina-
tion of welfare policy over time. Sensitivity analysis reveals findings are robust to multiple
spatial weighting schemes and specification choices.
2.2 Welfare Reform and the “Race to the Bottom”
The PRWORA legislation, now commonly referred to as welfare reform, sought to “end
welfare as we know it.” As outlined in Blank (2002), the major reform provisions included
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the devolution of greater policy authority to the states, the change in financing, ongoing
work requirements, incentives to reduce non-marital births, and a five year maximum time-
limit. Of these provisions, the first and second were central to the “race to the bottom”
debate.
2.2.1 Greater Policy Authority for the States
Under TANF, states were given increased discretion over eligibility, the form and level of
benefits, and the ability to impose even more stringent time limits and work requirements
if they so chose (Blank (2002), Grogger and Karoly (2005)). While many of the new
policies were designed to force participants to work and punish or sanction those who did
not comply, others were implemented to increase the reward to working. Examples of the
latter included reduced statutory tax rates on recipient’s income as well as expansions in
earnings disregards and liquid asset limits which determined benefit levels and eligibility
(Ziliak (2007)). These so called “carrots and sticks” of welfare reform were applied at the
discretion of each state and entered into use during the early 1990s in the experimental
waiver period.
Waiver-based reforms that had gone largely unused until the 1990s suddenly became a
key mechanism in the states’ push for reform. During this time, eighty-three waivers were
granted to forty-three states and the District of Columbia (Grogger and Karoly (2005)).5
For example, sixteen states were granted approval to implement various statewide time-
limit policies. Of these, Iowa was the first state to receive approval in 1993. Other midwest-
ern states to adopt time-limit waivers included Indiana (1994), Nebraska and Illinois (1995)
and Ohio (1996). Connecticut implemented the strictest time-limit policy of twenty-one
months which applied to the whole family. Delaware, Virginia, and South Carolina also re-
ceived approval for strict full family time-limits of twenty-four months. Statewide family-
cap waivers were granted to nineteen states between 1992-1996. The majority of these
5The following information on specific state waiver policies is drawn from Chapter 2 of Grogger and Karoly
(2005).
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allowed no increase in benefits for additional children beyond a certain number. Statewide
financial-incentive waivers were granted in twenty states over the same period. Before the
waiver period, welfare recipients faced a benefit reduction ratio of 100 percent after just
four months of working.6 In an attempt to encourage labor force participation or “make
work pay,” states experimented with increasing the income disregard and lowering the im-
plicit tax rate. Michigan, for instance, allowed a $200 disregard and lowered the tax rate on
earned income to twenty percent while Connecticut allowed recipients to keep 100 percent
of their earnings up until the federal poverty line. These constitute just a few of the exam-
ples of policies states initially enacted during the waiver period and carried over to TANF.
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the evolution of U.S. welfare reform, it was not only these
new waivers state policymakers pushed for in the final national reform. They also sought
the devolution of responsibility in program design from the federal level to the state.
Naturally, some believed this new found flexibility in welfare design would prove ef-
ficiency enhancing, as states could now tailor their programs to meet their citizens’ (both
tax-payers and potential recipients) wants and needs more closely. Others, however, were
concerned that the further decentralization of benefits would have a more worrisome ef-
fect – the aggravation of interjurisdictional externalities suggested by the fiscal federalism
tradition. While popular usage of the term “race to the bottom” tends to overstate the sit-
uation or connote “a draconian tendency to slash welfare benefits to the bare minimum,
mimicking the outcome of the least generous state,” the fact remains that economic theory
does point to a downward bias in generosity (Brueckner (2000)). This benefit underpro-
vision result has been demonstrated in the literature many times. The standard models of
benefit competition, built on the work of Brown and Oates (1987), Bucovetsky (1991), and
Wildasin (1991) consist of multiple jurisdictions composed of taxpayers and mobile poor
non-taxpayers who receive a welfare benefit. The welfare benefit is selected in each juris-
diction to maximize the utility of the taxpayers (who care about the poor in their own ju-
6 AFDC’s first finical work incentive, known as the “thirty-and-a third” policy, was enacted in 1967 but later
eliminated in 1981 for recipients with four months of work.
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risdiction) taking into account the benefit level in other jurisdictions. First order conditions
from these models take on the form of a Samuelson condition for the optimal provision
of a public good where the sum of the taxpayers marginal utility gain from increasing the
benefit is equal to the marginal cost. The suboptimality of this result is easily demonstrated
by obtaining the same condition for the case in which the poor are immobile. Comparison
reveals that the marginal cost of raising benefits will be higher when the poor can migrate
which leads to a lower benefit level than in the no migration case. Thus decentralized
benefit setting is said to lead to benefit under-provision.
To test this prediction, the past welfare competition literature focused on the maximum
AFDC benefit guarantee (sometimes augmented to include food stamps) for a given family
size. However, this statutory maximum may not sufficiently reflect a state’s welfare policy.
Under welfare reform, other critical factors include the rates at which states ‘claw back’
benefits as a recipient’s income increases along with the levels and sources of income that
may be excluded from benefit determination formula (Ziliak (2007)). These factors which
are determined by state policy act to drive a wedge between the statutory maximum benefit
level and the prevailing average effective benefit. This can be demonstrated with the stan-
dard benefit determination formula denoted as: B = MB − brr ∗ (WH +N −D), where
MB is the maximum benefit guarantee, brr is the states benefit reduction ratio (which was
set at 100 percent under AFDC), WH is labor income, N is any non-labor income, and D
is the earnings disregard). Prior to the reform many states did implemented earnings disre-
gards which led to effective tax rates of less than 100 percent. However, they were bound
by the statutory benefit reduction rate of 100 percent. During the waiver period and follow-
ing TANF, many states set new benefit reduction rates and earning disregard policies. For
instance, Michigan and Maryland implemented a benefit reduction rate of only twenty per-
cent during the waiver period while rates of twenty-five percent, thirty-three percent, and
fifty percent were set in place by Vermont, California, and New Hampshire, respectively.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the impact of such policies by plotting the time series trend for the
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average statutory maximum and average effective benefit level for a family of three.7 For
both variables a clear downward trend emerges in the late 1980s, which is consistent with
welfare competition. Even more interesting is the divergence between effective and statu-
tory benefit guarantees whose onset coincides with the 1996 reform. Ziliak (2007) notes
that the falling effective guarantees make welfare less attractive and are in line with the
reform goals of encouraging work and discouraging welfare use. One could also speculate
that these falling effective guarantees are consistent with states’ strategic efforts to keep
their welfare programs from appearing to be more desirable than their neighbors. Though
the effective benefit level may better reflect a state’s generosity relative to the statutory
maximum, the picture is not complete until one considers the effective tax rates faced by
recipients. The effective tax rate on earned income reflects the rate at which a state reduces
the monthly benefit amount paid to recipients as they earn labor income. State policies such
as reduced statutory rates and earnings disregards, lower the effective rate of taxation and
thus increase both the level of generosity and work incentives. Before the reform, this tax
rate had a statutory value of 100 percent though in practice it was much lower and displayed
a considerable degree of cross-state heterogeneity (Lurie (1974), Hutchens (1978), Franker
et al. (1985), McKinnish (2007a)). After the reform, the rates fell rapidly as seen in Figure
2.2 A strong case can be made for the use of these ‘effective’ variables. Though they can-
not separately identify the individual policies, these variables will reflect a states’ collective
use of policies such as family caps, asset limits, partial sanctions and earning disregards, as
well as caseworker discretion in the application of these policies (Ziliak (2007)).
However, there is also an extensive margin of generosity to consider. States can set
strict eligibility criteria, harsh sanction policies, or shorter more restrictive time limits.
Three additional measures therefore aim to capture aspects of state policy not represented
by the benefit and tax rate instruments discussed above. The first is the approval rate which
is meant to proxy for ease of access to welfare benefits. The latter two reflect a state’s strin-
7The effective benefit variable is constructed using administrative micro caseload data from the AFDC Qual-
ity Control System and the National TANF Data System. See data section for further detail.
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gency in terminating cases through the use of sanction and other non-sanction state polices
(such as shortened time limits). These measures are constructed using micro caseload data
available only for the post-reform regime. Figure 2.3 illustrates a national trend towards
declining case approval rates coinciding with an increasing trend in case termination due to
sanctions. Specifically, average state case approvals fell approximately seventeen percent
between 2000 and 2008 while sanction use nearly doubled. Overall, the trends documented
here suggest a tendency towards reducing welfare generosity along multiple margins con-
sistent with a race to the bottom. Detailed information on the construction of all variables
and their sources are provided in the data section.
The additional policy autonomy for the states was not the only factor cited in the grow-
ing debate on whether states would “race to the bottom.” Critics of the reform also argued
that the new cost-sharing arrangement between states and the federal government would
exert further downward pressure on benefits.
2.2.2 Change in Federal Cost Sharing
Brueckner (2000) demonstrated that a price correction mechanism, such as a system of
matching grants with the federal government, can be used to decrease the price of addi-
tional welfare spending and restore benefits to their optimal level. Such a system was in
existence prior to PRWORA. The reform, however, replaced this cost-sharing scheme with
a block grant system. With the old system of open-ended matching grants, states would
share any increase in their costs with the federal government (sometimes with the federal
government footing as much as eighty percent of the bill).8 Under TANF, states receive a
lump sum block grant which was initially tied to the level of federal matching-grant pay-
ments a state received in 1994 (Brueckner (2000)).9 As noted in Rom et al. (1998), each
8Under AFDC, the federal matching rate for each state was calculated based on the state’s per capita personal
income (PCI). The specific formula, match rate= 100 − .45 ∗ (StatePCI)
2
U.S.PCI , was the same formula used
to determined the Medicaid matching rate and was designed to give relatively poorer states more federal
assistance.
9The amount of the block grants was not tied to inflation. Between 1997 and 2011, the value of these grants
has been eroded by nearly thirty percent
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state therefore bears the full marginal cost of any increased spending in its welfare pro-
gram. Alternatively, states gain the full marginal benefit of any cost savings they incur. In
such a setting, attracting welfare migrants from low-benefit states would be quite costly,
and more so than before. Consequently, it was suggested that welfare competition could
intensify post reform, speeding up the race to the bottom (or at least the race to the benefit
floor required by federal law). Policy makers, perhaps in anticipation of strong downward
pressure on benefits levels, set “maintenance of effort” requirements stipulating that states
may not spend less than eighty percent of what they spent in 1994 (or seventy-five percent
if they meet minimum work requirements).10
While theory suggests the move towards greater state policy authority and block grant
financing could have led states to underprovide or even “race to the bottom” in setting their
welfare generosity, assessing the importance of any resulting competitive behavior is an
empirical matter.
2.2.3 Empirical Tests of “Race to the Bottom”
Because welfare migration is held to be the key mechanism in race to the bottom theory,
initial empirical studies sought to test whether or not migration actually occurred at any
meaningful magnitude. However, these studies found rather mixed results.11 The lack of
conclusive results confirming welfare migration does not prima facie rule out race to the
bottom behavior. As explained by Brueckner (2000), if state governments merely perceive
generous welfare benefits to attract welfare migrants, then the requirements for strategic
interaction and the resulting race to the bottom are met. He therefore argues, “because it
focuses directly on the behavioral response that leads to a race to the bottom, which may
arise even if welfare migration is mostly imaginary, a test for strategic interaction may be
more useful than a test for migration itself.”
10Like the block grants, MOE requirements were not indexed for inflation and have thus greatly declined.
11See Brueckner (2000) for a survey covering empirical studies of welfare migration. More recent works
finding evidence of moderate welfare migration include McKinnish (2004, 2007), and Gelbach (2004).
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The canonical approach is to employ a fiscal reaction function that relates the welfare
benefit level in one state to the benefit level in surrounding states, conditional on a state’s
socioeconomic conditions (the poverty rate, female unemployment rate, state per capita
personal income, population, governor’s political party, etc.). Equation (1) represents the
typical model,
bi = φ
∑
j 6=i
ωijbj +Xiβ + εi (1)
Here bi represents the benefit level in state i, while bj is the benefit level in all other states
j, where j 6= i. Xi is a matrix of controls for state i, β, its accompanying coefficient vector,
and εi is an error term. The weights, or importance, state i attaches to the benefit levels in
other states make up the ωij vector. Lastly, φ is the parameter representing the slope of the
reaction function. This parameter will take a non-zero value in the presence of strategic
interaction.12
To estimate equation (1) an a priori set of weights that determines the pattern of inter-
action between state i and their neighbor’s must be specified. Consequently, the question
as to which states should be considered neighbors is an important one. In related literatures
investigating strategic tax and expenditure policy setting, “economic” neighbors (which are
not necessarily geographic neighbors) have been defined based criteria such as racial com-
position or income (Case et al. (1993)). However, because welfare migration (or the fear
of welfare migration) is the main factor behind strategic interaction, it is natural to assume
a state will be most concerned with the policies of their geographic neighbors - arguably
more so, than in related literatures when strategic interaction is driven by capital mobility.13
Therefore, my initial weight matrix, WI, is a simple contiguity matrix where each state as-
signs a weight of zero to noncontiguous states (ωij = 0) and equal weights (ωij = 1/ni)
12Strategic interactions can be explained by behaviors such as welfare competition, yardstick competition, or
policy copycatting among states.
13Saavedra (2000) argued that a state will be more fearful of attracting welfare migrants from nearby states
due to both information issues and the fact that migration costs grow with distance.
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to bordering states where ni is the number of states contiguous to i. Because one’s geo-
graphic neighbors remain unchanged, the weights for each state will be time invariant. All
baseline models are estimated with this simple weighting scheme. Weighting schemes in
which a state scales the importance they attribute to neighbors based on population flows
and distance are explored in the sensitivity analysis and discussed therein.
Because benefit levels in different states are believed to be jointly determined, the inclu-
sion of benefit levels on the right side of equation (1) creates an endogeneity problem that
must be addressed in estimation. Common methods include reduced form estimation using
Maximum Likelihood (ML) spatial econometric techniques and an instrumental variable
approach. Past studies of AFDC benefit competition employing the reduced form approach
include Saavedra (2000) and Rom et. al (1998).14 Both author’s estimate versions of what
has become known in the literature as the spatial lag model with some key distinctions.
Specifically, Saavedra’s model is adopted to allow errors to follow a spatially autocorre-
lated process and is applied to several cross sections (1985, 1990, and 1995). Rom et al.
(1998) use a panel of data covering 1976-1994. They include a temporal lag of AFDC
benefits among their control variables in order to address contemporaneously correlated
errors but do not take into account spatial error correlation.15 In both studies, estimates of
φ, the slope of the reaction function are positive and statistically significant. One drawback
with this type of econometric approach is the need to impose restrictions on the reaction
function’s slope parameter.16 Another is the fact the ML spatial methods require the inver-
sion of the spatial weight matrix which can be computationally demanding (Kukenova and
Monteiro (2009), Kelejian and Prucha (1998), Lee (2007)).
14This method requires inverting the model given by (1). Specifically, one takes the matrix form of (1) given
by B = φWB+Xβ+ ε and solves for B which yields the reduced form equation B = (I−φW )−1Xβ+
(I −φW )−1ε. The equation can then be estimated using ML techniques assuming (I −φW ) is invertable.
15Under the reduced form approach, failing to account for spatial error correlation can result in spurious
evidence of welfare competition. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable introduces further econo-
metric issues which are not addressed in Rom et al. (1998) but are in the current paper.
16Consistent and efficient estimation of model parameters with MLE requires the structure of the interaction
given by the product of φ and W in the reduced form model to be nonexplosive. In the usual case, φ must
be less than one in absolute value.
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Figlio et al. (1999) use a two-stage IV approach to investigate the extent of strategic
interaction present among states over the period 1983 to 1994.17 Neighbor’s benefits are
instrumented with the weighted average of a subset of neighbor covariates, a common ap-
proach in the literature. Substantial evidence in favor of strategic benefit setting is found.
Evidence of asymmetric responses to changes in neighbors benefits levels are also found.
Specifically, states appear to respond much stronger when neighbors cut benefits and less so
when they increase them. Evidence of benefit competition has not been limited to the U.S..
Using similar methodologies Dahlberg and Edmark (2008) and Fiva and Rattsø (2006) find
evidence consistent with a race to the bottom in Swedish and Norwegian municipalities
respectively. See Figure 2.4 for details regarding the weighting schemes, data choice, es-
timation technique and findings for these past benefit competition studies. In addition to
the studies included in Figure 2.4, Shroder (1995), Berry et al. (2003), and Bailey and
Rom (2004) also addressed the question of interstate welfare competition using somewhat
different econometric approaches. Of these studies, Bailey and Rom (2004) is the only to
produce strong evidence of strategic welfare competition.
2.3 Estimation Issues
As previously discussed, the welfare competition literature has largely ignored the impor-
tance of dynamics in the determination of welfare policy. In part, this is likely due to the
fact that spatial estimators capable of providing proper econometric treatment to both an
endogenous spatial term and a lagged dependent variable have only recently become avail-
able. Also, some of the initial tests for welfare competition which sought to sign the slope
of the theoretically ambiguous reaction functions were preformed with cross sectional data.
However, because a states welfare policies are likely as much a function of time as they are
of space, a dynamic framework is required to identify the importance of strategic interac-
17While two-stage IV methods may be inefficient relative to ML methods, they have the advantage of being
computationally simpler and avoid strong assumptions on the normality of the error term (Lee (2007)).
Also IV produces results which are robust to the presence of spatial error correlation.
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tion in the determination of state welfare policies.
This analysis implements a dynamic estimator new to the welfare competition litera-
ture. Specifically, I use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator proposed by
Blundell and Bond (1998) that has become increasingly popular in the empirical literature
dealing with spatial dynamic panel models with several endogenous variables.18 I begin
with a basic empirical model of strategic interaction similar to those previously discussed
augmented to include a lagged dependent variable.
Yit = γYit−1 + φ
48∑
i 6=j
ωijtYjt +Xitβ + αi + δt + εit (2)
Here Yit represents each of the six welfare policy instruments under investigation for state i
in time t. Yjt represents these policies in all other states j at time t, where j 6= i. State fixed
effects, time effects, and the i.i.d error term are denoted by αi, δt, and εit respectively. The
importance or weight assigned to state j by state i at time t (j 6= i) is represented by ωijt.
Note that the static model given by equation (1) is embedded within this equation when
γ = 0, or a state’s lagged policies are not included in the model. With the dynamic model
given by (2), one can obtain estimates of strategic policy setting for both the short and long
run. The estimate of strategic policy setting over the short run is given by the coefficient,
φ, while the long run coefficient is calculated using the short-run coefficient and the coef-
ficient on the lagged dependent variable. Specifically, the long run coefficient is equal to
φ
1−γ .
19 Estimates of the short run coefficient, φ, capture the magnitude of a state’s immedi-
ate policy reaction to those of its neighbors while long run coefficients capture the policy
adjustment process. Consequently, differences between the short and long run estimates
18Kukenove and Monteiro (2009) and Jabobs et al. (2009) both consider the extension of the Blundell Bond
(1998) estimator for the estimation of models with spatially lagged dependent variables. Monte Carlo sim-
ulations show the estimator performs well in terms of bias and RMSE and that the system GMM estimator
outperforms the Arrelano and Bond difference estimator. Papers applying the System GMM estimator
to spatial panels include Madariaga and Poncet (2007), Foucault et al. (2008), Wren and Jones (2011),
Bartolini and Santolini (2011), and Neumayer and de Soysa (2011).
19Standard error for the long run coefficient are obtained using Stata’s nlcom command. Calculations are
based on the delta method.
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will be governed by the degree of policy persistence given by the parameter γ.
In order to remove the fixed effects (αi) which are correlated with the covariates and
the lagged dependent variable, equation (3) is first differenced and rewritten as:
∆Yit = γ∆Yit−1 + φ∆
48∑
i 6=j
ωijtYjt + ∆Xitβ + ∆δt + ∆εit (3)
Though the data transformation removes the fixed effects, the lagged dependent variable
remains endogenous since the term Yi,t−1 included in ∆Yit−1 = Yi,t−1 − Yi,t−2 is corre-
lated with the εi,t−1 in ∆εit = εit − εit−1. So too does the neighbor’s jointly determined
policy. Finally, any predetermined covariates in X become potentially endogenous given
that they too may correlate with εi,t−1. Following the GMM procedure, one can instru-
ment endogenous regressors with deeper lags which remain orthogonal to the error. Under
the assumption that error term is not serially correlated, valid moment conditions for the
endogenous variables are given by conditions (4)-(6)
E[Yi,t−τ∆εit] = 0; for t = 3, ...T and 2 ≤ τ ≤ t− 1 (4)
E[Wi,t−τYi,t−τ∆εit] = 0; for t = 3, ...T and 2 ≤ τ ≤ t− 1 (5)
E[Xi,t−τ∆εit] = 0; for t = 3, ...T and 1 ≤ τ ≤ t− 1 (6)
Conditions (4) and (5) restrict the set of instruments for the change in own lagged policy,
∆Yi,t−1, and the change in neighbor’s policy, ∆
∑48
i 6=j ωijtYjt, to levels of their second lags
or earlier. Condition (6) requires predetermined covariates be instruments with their first
lags or earlier. Because lagged levels of variables can be weak instruments when a variable
is highly persistent (as is the case with the welfare variables), the system estimator of
Blundell and Bond (1998) adds the original levels equation given by (2) to the model with
the additional moment conditions:
18
E[∆Yi,t−τεit] = 0; for t = 3, ...T (7)
E[∆Wi,t−τYi,t−τεit] = 0; for t = 3, ...T (8)
E[∆Xi,t−τεit] = 0; for t = 2, ...T (9)
The regression in levels given by equation (2) and the regression in differences given by
(3) are combined into a system and estimated simultaneously with lagged levels serving
as instruments for the difference equation and lagged differences serving as instruments
for the levels equation in accordance with the moment conditions (4)-(9). The model is
estimated in natural logs allowing coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities.
The consistency of the GMM estimator will depend of on the validity of the instruments.
However, under the above moment conditions, the instrument count grows prolifically in
T creating problems in finite samples (Ziliak (1997)).20 To avoid these problems I follow
Kukenova and Monteiro (2009) and Jacobs et al. (2009) and collapse the instruments.21
Collapsed moment conditions differ from the those proposed in Arellano and Bond (1991)
where each moment applies to all available periods rather than a particular time period. For
instance, under this modification the moment condition given by (4) now appears as
E[Yi,t−τ∆εit] = 0; 2 ≤ τ ≤ t− 1 (10)
The new conditions still impose orthogonality, but now the conditions only hold for each τ
rather than for each t and τ. Collapsed instruments can be shown to lead to less biased esti-
mates but their standard errors tend to increase (Roodman (2006)). Two specification tests
are conducted to verify the validity of the chosen instrument set. Specifically, the Hansen
20 The use of too many instruments will over fit an endogenous variable and result in poor estimation of
the optimal weighting matrix. Roodman(2009) notes it is not uncommon for the optimal weight matrix to
become singular and force the use of the generalized inverse.
21Collapsed instruments have also been used in the economic growth literature where dynamic panel models
of a similar cross-sectional and time dimensions are estimated. See for instance Cauldron et. al (2002),
Beck and Levine (2004), and Karcovic and Levine (2005).
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test for over identification is performed to verify instrument validity while the Arellano-
Bond test is performed to verify the the required assumptions on the absence of serial
correlation in the level residuals. The system estimator described above is used to obtain
estimates of φ, the reaction function slope parameter, for each of the six policy instruments
across the full sample period (1983-2008) and the three distant welfare periods - the AFDC
regime, Waiver period, and TANF era.
2.3.1 Allowing for Asymmetrical Policy Responses
The idea that a state may respond differently to the policies of their neighbor’s given their
neighbor’s policy action (i.e. benefit increase versus benefit cut) or their relative position
(relatively generous or relatively stingy) has taken hold in the welfare and more general fis-
cal competition literature (Figlio (1999), Bailey and Rom (2004), Fredriksson and Millimet
(2002)). The premise has a clear intuitive appeal for researchers attempting to disentangle
whether competition or some other competing explanation (yardstick competition, copy-
catting, common intellectual trend) is driving the strategic policy behavior. Under the “race
to the bottom” scenario one could expect a benefit cut by one state to invoke a larger policy
response from neighbors offering relatively more generous benefits than neighbors who al-
ready have a low benefit level. I therefore extend the model to allow for asymmetrical state
responses. Specifically, equation (2) is written as
Yit = γYi,t−1 + φ0Iit
48∑
i 6=j
ωijtYjt + φ1(1− Iit)
48∑
i 6=j
ωijtYjt +Xitβ + αi + δt + εit (11)
where
Iit =
 1 if Yit >
∑
i 6=j ωijtYjt
0 otherwise
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In doing so, I allow states to be differentially impacted by the changing welfare policies
of their neighbor’s conditioning on whether their benefits, tax rates, etc. are above or
below the weighted average of their neighbors. Under this specification, φ0 (φ1) gives the
strategic response of states with welfare policies higher (lower) than the weighted average
of their neighbors. Wald tests are utilized to determine if response asymmetries are present.
Under the null hypothesis, φ0= φ1, state’s respond the same to a neighbor’s policy change
regardless of their relative position. Rejection of the null hypothesis is consistent with
response asymmetries.
2.4 Data
To estimate equations (2) and (11), I assemble a panel of data on state welfare policies,
demographics, and the macro economic and political environment for the years 1983-
2008. For the maximum benefit level I use the state set maximum AFDC (or TANF)
benefit level for a family of three collected from the UKCPR’s welfare database.22 To
obtain state level estimates of the effective benefit guarantees and tax rates, I implement
the reduced-form methodology of Ziliak (2007) which requires the use of administrative
micro caseload data.23 With such data one regresses the actual AFDC/TANF benefit for
recipient i = 1, ...N , in state j = 1, ...J, at time t = 1, ...T on the recipient’s earned in-
come, unearned/transfer income and controls for the number of children. State specific and
time-varying intercepts combined with coefficients on variables indicating the presence
of additional children provide an estimate of the effective benefit guarantee for families
of various sizes. The coefficient on the recipients earned income is used to provide esti-
mates of effective tax rates.24 The caseload data used in constructing these estimates comes
from two different administrative sources. The first is the AFDC Quality Control System
22www.ukcpr.org/AvailableData.aspx
23 I am grateful to Jim Ziliak for providing programs and data which allowed me to replicate and extend his
1983-2002 analysis through 2008.
24A more detailed explanation of the construction of the effective benefit guarantees and tax rates is contained
in the data appendix.
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(AFDC-QC), which covers 1983-1997, and the second is the National TANF Data Sys-
tem (NTDS), which covers 1998-2008.25 Summary statistics for the benefit and tax rate
variables are presented in Table 2.1 for the pooled sample and the three separate welfare
periods. The geographic distribution of benefit levels is illustrated by Figures 2.5 and 2.6
which map the maximum state benefit levels for the AFDC and TANF periods. Looking
at 2.5, the AFDC map, one can see a clear pattern of geographic clustering with the most
generous benefits levels located in the New England and west coast and the least generous
located in the south. Moving to 2.6, the TANF map, one can see the map lighten as more
states join the lower benefit levels.
The final three welfare measures are constructed from data available only for the TANF
period. The first of these is the approval rate which I define as the average monthly num-
ber of applications approved over the average monthly applications received.26 The other
two variables capture state strictness in removing people from the welfare roles. The first,
sanction use, is defined as the percent distribution of TANF closed-case families with cases
closed by sanctions. The final variable, non-sanction state policy, is defined as the per-
cent distribution of TANF case-closed families with cases closed by state-policy. Case
closure data comes from the Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of TANF Recip-
ients database.27 Summary statistics for these variables are presented in Table 2.1. Their
geographic distributions are displayed in figure 2.7-2.9. From the map, one can tell some
states - Idaho, Texas, Florida, Oklahoma, and Maryland, for example - appear very policy
stringent by displaying both low access rates and high sanction use. Other states, New
York, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Oregon, among others, appear more lenient with higher
acceptance rates and very low sanction use.
25The NTDS is called the Emergency TANF Data System for the years 1998 and 1999. See Ziliak (2007) for
a detailed discussion of the micro data and sample selection criterion. The AFDC-QC data and codebooks
for 1983-1997 are available online at http://afdc.urban.org/ while the TANF 1998-2008 data are available
online at http://aspe.hhs.gov/ftp/hsp/tanf-data/index.shtml
26The application data is available online for the years 2000-2010 at www.acf.hhs.gov/program/ofa/data-
reports/caseload/applications/application.htm
27Data available for the years 1998-2009 online at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/character/index.html
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The control variables adopted for this analysis are those commonly found in the em-
pirical literature and are meant to capture aspects of each state’s economic and political
climate as well as characteristics of the low-skill and female labor market. Specifically
I control for population, the African American proportion of the population, the poverty
rate, the female unemployment rate, median wage, employment per capita, and an indica-
tor for a democratic governor. The African American proportion of the population, median
wage, and female unemployment rate are constructed from the Current Population Survey
(CPS).28 The remaining variables come from the UKCPR’s welfare database. All variables
are measured in 2007 dollars. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.1.
2.5 Results
All models are estimated in both a static and dynamic framework. I begin by presenting
the results for the benefit and tax rate variables over the full 1983-2008 period and then
the three separate welfare periods - AFDC, waiver, and TANF. Results for the remaining
variables (access, sanctions, and non sanction state policy) are reported separately as they
span a different time period (2000-2008). I report models with and without allowing for
response asymmetries. WYp denotes the spatial coefficient in the model without asym-
metries, where different policy instruments are indexed by p. For the model including
asymmetries, WYp(Iit) denotes the spatial coefficient for states with benefits, tax rates, etc.
greater than their neighbors on average, while WYp(1−Iit) is the response of states setting
these policies lower than their neighbors on average. Wald tests are presented to indicate
whether or not response asymmetries are present. Hansen tests for over identification are
presented for all models and consistently fail to reject the null of valid instruments. The
Arellono-Bond tests for serial correlation and instrument counts are also reported.
The baseline models use the main contiguity weight matrix, WI. Endogenous spatial
variables are instrumented with their second through fourth lags collapsed in all initial
28To address the fact that samples sizes can be limited for subpopulations in smaller states, these variables
are constructed as three-year moving averages.
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models while controls are treated as predetermined and instrumented with their first lag
collapse.29 Estimates of control variables are suppressed for ease of presentation. Full
results are available upon request.
2.5.1 Static Results
Table 2.2 presents the full period analysis. Evidence of strategic state policy setting is
found across all benefit and tax rate variables for the 1983-2008 period. Estimates of the
different spatial coefficients are both economically and statistically significant. The mag-
nitude of strategic behavior appears to be largest for the maximum and effective benefit
levels. Estimates suggest that states respond to a 10 percent cut in the average benefit level
of the their neighbors with an own cut of around 9.3 percent. When allowing for asymmet-
ric responses, I find states are slightly more responsive to cuts in neighbors benefits when
their own benefit level is above the weighted average of their neighbors.30 Though not
conclusive evidence, the finding of asymmetries suggests the strategic interaction found is
likely due to competitive behavior rather than other phenomenons noted in the literature
(yardstick competition, copy-catting, common intellectual trend) or some geographically
correlated omitted variable. Or, as stated by Figlio et. al (1999), it appears that “states are
more concerned about being left-ahead in welfare benefit levels than they are about being
left behind.” Strategic policy setting over the effective benefit level is also detected and
indicates states respond to a 10 percent cut in neighbor effective benefits with an own cut
of 7.5 percent Evidence of competition over the effective benefit suggests states could be
strategically using polices such as family caps, partial sanctions, and financial incentives
to keep the actual benefits they pay in line with their neighbors. This finding implies there
29Estimates are robust to the use of multiple lag structures (see sensitivity analysis located in appendix).
30Asymmetry results for the benefit level variables do not produce much of a differential affect and are
therefore not of much interest. However, more important asymmetries are detected for the remaining policy
instruments. It is also worth noting that while one might expect the main estimate of the spatial coefficient
to provide a upper bound (or lower bound) for states below the mean (above the mean), this is not always
the case or required econometrically given the time varying nature of whether a state falls above or below
the mean.
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may exist competition over the benefit base as well as the level. Moving onto the tax rate
results, I find that a 10 percent cut in the effective tax rate on earned income by states’
neighbors is met with an own state reduction of approximately 8 percent.
Interestingly, the asymmetrical responses to neighbors’ effective tax rates on earnings
are much larger and economically important than those found for benefits. While at first
one might suspect states engaged in competition would increase effective tax rates in order
to reduce overall generosity, this is not necessarily the case.31 Cuts in the effective tax
rates coinciding with falling benefits would not do much to increase overall state welfare
generosity (especially if one was not working or receiving non-labor income). Instead, one
should view the falling effective tax rates on earned income as use of ‘carrot’ policies by
states to lure recipients to the labor market and eventually off welfare. In some sense, the
results suggest states are ‘racing to force recipients back to work’. A state that finds itself
employing an effective tax rate on earned income greater on average than its neighbors, will
match a 10 percent cut in neighbors benefits with a own cut of roughly 9 percent. However,
if that same state was instead employing an effective tax rate lower than its neighbors, it
will only match a 10 percent cut with and own cut of 6.7 percent. Put another way, while
states may ‘race along’ with their neighbors in promoting work, they slow at the prospect
of leading this race or being overly generous.
Table 2.3 and 2.4 present results for the three separate welfare regimes. While the full
period analysis established evidence of competitive behavior, results produced for this pe-
riod could mask changes in state behavior occurring after the onset of the waiver period or
the 1996 structural shift in the welfare system. For both benefit variables, evidence of com-
petition is found across all three periods. Point estimates suggest benefit competition grew
stronger over waiver and TANF periods. For instance, during the AFDC regime, estimates
suggest states respond to a 10 percent cut in the maximum benefit level of their neighbor’s
with an own cut of nearly 7 percent. This magnitude increases to roughly 9.5 percent , and
31 Falling effective tax rates appears to be the dominant trend in the data making a discussion of “race to the
bottom” under this scenario more useful.
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8.7 percent for the waiver and TANF periods, respectively. However, when coefficients are
tested for equality across periods, I fail to find evidence that they are statistically different
from one another. Interestingly, when asymmetries are included, evidence of asymmetrical
responses for the maximum benefit level is only found during the TANF era. The effective
benefit displays a very similar pattern with asymmetrical responses detected in both the
waiver and TANF regimes. With the effective tax rate on earned income, evidence of com-
petition is only found for the AFDC and TANF era. The finding that states implemented
very similar tax rates to those of their neighbors under AFDC is perhaps unsurprising given
that all states were subject to the same statutory tax rates under this regime. Differentials in
state effective tax rates arose primarily due the differences in sources and levels of income
disregards permitted by each state. With the onset of the waiver period, states began to
experiment by altering their statutory rates and offering further financial incentives. The
estimate of strategic policy setting for this period suggests that they did so at first without
paying much attention to the policies of bordering states. However under TANF it appears
state’s did strategically set policies impacting their effective tax rates. Furthermore, the
evidence of important asymmetrical responses are only found for the TANF era. These
finding suggests several things. First, my previous findings of behavioral asymmetries for
the full period were most likely driven by the waiver and TANF periods. Second, after
welfare reform, states appear to place more importance on their relative position to their
neighbors as one might expect if competition was intensifying.
Table 2.5 presents the results for the final three welfare variables - ease of access, sanc-
tion use, and non-sanction state policy. Again, these variables are meant to proxy policy
dimensions not captured by the four main policy instruments and are only analyzed for
the TANF period. States appear to exhibit strong behavioral responses to their neighbors’
approval rates or ‘ease of access’ to welfare benefits. Specifically, in the model without
asymmetrical responses, it appears a state reacts to a 10 percent cut in the weighted aver-
age of their neighbors approval rate with an own cut of nearly 8 percent. Setting restrictive
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access policy could prove ideal for policy makers wishing to offer relatively generous ben-
efits to the worst off without attracting migration. In fact, the inclusion of asymmetries into
the model reveals the finding that states already offering more restrictive access relative to
their neighbors’ respond much stronger to changes in neighbor’s policy. The magnitude of
the spatial coefficient for states offering relatively more restrictive access is actually double
that of the spatial coefficient for their less restrictive counterparts. In other words, if com-
petition is in fact the force behind this strategic behavior, then states choosing to compete
through access compete fiercely. The same asymmetry story holds for the sanction and
non-sanction state policy variables. This finding is different from the behavior observed
over the first four variables. The race to the bottom story consistent with those results was
one in which states behave strategically with the goal of keeping their policies in line with
those of their neighbors rather that attempting to surge ahead. For the later three variables
this is not the case.
2.5.2 Dynamic Results
Table 2.6 presents the results for the full period dynamic specification. As one would
expect, the lagged dependent variables are highly significant across all policy instruments.
Furthermore, they appear to be a principle factor determining a state’s policy for the current
year. In fact, once controlling for last year’s maximum benefit level, all evidence of strate-
gic responses to neighbor policy for this variable disappears (at least for the time frame in
question). An explanation for the stark contrast between static and dynamic results is sim-
ply that in the case of the maximum benefit level, neighbors benefits are serving as a proxy
for own state benefit level. Once controlling for state dependence, neighbors’ benefits no
longer appear important or, put another way, it no longer appears that states are setting their
maximum benefit level strategically. Strategic behavior over the effective benefit level and
effective tax rate on earned income remains in the dynamic framework though the spatial
coefficients are now reduced in magnitude. The short run effect of a 10 percent cut in the
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average effective benefit levels of neighboring states leads to an own state reduction of 2.3
percent. In the long run however, this responsiveness grows to nearly 8 percent. For the
effective tax rate, the short run response to a ten percent cut by neighbors is an own cut
around three percent while the estimated long run coefficient is approximately six percent.
Strong evidence of asymmetries are again detected for both the effective benefit variable
and tax rate offering further evidence of competition. Figure 2.10 illustrates the dynamic
results for both the statutory maximum benefit variable and effective benefit variable by
plotting their short run versus long run reaction functions.32
Analyzing the three welfare periods separately reveals further evidence of important
strategic interaction as well as several interesting patterns. Table 2.7 presents the results for
the benefit variables, and 2.8, the results for the effective tax rate. For the maximum benefit
guarantee, statistically significant spatial coefficients are only found in the TANF era (and
only for the model including asymmetrical responses). However, evidence of strategic
interaction does presents in the long run estimates for all three periods suggesting that states
may not have set benefit policy simultaneously but they did adjust benefits based upon their
neighbors’ policies over time. Furthermore, the long run coefficients grow larger across the
different periods displaying the same pattern detected in static estimates. Another clear
pattern is the growing persistence is state welfare policies. The coefficient on last year’s
benefits hovered around .7 percent during the AFDC period and then increased to over .9
percent in the TANF regime. Strategic behavior in setting the effective benefit level is more
apparent. Though statistically significant spatial coefficients are not found until the TANF
period, evidence of strategic behavior over a longer run as well as asymmetrical responses
manifest in both the waiver and TANF periods.33Taken together these findings suggest the
32The predicted benefit levels plotted in the figure are created using the parameters obtained from the static
and dynamic models controlling for mean values of the control variables.
33The long run coefficients obtained in the TANF period are greater than one indicating an explosive pattern
of interaction. This could be taken as evidence of a non-stable equilibrium. Spatial coefficients in excess of
one have not been uncommon is the welfare competition literature (See figure 2.4). However, stationarity
for spatial dynamic panels requires |α| ≤ 1 − φWmax if φ ≥ 0 or that the sum of the spatially and
temporally lagged dependent variable is < 1 and thus estimates should be viewed with caution.
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intensity of strategic behavior over the maximum and effective benefit level grows when
moving ahead to the post reform period.
For the effective tax rate, I again find evidence of strategic behavior in both the AFDC
and TANF periods but not during the waiver era. Asymmetries are also detected in the
periods where strategic behavior occurred and appear to be of clear economic importance
during TANF. Specifically, when failing to allow for asymmetrical responses one finds a
state responds to a ten percent cut in the average effective tax rate of neighbors with an
own cut of 1.2 percent. However, once asymmetries are modeled it appears this behavior
occurs mainly among states offering relatively higher tax rates on earned income. These
states will match a ten percent cut in neighbors benefits with and own reduction of over
five percent while states already offering lower than average tax rates appear unresponsive.
This suggests states are strategically manipulating policy parameters used to provide better
work incentives. The persistence in the effective tax rates implement by states also appears
to be increasing across the periods.
Lastly, Table 2.9 presents the results for the remaining three variables. Evidence of
strategic policy setting over these variables does not appear robust to the inclusion of dy-
namics for the main models. Instead, own state policies last year appear to be the dominant
factor in determining current policies. Both the approval rate and sanction use appear to
be highly persistent as seen by their sizable coefficients on the lagged dependent variables.
However, as before, some evidence is present in the asymmetry models. Here, both sanc-
tion use and non-sanction state policy continues to exhibit evidence of short-run strategic
policy setting once dynamics are incorporated. Overall results for these models parallel
those found in the static analysis again suggesting that states already ahead of their neigh-
bors on average in the use of sanctions and non-sanction state policy are the most responsive
to neighbor policy changes.
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2.6 Sensitivity Analysis
This section presents the results of several sensitivity analyses to explore the robustness of
baseline results. Specifically I investigate the sensitivity of the estimation results to the (i)
specification of alternative weighting schemes and (ii) additional dynamic considerations.
2.6.1 Alternative Weighting Schemes
I compare baseline estimates that used contiguous states as neighbors with those obtained
from several additional weighting schemes based on migration flows and distance. The first
of these, WMig, assigns each state a weight of ωij = mij/
∑
imij where mij is the number
of migrants to state i that resided in state j five years ago. When constructing this matrix, I
used 1980 census data (on 1975 to 1980 population flows) to avoid introducing endogeneity
into the weighting scheme. W Pov Mig, and WEdu Mig are constructed in the same manner
but restricting the migration flows to the population under twice the poverty line and the
population with less than a high school education, respectively. For illustration, Figure 2.11
shows the weight matrix constructed from the migration flows of the population under twice
the poverty line. The vertical column of state names represents the destination state while
the top row across represents the state where the migrant previously resided.The matrix is
row normalized so that each row sums to one. Reading across the first row, for example,
demonstrates that under one percent of migrants to Alabama came from Arizona while
roughly fifteen percent came from Florida, and eleven percent from Georgia. I estimate
models using both a restricted form of these weighting schemes where a state continues to
only consider its contiguous neighbors, and an unrestricted form where all states are given
weight as long as mij 6= 0. A final weight matrix, WDist, is a distance matrix. Here, the
off-diagonal elements ωij are equal to (1/dij)/
∑
j∈Ji(1/djk) where dij is the distance in
kilometers between state centroids if dij is less than 1000 kilometer and zero otherwise.
Under this scheme states consider the policies of a wider set of geographic neighbors. For
simplicity I focus on the three main variables over the full 1983-2008 period. Results for
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both the static and dynamic models are presented in Table 2.10.
Overall, results for both the static and dynamic models appear robust to different mi-
gration based contiguity weighting schemes. For instance, moving from the contiguity
weighting scheme to the migration or poverty based migration contiguity weighting scheme
reduces the spatial coefficient on the maximum benefit from .926 to approximately .86, or
roughly 7 percent. However, once one extends the “neighborhood” to include all states,
little evidence of competition remains – especially for the benefit level variables. For the
most part, spatial coefficients are reduced in magnitude and lose statistical significance
suggesting states are most responsive to the maximum benefit levels set by their immediate
neighbors. These results are consistent with neighboring states engaged in strategic policy
setting rather than states simply following a regional or national trend. Interestingly, the
effective tax rate does continue to display some evidence of strategic interaction under the
unrestricted weighting schemes.
2.6.2 Additional Dynamics
In the standard empirical models of fiscal competition, governments set policies based on
those being simultaneously set by their neighbors. However, it is very possible that it takes
time for states to learn about and respond to changes in their neighbor’s policies. If this is
indeed the case, then we might observe states strategically setting policies based on those
of their neighbors in period t-1 rather than period t. The short and long run coefficients
estimated under the previous dynamic specifications provide us a better understating of the
magnitude of the immediate response versus the longer run response that captures these
policy adjustments. However, by including additional lags of neighbor’s policies in the
reaction function, we can gain further insight into the timing state policy responses.
Here I perform I perform two additional analyses incorporating state responses to neigh-
bor’s past policies. In the first, I begin with the static model but replace neighbor’s policy,∑48
i 6=j ωijYjt, with neighbor’s policy in t-1,
∑48
i 6=j ωijYjt−1. Results are shown in Table 2.11
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which compares which compares baseline estimates of a state’s response to their neigh-
bor’s concurrent policies (lag 0) with their estimated response to neighbor’s policy in t-1
(lag 1).34
Second, I modify the dynamic specification to include additional lags of neighbor’s
policy. Equation (12) shown below augments equation (4) by including neighbors policy
last year.35 The inclusion of additional spatial lags can capture the delayed response of
states to their neighbor’s policy changes.
∆Yit = γ∆Yit−1 + φ0∆
48∑
i 6=j
ωijtYjt + φ1∆
48∑
i 6=j
ωijtYjt−1 + ∆Xitβ + ∆δt + ∆εit (12)
Table 2.11 contains the static estimation results. Coefficients on neighbor’s policy in
t-1 are smaller than coefficients on concurrent policies (by roughly twenty percent in the
case of the maximum benefit level and less than five percent for the effective benefit and
tax rate). Table 2.12 contains the dynamic estimation results. For each variable, the first
column contains the base line results while the second column contains the results when
neighbor’s concurrent policy is replaced with neighbor’s policy in t-1. The third column
contains results when both concurrent and lagged neighbor policy are included together.
I again find significant evidence of strategic policy setting for both the effective benefit
level and the effective tax rate on earned income. Results are very similar when concur-
rent policy is replaced with lagged policy. For the model with neighbor’s policy in both
period t and t-1, the inclusion of addition spatial lags tend to increase the spatial coefficient
on neighbors concurrent benefit level while the additional spatial lag terms are negative –
suggestive of a policy adjustment process taking place over several periods. The calcu-
lated long run coefficients remain consistent with those produced by the baseline models.
34As in the case with the lagged dependent variable, neighbor’s policy in period t-1 remains correlated with
the error term and is therefore instrumented in the same manner.
35Long run coefficients are now calculated as φ0+φ11−γ .
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Thus, the inclusion of additional dynamics does not alter conclusions drawn from previous
results.
2.7 Conclusion
Using a new spatial econometric approach, this analysis has examined interstate welfare
competition over the old AFDC regime, the waiver period, and the first decade of the new
TANF era. The estimates suggest that interstate competition was present across all three pe-
riods and strongest during the waiver and TANF periods. Long run estimates, which allow
for states to adjust to their neighbor’s policies over time, are also largest in the waiver and
TANF era consistent with a race to the bottom after welfare reform. The results obtained for
the effective benefit level and tax rate suggest strategic policy setting occurs in both the ben-
efit level and base. Moreover, response asymmetries indicate states appear more concerned
about being relatively generous than relatively stingy when compared with neighbor’s in
the provision of benefits and work incentives. Lastly, estimates for the approval rate, sanc-
tion use, and non-sanction state policy imply states also strategically set policies affecting
the extensive margin of program generosity. Interestingly, response asymmetries found for
the approval rate, sanction use, and non-sanction state policy indicate states competing on
these margins may want to be leaders in the “race to the bottom” rather than just staying
in line with neighbor’s as was the case with the effective benefit and tax rate. Together,
the sizable spatial coefficient found in the static analysis and the long run coefficients pro-
duced from the dynamic specifications suggest strategic policy setting was an important
factor behind downward trends in welfare generosity.
The fact that states appear highly responsive to the welfare policies of their neighbors
may pose cause for concern in today’s fiscal climate. Motivated by looming budgetary
problems, many states have had to enact deep cuts in their welfare programs. According to
a report produced by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, in 2011 alone at least five
states including California, Washington, New Mexico, South Carolina, and the District of
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Columbia cut their monthly benefit levels in a substantial way.36 For instance, Washington’s
monthly benefit for a family of three was slashed by $84 dollars while South Carolina’s
dropped by twenty percent to $217 - an amount corresponding to only fourteen percent
of the federal poverty line. At the same time, multiple states adopted shorter or more
restrictive time limits and cut financial work incentives. California, for instance, cut its
time limit from sixty to forty-eight months and reduced their $225 earning’s disregard to
$112. Michigan tightened its time limit and scaled back its refundable EITC (partially
funded by TANF) from twenty percent of the federal credit to only six percent. Results
from the empirical analysis are consistent with states strategically responding to policy
changes such as these suggesting we may see a continued reduction in the generosity of
state welfare programs.
36Schott and Pavetti (2011)
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Figure 2.4 Survey of  Welfare Competition Empirical Strategies 
Author 
(Date) 
Data/years Dependent Variable Main 
Weight 
Matrix 
Model/Estimation technique Spatial 
Coefficient 
Estimates (ρ)  
Dahlberg & Edmark 
(2008) 
281 Swedish 
Municipalities  
1989-1994 
Benefit Expenditure per 
recipient 
contiguity 𝐵𝑡 =  𝜌𝑊𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛿𝑊𝑋𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡  ; IV 
 
.648-1.519 
Figlio et. al  (1999) Continental U.S. 
1983-1994 
Combined maximum 
AFDC and Food Stamp 
benefit for family of 3 
Based on 
state to state 
migration 
flows 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝜌𝛥𝑊𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝛥𝑋𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡        & 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝜌𝛥𝑊𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝛥𝑋𝑡 + 𝜌𝛥𝑊𝐵𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ; 
IV 
.904-1.314 
Fiva & Rattso  (2006) 433 Norwegian 
Municipalities in 1998 
Expected welfare benefit 
of standardized recipient, 
benefit norm for 1  
contiguity   𝐵𝑡 = 𝜌𝑊𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡  ; 
 IV & reduced form 
 
.36-.81 
Saavedra (2000) Continental U.S. 
1985, 1990, 1995 – 
separate cross section & 
pooled 
Maximum AFDC benefit 
for family of 3 
contiguity 𝐵𝑡 = 𝜌𝑊𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡  ;  
reduced form 
 
.21-1.35 
Rom et. al 
(1998) 
Continental U.S. 
1976-1994 
Maximum AFDC benefit 
for family of 4 
contiguity 𝐵𝑡 = 𝜌𝑊𝐵𝑡 + 𝛾𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ; reduced 
form 
.274 
  Table notes: All reported coefficients are statistically significant at 90% confidence level. 
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Figure 2.5 Maximum Benefit for a Family of 3 under AFDC 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Maximum Benefit for a Family of 3 under TANF 
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Figure 2.7 Acceptance Rate (2000-2008) 
 
 
Figure 2.8 Percent Distribution of Cases Closed by Sanction (2000-2008) 
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Figure 2.9 Percent Distribution of Cases Closed by Non-Federal Non-Sanction Policy (2000-2008) 
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Figure 2.11 Poverty Migration Based  Weight Matrix (Unrestricted Distance Version)
AL AZ AR CA CO CT DE FL GA ID IL IN IA KS KY LA ME
AL 0.000 0.009 0.015 0.070 0.015 0.009 0.004 0.146 0.114 0.000 0.026 0.023 0.008 0.010 0.023 0.046 0.003
AZ 0.005 0.000 0.027 0.241 0.047 0.001 0.000 0.031 0.010 0.017 0.023 0.018 0.012 0.020 0.007 0.013 0.003
AR 0.008 0.017 0.000 0.077 0.013 0.000 0.001 0.050 0.021 0.000 0.042 0.017 0.012 0.024 0.007 0.060 0.001
CA 0.009 0.069 0.023 0.000 0.042 0.004 0.001 0.038 0.008 0.030 0.026 0.011 0.010 0.017 0.007 0.015 0.003
CO 0.006 0.065 0.015 0.122 0.000 0.006 0.002 0.026 0.014 0.019 0.035 0.013 0.014 0.041 0.005 0.008 0.006
CT 0.008 0.027 0.006 0.091 0.020 0.000 0.007 0.166 0.015 0.006 0.013 0.013 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.037
DE 0.000 0.028 0.006 0.050 0.028 0.028 0.000 0.133 0.028 0.006 0.044 0.011 0.000 0.006 0.011 0.011 0.006
FL 0.050 0.017 0.011 0.075 0.016 0.008 0.005 0.000 0.114 0.003 0.027 0.030 0.004 0.005 0.021 0.017 0.008
GA 0.101 0.010 0.011 0.048 0.015 0.002 0.002 0.196 0.000 0.002 0.020 0.012 0.003 0.005 0.021 0.020 0.001
ID 0.005 0.030 0.005 0.121 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000
IL 0.014 0.051 0.031 0.116 0.027 0.003 0.000 0.113 0.020 0.003 0.000 0.049 0.032 0.008 0.022 0.014 0.001
IN 0.016 0.044 0.015 0.076 0.021 0.002 0.000 0.148 0.021 0.002 0.094 0.000 0.005 0.013 0.085 0.006 0.002
IA 0.004 0.041 0.029 0.083 0.059 0.004 0.000 0.040 0.010 0.003 0.074 0.016 0.000 0.027 0.008 0.005 0.000
KS 0.007 0.031 0.034 0.080 0.066 0.005 0.000 0.025 0.009 0.005 0.022 0.019 0.022 0.000 0.011 0.009 0.000
KY 0.022 0.012 0.008 0.066 0.014 0.002 0.001 0.097 0.029 0.001 0.046 0.128 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.012 0.005
LA 0.036 0.010 0.028 0.114 0.018 0.001 0.000 0.065 0.025 0.001 0.025 0.015 0.003 0.014 0.010 0.000 0.001
ME 0.013 0.032 0.003 0.073 0.019 0.029 0.006 0.099 0.013 0.000 0.022 0.013 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.000
MD 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.070 0.013 0.015 0.036 0.120 0.025 0.000 0.014 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.012 0.007
MA 0.007 0.025 0.001 0.114 0.018 0.041 0.005 0.148 0.017 0.001 0.012 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.058
MI 0.023 0.047 0.019 0.118 0.027 0.005 0.001 0.147 0.028 0.006 0.045 0.050 0.007 0.004 0.026 0.008 0.001
MN 0.002 0.054 0.006 0.105 0.047 0.002 0.000 0.042 0.008 0.010 0.038 0.010 0.053 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.002
MS 0.066 0.009 0.032 0.063 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.069 0.021 0.001 0.093 0.013 0.003 0.009 0.013 0.110 0.003
MO 0.007 0.029 0.065 0.099 0.035 0.002 0.000 0.048 0.014 0.008 0.107 0.020 0.034 0.101 0.009 0.015 0.001
MT 0.007 0.050 0.013 0.089 0.079 0.003 0.000 0.017 0.007 0.053 0.013 0.000 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.003 0.000
NE 0.006 0.030 0.026 0.110 0.119 0.004 0.000 0.026 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.134 0.087 0.002 0.013 0.006
NV 0.003 0.038 0.013 0.373 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.003 0.060 0.013 0.005 0.015 0.008 0.003 0.015 0.005
NH 0.010 0.022 0.000 0.051 0.013 0.041 0.003 0.121 0.016 0.010 0.006 0.000 0.003 0.016 0.003 0.010 0.105
NJ 0.007 0.023 0.002 0.086 0.012 0.022 0.010 0.212 0.025 0.003 0.012 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.008 0.012
NM 0.004 0.081 0.015 0.132 0.083 0.002 0.000 0.023 0.009 0.013 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.019 0.015 0.013 0.006
NY 0.012 0.028 0.003 0.120 0.023 0.030 0.003 0.243 0.026 0.002 0.015 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.005
NC 0.025 0.014 0.009 0.064 0.012 0.008 0.002 0.112 0.084 0.002 0.018 0.011 0.005 0.008 0.015 0.012 0.005
ND 0.004 0.033 0.000 0.083 0.046 0.008 0.004 0.042 0.025 0.025 0.013 0.008 0.017 0.025 0.000 0.013 0.000
OH 0.016 0.043 0.008 0.084 0.023 0.005 0.002 0.185 0.025 0.003 0.036 0.050 0.004 0.007 0.073 0.009 0.003
OK 0.015 0.024 0.078 0.099 0.053 0.001 0.000 0.020 0.018 0.006 0.018 0.006 0.010 0.068 0.015 0.018 0.005
OR 0.000 0.043 0.013 0.273 0.032 0.000 0.001 0.018 0.005 0.071 0.014 0.012 0.016 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.001
PA 0.009 0.024 0.003 0.090 0.020 0.012 0.023 0.154 0.019 0.000 0.018 0.013 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.006
RI 0.007 0.011 0.000 0.092 0.028 0.043 0.000 0.106 0.018 0.004 0.025 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.043
SC 0.023 0.012 0.008 0.059 0.005 0.009 0.001 0.095 0.122 0.005 0.016 0.013 0.005 0.004 0.013 0.016 0.004
SD 0.004 0.052 0.008 0.104 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.004 0.016 0.012 0.008 0.056 0.028 0.004 0.000 0.000
TN 0.056 0.012 0.036 0.065 0.013 0.002 0.002 0.094 0.107 0.000 0.036 0.029 0.002 0.011 0.061 0.023 0.002
TX 0.020 0.024 0.054 0.174 0.042 0.007 0.001 0.051 0.023 0.007 0.026 0.018 0.008 0.025 0.013 0.071 0.003
UT 0.003 0.079 0.003 0.223 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.005 0.092 0.015 0.010 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.010 0.005
VT 0.005 0.016 0.000 0.064 0.032 0.027 0.000 0.181 0.005 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.016 0.053
VA 0.016 0.011 0.005 0.078 0.014 0.011 0.007 0.100 0.040 0.003 0.019 0.013 0.003 0.006 0.018 0.008 0.006
WA 0.007 0.047 0.008 0.217 0.022 0.003 0.002 0.025 0.006 0.066 0.021 0.006 0.004 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.001
WV 0.021 0.019 0.006 0.045 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.117 0.028 0.000 0.019 0.023 0.004 0.004 0.049 0.004 0.000
WI 0.007 0.044 0.012 0.121 0.030 0.002 0.000 0.080 0.008 0.008 0.102 0.022 0.031 0.012 0.001 0.006 0.001
WY 0.008 0.037 0.012 0.091 0.156 0.004 0.000 0.021 0.004 0.049 0.021 0.008 0.021 0.008 0.004 0.016 0.008
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MD MA MI MN MS MO MT NE NV NH NJ NM NY NC ND OH OK OR PA RI SC
0.005 0.003 0.036 0.001 0.073 0.012 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.022 0.024 0.000 0.032 0.013 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.028
0.004 0.007 0.022 0.013 0.004 0.026 0.004 0.007 0.026 0.004 0.005 0.037 0.021 0.016 0.003 0.029 0.025 0.032 0.017 0.002 0.004
0.005 0.003 0.036 0.005 0.037 0.093 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.016 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.016 0.110 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.007
0.007 0.012 0.018 0.014 0.006 0.028 0.013 0.010 0.047 0.002 0.008 0.022 0.029 0.016 0.004 0.018 0.034 0.102 0.020 0.002 0.006
0.005 0.004 0.026 0.019 0.005 0.040 0.019 0.032 0.013 0.002 0.008 0.045 0.021 0.011 0.010 0.016 0.043 0.034 0.008 0.000 0.006
0.011 0.115 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.027 0.022 0.007 0.113 0.043 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.007 0.029 0.031 0.019
0.139 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.028 0.011 0.000 0.011 0.017 0.011 0.161 0.006 0.022
0.016 0.020 0.033 0.007 0.017 0.013 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.026 0.007 0.066 0.058 0.003 0.046 0.011 0.007 0.027 0.003 0.030
0.015 0.008 0.017 0.005 0.017 0.016 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.013 0.005 0.034 0.056 0.004 0.020 0.010 0.004 0.017 0.001 0.056
0.002 0.002 0.014 0.009 0.000 0.014 0.046 0.007 0.027 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.014 0.117 0.002 0.000 0.009
0.002 0.009 0.043 0.020 0.023 0.058 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.009 0.020 0.012 0.001 0.019 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.001 0.006
0.008 0.007 0.060 0.008 0.008 0.021 0.002 0.007 0.008 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.019 0.017 0.006 0.060 0.013 0.008 0.016 0.001 0.011
0.005 0.004 0.012 0.079 0.001 0.107 0.007 0.086 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.018 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.014 0.018 0.022 0.007 0.000 0.004
0.005 0.005 0.009 0.010 0.005 0.188 0.006 0.036 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.015 0.007 0.004 0.011 0.120 0.017 0.005 0.002 0.009
0.006 0.004 0.036 0.006 0.011 0.020 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.020 0.040 0.001 0.150 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.000 0.009
0.007 0.004 0.010 0.008 0.131 0.014 0.006 0.006 0.015 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.010 0.019 0.001 0.010 0.026 0.007 0.010 0.001 0.010
0.006 0.089 0.013 0.010 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.131 0.010 0.019 0.057 0.019 0.003 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.029 0.019 0.016
0.000 0.025 0.015 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.015 0.008 0.035 0.065 0.000 0.018 0.009 0.010 0.100 0.005 0.023
0.015 0.000 0.015 0.009 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.110 0.017 0.006 0.102 0.019 0.001 0.017 0.003 0.008 0.025 0.032 0.007
0.005 0.009 0.000 0.008 0.013 0.021 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.008 0.028 0.022 0.003 0.062 0.008 0.013 0.019 0.001 0.009
0.002 0.011 0.022 0.000 0.003 0.017 0.026 0.013 0.011 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.016 0.005 0.088 0.016 0.021 0.021 0.005 0.002 0.007
0.007 0.003 0.040 0.006 0.000 0.025 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.012 0.019 0.001 0.025 0.015 0.004 0.013 0.001 0.010
0.002 0.004 0.021 0.011 0.013 0.000 0.005 0.017 0.011 0.001 0.004 0.014 0.013 0.008 0.003 0.016 0.068 0.015 0.008 0.000 0.005
0.007 0.003 0.010 0.046 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.026 0.013 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.017 0.010 0.043 0.007 0.017 0.076 0.010 0.000 0.003
0.002 0.006 0.009 0.022 0.009 0.043 0.017 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.011 0.009 0.006 0.011 0.032 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.004
0.000 0.003 0.010 0.013 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.000 0.013 0.018 0.070 0.008 0.003 0.003
0.006 0.220 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.019 0.000 0.010 0.003 0.045 0.019 0.003 0.010 0.006 0.019 0.010 0.016 0.003
0.023 0.033 0.011 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.130 0.038 0.000 0.020 0.003 0.005 0.124 0.007 0.017
0.000 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.019 0.004 0.006 0.011 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.038 0.013 0.011 0.000 0.004
0.018 0.046 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.007 0.077 0.007 0.000 0.036 0.002 0.021 0.006 0.004 0.058 0.007 0.023
0.024 0.011 0.018 0.003 0.013 0.014 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.023 0.008 0.051 0.000 0.001 0.029 0.009 0.003 0.035 0.004 0.103
0.000 0.004 0.000 0.267 0.013 0.021 0.063 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.013 0.021 0.000 0.017 0.025 0.029 0.004 0.000 0.008
0.012 0.008 0.045 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.022 0.024 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.008 0.038 0.000 0.016
0.003 0.000 0.006 0.004 0.010 0.059 0.003 0.010 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.018 0.013 0.008 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.021 0.011 0.000 0.008
0.000 0.007 0.014 0.012 0.003 0.013 0.018 0.011 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.013 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.016 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.001
0.039 0.022 0.022 0.003 0.002 0.012 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.006 0.103 0.006 0.080 0.027 0.004 0.065 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.021
0.011 0.213 0.011 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.011 0.028 0.014 0.004 0.092 0.025 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.032 0.000 0.011
0.019 0.009 0.015 0.003 0.013 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.028 0.005 0.047 0.163 0.003 0.028 0.011 0.003 0.028 0.003 0.000
0.004 0.008 0.008 0.124 0.004 0.012 0.028 0.080 0.012 0.012 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.072 0.008 0.016 0.032 0.004 0.000 0.000
0.007 0.007 0.025 0.005 0.070 0.022 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.019 0.041 0.002 0.041 0.015 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.023
0.006 0.007 0.018 0.010 0.009 0.025 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.045 0.016 0.021 0.005 0.019 0.092 0.018 0.011 0.002 0.012
0.000 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.003 0.026 0.033 0.005 0.036 0.003 0.013 0.036 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.010 0.018 0.054 0.005 0.000 0.003
0.005 0.085 0.011 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.117 0.000 0.005 0.160 0.011 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.005 0.021 0.005 0.005
0.067 0.018 0.014 0.003 0.009 0.016 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.019 0.009 0.041 0.119 0.003 0.030 0.009 0.005 0.052 0.008 0.025
0.007 0.010 0.019 0.012 0.002 0.020 0.037 0.006 0.012 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.019 0.010 0.006 0.014 0.021 0.197 0.008 0.001 0.008
0.032 0.002 0.015 0.000 0.006 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.015 0.034 0.000 0.211 0.013 0.002 0.060 0.000 0.023
0.008 0.009 0.057 0.122 0.013 0.026 0.009 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.015 0.019 0.016 0.009 0.022 0.014 0.014 0.009 0.002 0.005
0.008 0.000 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.016 0.049 0.025 0.021 0.012 0.008 0.021 0.008 0.012 0.000 0.004 0.025 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000
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SD TN TX UT VT VA WA WV WI WY
0.001 0.074 0.078 0.004 0.000 0.023 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.001
0.007 0.003 0.092 0.044 0.003 0.011 0.038 0.003 0.011 0.008
0.004 0.065 0.163 0.001 0.000 0.009 0.013 0.001 0.009 0.005
0.004 0.010 0.085 0.035 0.003 0.017 0.095 0.004 0.010 0.007
0.010 0.016 0.079 0.027 0.007 0.011 0.039 0.007 0.008 0.032
0.000 0.009 0.026 0.002 0.025 0.035 0.011 0.007 0.006 0.003
0.000 0.006 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.011 0.017 0.006 0.000
0.002 0.041 0.067 0.004 0.002 0.038 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.002
0.001 0.084 0.066 0.002 0.002 0.039 0.014 0.002 0.006 0.002
0.005 0.002 0.041 0.178 0.002 0.016 0.206 0.000 0.007 0.030
0.002 0.033 0.065 0.004 0.000 0.010 0.015 0.007 0.086 0.003
0.001 0.046 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.013 0.005 0.026 0.002
0.036 0.011 0.051 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.029 0.000 0.045 0.004
0.004 0.011 0.102 0.007 0.000 0.016 0.021 0.000 0.006 0.009
0.005 0.081 0.048 0.002 0.000 0.028 0.007 0.020 0.009 0.000
0.001 0.019 0.245 0.007 0.000 0.021 0.023 0.004 0.012 0.000
0.000 0.006 0.051 0.006 0.022 0.064 0.010 0.006 0.003 0.003
0.001 0.019 0.042 0.006 0.003 0.131 0.013 0.050 0.005 0.002
0.001 0.007 0.033 0.003 0.032 0.028 0.013 0.002 0.006 0.001
0.003 0.037 0.062 0.005 0.000 0.024 0.018 0.006 0.034 0.001
0.042 0.007 0.045 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.039 0.003 0.138 0.008
0.003 0.113 0.096 0.001 0.001 0.025 0.007 0.001 0.029 0.001
0.004 0.025 0.083 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.020 0.003 0.014 0.003
0.020 0.007 0.050 0.040 0.000 0.007 0.152 0.000 0.010 0.056
0.026 0.002 0.076 0.002 0.000 0.013 0.035 0.004 0.017 0.026
0.003 0.003 0.048 0.065 0.000 0.008 0.060 0.003 0.000 0.003
0.003 0.013 0.010 0.003 0.080 0.029 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.003
0.001 0.007 0.019 0.003 0.008 0.038 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.000
0.006 0.009 0.300 0.025 0.004 0.011 0.019 0.004 0.006 0.017
0.001 0.007 0.044 0.004 0.010 0.034 0.010 0.003 0.005 0.002
0.002 0.039 0.054 0.007 0.004 0.099 0.009 0.014 0.008 0.001
0.021 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.042 0.004 0.017 0.004
0.001 0.033 0.053 0.005 0.001 0.021 0.011 0.050 0.010 0.003
0.003 0.021 0.263 0.006 0.000 0.013 0.024 0.000 0.011 0.005
0.004 0.011 0.025 0.017 0.000 0.009 0.256 0.003 0.005 0.009
0.002 0.008 0.040 0.004 0.001 0.055 0.011 0.023 0.006 0.001
0.000 0.004 0.028 0.011 0.007 0.043 0.018 0.000 0.004 0.007
0.000 0.043 0.050 0.007 0.001 0.064 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.003
0.000 0.004 0.064 0.012 0.000 0.008 0.048 0.000 0.016 0.036
0.001 0.000 0.070 0.002 0.000 0.040 0.013 0.005 0.007 0.001
0.002 0.013 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.022 0.026 0.005 0.008 0.002
0.003 0.013 0.064 0.000 0.003 0.013 0.046 0.003 0.008 0.028
0.005 0.005 0.021 0.011 0.000 0.027 0.021 0.005 0.005 0.000
0.003 0.044 0.045 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.018 0.047 0.007 0.001
0.003 0.010 0.048 0.031 0.001 0.021 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.006
0.000 0.030 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.138 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.002
0.009 0.009 0.060 0.003 0.001 0.014 0.022 0.001 0.000 0.005
0.029 0.004 0.070 0.091 0.000 0.008 0.041 0.000 0.008 0.000
Figure 2.11 Continued
43
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
Full Period 
(1983-2008) Benefit and Tax Rate Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
 
     Maximum Benefit for Family of  3 1248 523.36 202.35 
 Effective Benefit for Family of  3 1248 482.65 201.72 
 Effective Tax Rate on Earned Income 1248 27.23 17.03 
AFDC 
(1983-1991) Maximum Benefit for Family of  3 432 616.55 222.69 
 Effective Benefit for Family of  3 432 599.67 212.55 
 Effective Tax Rate on Earned Income 432 37.58 13.23 
Waiver Period 
(1992-1996) Maximum Benefit for Family of  3 240 528.22 184.48 
 Effective Benefit for Family of  3 240 514.09 176.2 
 Effective Tax Rate on Earned Income 240 34.95 12.71 
TANF 
(1997-2008) Maximum Benefit for Family of  3 576 451.44 160.5 
 Effective Benefit for Family of  3 576 381.79 143.49 
 Effective Tax Rate on Earned Income 576 16.25 14.31 
Additional Welfare Variables  
TANF only 
    (2000-2008) % of cases closed by sanction 432 11.13 11.51 
 % of cases closed by state policy 432 12.78 10.53 
 Approval  rate 432 55.47 19.33 
Control Variables (1983-2008) 
Full Period 
(1983-2008) population in 1000s 1248 3320.21 2692.72 
 African American proportion of population 1248 9.83 9.65 
 median wage 1248 16.14 1.76 
 poverty rate 1248 12.85 3.85 
 per capita employment 1248 48.04 3.59 
 female unemployment rate 1248 3.17 0.99 
 democratic governor 1248 0.5 0.5 
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Table 2.2  Static Panel GMM Estimates of Neighbor’s Reaction Function for Alternative Welfare Policy Instruments, full period (1983-2008) 
 
Policy 
Instrument: 
 
Maximum Benefits 
 
Effective Benefits 
 
ETR on Earned Income 
𝜙WYp  0.926** 
  
0.745*** 
  
0.779*** 
 
 
(0.420) 
  
(0.283) 
  
(0.241) 
 
 𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) 
  1.028*** 
  
0.843*** 
  
0.988*** 
 
 
(0.381) 
  
(0.233) 
  
(0.288) 
𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) 
  1.014** 
  
0.815*** 
  
0.666** 
  (0.382) 
  
(0.234) 
  
(0.275) 
         Wald-test for Asymmetries 
 
8.12 
  
10.36 
  
11.37 
(𝜙0 = 𝜙1)    p-value 
 
0.007 
  
0.002 
  
0.002 
         
         Observations 1248 1248 
 
1248 1248 
 
1248 1248 
         AR (1) p-value 0.402 0.376 
 
0.172 0.112 
 
0.002 0.0003 
AR (2) p-value 0.769 0.420 
 
0.045 0.048 
 
0.947 0.466 
         
Hansen’s  J-statistic 5.418 8.499 
 
10.08 13.06 
 
11.98 
14.03 
 
p-value 0.862 0.668 
 
0.433 0.289 
 
0.286 0.231 
No. of instruments 44 46 
 
44 46 
 
44 46 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All non-dummy variables are in logs.  𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 denotes policy response to neighbors in model with no 
asymmetries. For asymmetry model, 𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) /𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) denote responses of states with policy values greater than/less than their neighbor's on average. All spatial 
variables are instrumented with their second through forth lags collapsed.  
 
45
Table 2.3 Static Panel GMM Estimates of Neighbor’s Reaction Function for Alternative Welfare Policy Instruments by Welfare Period 
 
Policy instrument is Maximum Benefit Policy instrument is Effective Benefit 
 
AFDC Waiver TANF AFDC Waiver TANF 
 
 
 
0.694* 
 
0.959*** 
 
0.867*** 
 
0.853*** 
 
0.907*** 
 
0.934*** 
 
 
(0.358) 
 
(0.221) 
 
(0.303) 
 
(0.266) 
 
(0.252) 
 
(0.234) 
 
             
 
 
 
0.769** 
 
0.934*** 
 
1.200*** 
 
0.932*** 
 
1.059*** 
 
0.975*** 
  
(0.376) 
 
(0.244) 
 
(0.241) 
 
(0.339) 
 
(0.246) 
 
(0.158) 
 
 
 
0.761** 
 
0.905*** 
 
1.179*** 
 
0.918*** 
 
1.038*** 
 
0.922*** 
  
(0.375) 
 
(0.250) 
 
(0.238) 
 
(0.335) 
 
(0.241) 
 
(0.163) 
             Wald-test for Asymmetries 1.97 
 
1.89 
 
4.53 
 
3.69 
 
3.82 
 
5.91 
 
    p-value 
 
 
0.167 
 
0.175 
 
0.039 
 
0.061 
 
0.057 
 
0.019 
             Observations. 432 432 240 240 576 576 432 432 240 240 576 576 
             AR(1) p-value 0.982 0.82 0.441 0.377 0.355 0.442 0.591 0.944 0.15 0.647 0.169 0.0539 
AR(2) p-value 0.211 0.241 0.779 0.911 0.702 0.692 0.707 0.645 0.154 0.401 0.0743 0.128 
             Hansen’s J-statistic 1.927 6.178 4.335 7.137 6.736 10.28 5.354 9.877 2.928 11.35 10.84 17.36 
p-value 0.997 0.939 0.931 0.895 0.75 0.671 0.866 0.704 0.983 0.582 0.37 0.183 
No. of instruments 27 31 23 27 30 34 27 31 23 27 30 34 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All non-dummy variables are in logs. All non-dummy variables are in logs. 𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 denotes policy response 
to neighbors in model with no asymmetries. For the asymmetry model, 𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) /𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) denote responses of states with policy values greater than/less than their 
neighbor's on average. 
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 Table 2.4 Static Panel GMM Estimates of Neighbor’s Reaction Function for Alternative Welfare Policy Instruments by Welfare 
Period 
 
Policy instrument is ETR on earned income 
 
 
AFDC   Waiver   TANF 
 𝜙WYp  0.843*** 
  
0.486 
  
0.624*** 
  
 
(0.266) 
  
(0.614) 
  
(0.214) 
  
          𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) 
 
 
0.923*** 
  
0.882* 
  
0.906*** 
 
  
(0.261) 
  
(0.485) 
  
(0.178) 
 𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) 
 
 
0.833*** 
  
0.776* 
  
0.459** 
 
  
(0.247) 
  
(0.452) 
  
(0.215) 
 
          Wald-test for Asymmetries 2.58 
  
2.12 
  
11.92 
 (𝜙0 = 𝜙1)    p-value 
 
0.115 
  
0.15 
  
0.001 
 
          Observations. 432 432 
 
240 240 
 
576 576 
 
          AR(1) p-value 0.001 0.021 
 
0.149 0.175 
 
0.005 0.002 
 AR(2) p-value 0.036 0.010 
 
0.202 0.270 
 
0.850 0.872 
 
          Hansen’s J-statistic 6.216 14.25 
 
6.376 9.642 
 
8.150 11.22 
 p-value 0.797 0.356 
 
0.783 0.723 
 
0.614 0.592 
 No. of instruments 27 31 
 
23 27 
 
30 34   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All non-dummy variables are in logs.   𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 denotes policy response to neighbors 
in model with no asymmetries. For asymmetry model, 𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) /𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) denote responses of states with policy values greater than/less 
than their neighbor's on average. All spatial variables are instrumented with their second through forth lags collapsed 
 
 
 
47
 Table 2.5 Static Panel GMM Estimates for Neighbor’s Reaction Function for Additional Welfare 
Policy Instruments, TANF only (2000-2008) 
 
Approval Rate 
 
Sanction Use 
 
Non-Sanction State 
Policy 
𝜙WYp  0.765* 
  
0.202 
  
0.254 
 
 
(0.464) 
  
(0.466) 
  
(0.320) 
 
         𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) 
 
 
0.940** 
  
1.161*** 
  
0.578* 
  
(0.371) 
  
(0.288) 
  
(0.333) 
𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) 
 
 
1.916*** 
  
-0.277 
  
0.111 
  
(0.672) 
  
(0.346) 
  
(0.334) 
         Wald-test for Asymmetries 5.89 
  
24.18 
  
7.32 
(𝜙0 = 𝜙1)    p-value 
 
0.01 
  
0.00 
  
0.009 
         
         Observations 432 432 
 
432 432 
 
432 432 
        AR (1) p-value 0.712 0.101 
 
0.0139 0.00336 
 
0.143 0.0167 
AR (2) p-value 0.171 0.814 
 
0.568 0.448 
 
0.298 0.424 
         Hansen’s J-statistic 5.308 11.66 
 
14.15 13.64 
 
5.434 9.920 
p-value 0.870 0.556 
 
0.166 0.399 
 
0.860 0.700 
No. of instruments 27 31 
 
27 31 
 
27 31 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All non-dummy variables are in logs. 
 𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 denotes policy response to neighbors in model with no asymmetries. For asymmetry model, 𝜙0WYp ∗ (Iit) 
/𝜙1WYp ∗ (1 − Iit) denote responses of states with policy values greater than/less than their neighbor's on average.  
All spatial variables are instrumented with their second through forth lags collapsed 
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Table 2.6  Dynamic Panel GMM Estimates of Neighbor’s Reaction Function for Alternative Welfare Policy Instruments, full period 
(1983-2008) 
Policy Instrument: Maximum Benefits 
 
Effective Benefits 
 
ETR on Earned Income 
𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 0.095 
  
0.234** 
  
0.320** 
 
 
(0.107) 
  
(0.116) 
  
(0.161) 
 
         𝜙0𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
 
 
0.040 
  
0.275* 
  
0.442* 
  
(0.089) 
  
(0.163) 
  
(0.249) 
𝜙1𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
 
 
0.044 
  
0.249 
  
0.365* 
  
(0.088) 
  
(0.163) 
  
(0.213) 
𝛾𝑌𝑝,𝑡−1 0.857*** 0.902*** 
 
0.699*** 0.506*** 
 
0.486*** 0.438*** 
 
(0.094) (0.088) 
 
(0.095) (0.123) 
 
(0.106) (0.157) 
         Long Run Coefficients 
        𝜙/(1−  𝛾) or  𝜙0/(1−  𝛾)  0.667 0.406 
 
.777*** 0.557** 
 
.622** .787*** 
 
(0.574) (.730) 
 
(0.285) (0.282) 
 
(0..296) (0.312) 
         𝜙1  /(1−  𝛾)  
 
0.447 
  
0.504* 
  
0.649* 
  
(.713) 
  
(0.286) 
  
(0.346) 
  
        Wald-test for Asymmetries 1.42 
  
15.28 
  
0.33 
(𝜙0 = 𝜙1)    p-value 
 
0.234 
  
0.000 
  
0.567 
AR (2) p-value 0.389 .234 
 
0.780 0.788 
 
0.208 0.241 
Observations 1200 1200 
 
1200 1200 
 
1200 1200 
Hansen’s J-statistic 9.198 7.984 
 
6.176 6.492 
 
9.301 17.54 
p-value 0.604 0.786 
 
0.861 0.889 
 
0.594 0.130 
No. of instruments 45 47   45 47   45 47 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All non-dummy variables are in logs. Spatial variables and lagged dependent 
variable are instrumented with their collapsed lags. 
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Table 2.7  Dynamic Panel GMM Estimates of Neighbor’s Reaction Function for Alternative Welfare Policy Instruments by Welfare Period  
 
Policy instrument is maximum benefit Policy instrument is effective benefit 
 
AFDC Waiver TANF AFDC Waiver TANF 
𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 0.181 
 
0.114 
 
0.129 
 
0.118 
 
0.189 
 
0.331**   
 
(0.137) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.162) 
 𝜙0𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
             0.162  0.136  0.153* 0.178  0.130  0.330** 
𝜙1𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡)  (0.160)  (0.172)  (0.089)  (0.161)  (0.159)  (0.159) 
  
0.163  
 
0.135  
 
0.151* 
 
0.175  
 
0.125  
 
0.301* 
  
(0.155) 
 
(0.173) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.160) 
 
(0.156) 
             γYp,t−1 0.768*** 0.763*** 0.884*** 0.844*** 0.940*** 0.919*** 0.795*** 0.705*** 0.786*** 0.837*** 0.746*** 0.595*** 
 
(0.117) (0.170) (0.116) (0.142) (0.050) (0.043) (0.252) (0.265) (0.128) (0.130) (0.121) (0.159) 
Long Run Coefficients 
            0.780  0.681* .983*** .876** 2.155  1.890* 0.579  0.602  0.873** .799* 1.303*** .817*** 
𝜙/(1 − 𝛾) or (0.538) (0.385) (0.385) (0.453) (1.674) (1.119) (0.759) (0. 400) (0.457) (0.474) (0.386) (0.268) 
𝜙1/(1 − 𝛾) 
            
  
0.687* 
 
.870* 
 
1.860* 
 
0.594 
 
0.77 
 
.744*** 
𝜙1/(1 − 𝛾)  
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.47) 
 
(1.10) 
 
(0.40) 
 
(0.49) 
 
(0.28) 
             Wald-test for Asymmetries 0.04 
 
0.02 
 
0.61 
 
4.1 
 
2.14 
 
4.16 
     (𝜙0 = 𝜙1)        
p-value 
 
0.848 
 
0.879 
 
0.435 
 
0.043 
 
0.143 
 
0.0414 
             Observations 384 384 240 240 576 576 384 384 240 240 576 576 
AR (2)  p-value 0.431 0.455 0.344 0.418 0.933 0.987 0.836 0.813 0.818 0.634 0.75 0.8 
Hansen’s J-
statistic 15.25 17.62 11.72 16.18 16.18 16.67 14.96 16.84 17.35 19.12 24.18 27.35 
p-value 0.645 0.673 0.861 0.759 0.58 0.731 0.184 0.265 0.5 0.577 0.149 0.16 
No. of 
instruments 35 39 31 35 39 43 28 32 31 35 39 43 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All non-dummy variables are in logs. Spatial variables and lagged dependent variable are 
instrumented with their collapsed  lags. 
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Table 2.8 Dynamic Panel Estimation Results for the Effective Tax Rate by Welfare Period 
 
Policy instrument is ETR on earned Income 
 
AFDC   
 
Waiver   
 
TANF   
𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 0.593** 
  
0.167 
  
0.118 
 
 
(0.258) 
  
(0.425) 
  
(0.167) 
 
         𝜙0𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (𝐼𝑖𝑡) 0.545** 0.402 0.479** 
  (0.225)   (0.307)   (0.233) 
𝜙1𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡)  0.472**   0.333   0.138 
  (0.227)   (0.303)   (0.211) 
         γYp,t−1 -0.186 -0.036 
 
0.740*** 0.457* 
 
0.808*** 0.445*** 
 
(0.179) (0.088) 
 
(0.276) (0.241) 
 
(0.265) (0.134) 
Long Run Coefficients 
        𝜙/(1−  𝛾) or  𝜙0/(1−  𝛾)  0.450** .526** 
 
.640 .740 
 
.617 .863*** 
 
(0.251) (0.224) 
 
(1.687) (.672) 
 
(.606) (0.341) 
         𝜙1/(1 −  𝛾)  
 
0.456** 
  
.613 
  
0.248 
  
(0.225) 
  
(.637) 
  
(0.361) 
Wald-test for Asymmetries         
 
6.08 
  
2.04 
  
6.91 
(𝜙0 = 𝜙1)   p-value 
 
0.014 
  
0.15 
  
0.009 
         Observations 384 384 
 
240 240 
 
576 576 
AR (2) p-value 0.040 0.063 
 
0.158 0.223 
 
0.413 0.471 
Hansen’s  J-statistic 12.20 18.39 
 
12.36 19.70 
 
12.74 28.65 
p-value 0.837 0.624 
 
0.828 0.540 
 
0.311 0.123 
No. of instruments 35 39 
 
31 35 
 
32 43 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All non-dummy variables are in logs. 
 Spatial variables and lagged dependent variable are instrumented with their collapsed lags. 
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 Table 2.9 Dynamic Panel GMM Estimates of  Neighbor’s Reaction Function for the Approval Rate, 
Sanction Use, and Non-sanction State Policy, TANF only  (2000-2008) 
 
Approval Rate 
 
Sanction Use 
 
Non-Sanction State 
Policy 
𝜙𝑊𝑌𝑝 0.034 
  
0.168 
  
0.009 
 
 
(0.135) 
  
(0.294) 
  
(0.165) 
 
         𝜙0𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
 
0.121 
  
0.596* 
  
0.495* 
 
 
(0.160) 
  
(0.308) 
  
(0.266) 
𝜙1𝑊𝑌𝑝 ∗ (1 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡) 
 
0.298 
  
-0.011 
  
-0.055 
  
(0.229) 
  
(0.217) 
  
(0.277) 
 
        γYt−1,p  0.832*** 0.722*** 
 
0.823*** 0.676*** 
 
0.254 0.115 
 
(0.075) (0.119) 
 
(0.187) (0.160) 
 
(0.258) (0.273) 
Long  Run Coefficients 
         𝜙/(1−  𝛾) or  𝜙0/(1−  𝛾) .200 0.434 
 
.949 1.842* 
 
0.012 0.559* 
 
(.818) (0.629) 
 
(1.927) (.984) 
 
(0..222) (0.304) 
         or  𝜙1/(1−  𝛾) 
 
1.072 
  
-0.033 
  
-0.062 
  
(0.833) 
  
(.669) 
  
(0313) 
         Wald-test for asymmetries 2.24 
  
5.53 
  
6.90 
(𝜙0 = 𝜙1)   p-value 
 
0.141 
  
.023 
  
0.012 
         Observations 336 336 
 
336 336 
 
336 336 
AR (2) p-value 0.116 0.0805 
 
0.448 0.754 
 
0.266 0.616 
Hansen’s J-statistic 14.05 14.04 
 
19.83 26.20 
 
20.23 27.16 
p-value 0.781 0.900 
 
0.405 0.243 
 
0.381 0.205 
No. of instruments 35 39 
 
35 39 
 
35 39 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All non-dummy variables are in logs. Spatial 
variables and lagged dependent variable are instrumented with their collapsed lags. 
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Table 2.10 Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Weight Matrix Specifications for the Static and Dynamic Models  
Static Models          
 
Contiguity Weights 
 
Unrestricted Distance 
Weight Matrix 𝑾𝑩𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒆  𝑾𝑴𝒊𝒈  𝑾𝑷𝒐𝒗_𝑴𝒊𝒈  𝑾𝑬𝒅𝒖_𝑴𝒊𝒈  
 
𝑾𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕  𝑾𝑴𝒊𝒈  𝑾𝑷𝒐𝒗 _𝑴𝒊𝒈  𝑾𝑬𝒅𝒖_𝑴𝒊𝒈  
Maximum Benefit:          
𝜙WY 0.926** 0.858* 0.862* 0.809  0.739 -0.035 -0.191 -0.362 
 (0.420) (0.462) (0.455) (0.505)  (0.531) (0.940) (1.013) (0.848) 
Effective Benefit          
𝜙WY 0.745** 0.608* 0.542 0.637*  0.541 0.119 -0.004 -0.278 
 (0.290) (0.323) (0.326) (0.352)  (0.421) (0.977) (1.016) (0.731) 
Effective tax rate:          
𝜙WY 0.779*** 0.496* 0.476* 0.515*  .790* 0.798 0.562 0.546 
 (0.241) (0.258) (0.264) (0.262)  (0.436) (0.549) (0.572) (0.530) 
  
         Dynamic Models                   
 Contiguity Weights  Unrestricted Distance 
 𝑾𝑩𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒆  𝑾𝑴𝒊𝒈  𝑾𝑷𝒐𝒗_𝑴𝒊𝒈  𝑾𝑬𝒅𝒖_𝑴𝒊𝒈   𝑾𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕  𝑾𝑴𝒊𝒈  𝑾𝑷𝒐𝒗 _𝑴𝒊𝒈  𝑾𝑬𝒅𝒖_𝑴𝒊𝒈  
Maximum Benefit:          
𝜙WY 0.095 0.022 0.035 0.006  0.179* -0.114 -0.095 -0.090 
 (0.107) (0.117) (0.126) (0.122)  (0.101) (0.188) (0.186) (0.152) 
Effective Benefit:          
𝜙WY 0.234** 0.199 0.230* 0.195  -0.017 -0.215 -0.205 -0.174 
 (0.116) (0.132) (0.126) (0.137)  (0.199) (0.223) (0.215) (0.162) 
Effective tax rate:          
𝜙WY .320** 0.305* 0.339* 0.312*  0.770** 0.761 0.791* 0.722 
 (0.161) (0.179) (0.183) (0.175)  (0.303) (0.476) (0.476) (0.465) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All non-dummy variables are in logs. Spatial variables and lagged dependent 
variable are instrumented with their collapsed lags. 
53
 
Table 2.11 Sensitivity Analysis: Allowing for Lagged Policy Responses in Static Model 
Policy Instrument Maximum Benefit 
 
Effective Benefit 
 
Effective Tax Rate 
Lag lag 0 lag 1 
 
lag 0 lag 1 
 
lag 0 lag 1 
                  
𝜙WY 0.926** 0.752** 
 
0.745** 0.709 
 
0.779*** 0.767* 
 
(0.420) (0.329) 
 
(0.290) (0.525) 
 
(0.241) (0.386) 
         Observations 1248 1200 
 
1248 1200 
 
1248 1200 
         AR(1) p-value 0.402 0.683 
 
0.172 0.204 
 
0.002 0.002 
AR(2) p-value 0.769 0.378 
 
0.0450 0.155 
 
0.947 0.702 
Hansen's J- test 5.418 5.385 
 
10.08 10.88 
 
11.98 12.85 
p-value 0.862 0.864 
 
0.433 0.367 
 
0.286 0.232 
No. of instruments 44 43   44 43   44 43 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All non-dummy variables are in 
logs. Spatial variables and lagged dependent variable are instrumented with their collapsed lags. 
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Table 2.12 Sensitivity Analysis: Allowing for Lagged Policy Responses in Dynamic  Model 
  Maximum Benefit   Effective Benefit   Effective Tax Rate 
VARIABLES lag 0 lag 1 lag 0&1 
 
lag 0 lag 1 lag 0&1 
 
lag 0 lag 1 lag 0&1 
                        
𝜙0WY𝑡  0.095 
 
0.357 
 
0.234** 
 
0.682** 
 
0.320** 
 
0.262 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.415) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.321) 
 
(0.161) 
 
(0.299) 
𝜙1W𝑌𝑡−1 
 
0.071 -0.246 
  
0.310** -0.264 
  
0.343** 0.033 
  
(0.077) (0.355) 
  
(0.138) (0.198) 
  
(0.154) (0.243) 
            γYt−1,p  0.857*** 0.906*** 0.885*** 
 
0.699*** 0.631*** 0.613*** 
 
0.486*** 0.527*** 0.511*** 
 
(0.094) (0.083) (0.092) 
 
(0.095) (0.094) (0.122) 
 
(0.106) (0.099) (0.113) 
Long Run Coefficients 
          𝜙0 + 𝜙1/(1 −  γ) 0.67 0.75 0.96 
 
.777*** 0.841*** 1.078*** 
 
0.622** 0.726** 0.603** 
 
(0.574) (0.626) (0.918) 
 
(0.285) (0.317) (0.253) 
 
(0.296) (0.345) (0.287) 
            Observations 1200 1152 1152 
 
1200 1152 1152 
 
1200 1152 1152 
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.13 0.15 0.13 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) p-value 0.389 0.437 0.230 
 
0.780 0.738 0.926 
 
0.208 0.224 0.208 
Hansen’s J- test 8.204 12.61 9.909 
 
3.109 4.353 5.158 
 
9.301 8.673 9.548 
p-value 0.695 0.319 0.624 
 
0.989 0.958 0.952 
 
0.594 0.652 0.656 
No. of instruments 45 44 46   45 44 46   45 44 46 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All non-dummy variables are in logs. Spatial variables and lagged 
dependent variable are instrumented with their collapsed lags. 
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3 The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Sensitivity to Key Economic and Statistical Deci-
sions
3.1 Introduction
Understanding how taxable income responds to marginal tax rates, i.e. the elasticity of
taxable income (ETI), has become a focal outcome for research and policy on the optimal
design of the income tax and transfer system (Feldstein (1995); Auten and Carroll (1999);
Gruber and Saez (2002); Kopczuk (2005), Kopczuk (2012); Heim (2009); Blomquist and
Selin (2010); Giertz (2010); Saez (2001); Brewer et al. (2010); Saez et al. (2012), Kleven
and Schultz (2012)). This interest stems in part from the fact that under certain assumptions
the ETI can serve as a sufficient statistic for optimal tax analysis Saez et al. (2012). That is,
conditional on the shape of the income distribution, how income changes with changes in
the marginal tax rate determines the revenue-maximizing rate of taxation for high earner-
sthat tax rate where revenue is likely to fall with incremental increases in the marginal tax
rate. Using the Saez, et al. formula, Keane (2011), Table 1) shows that the top marginal rate
can be as high as 100 percent when the elasticity is 0, and that it falls quickly as the elastic-
ity increases. For example, under plausible redistributive preferences, the top tax rate falls
to about fifty percent with an elasticity of 0.5. This suggests that whether it is a sufficient
statistic or not, pinning down the ETI has important ramifications for the progressivity of
the tax system.
I present new evidence on the elasticity of taxable income, with particular emphasis on
how the ETI varies with key economic and statistical decisions such as measurement of
the tax rate, heterogeneity across education attainment, selection on observables and unob-
servables, and identification. I begin with the canonical ETI specification and identification
scheme that regresses the change in log annual income on the change in the log net-of-
tax share, defined as one minus the marginal tax rate, conditional on initial log income to
control for possible regression-to-the-mean effects. Because the change in log net-of-tax
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is likely endogenous, most authors have adopted some variant of the identification scheme
proposed by Gruber and Saez (2002) whereby the net-of-tax share is instrumented with the
predicted change in log net-of-tax share that would obtain if incomes grew from one year
to the next solely due to inflation.
The first point of departure with the prior literature is the use of two-year matched pan-
els from the Current Population Survey (CPS).1 With few exceptions (e.g. Moffitt and Wil-
helm (2000)), the ETI literature uses some variant of taxpayer panel data. The advantage
of tax panels over the CPS is the quality of data for measuring deductions and exemptions
necessary to move from gross income to taxable income, coupled with the fact that most tax
panels follow the same person for several years whereas the maximum panel length in the
CPS is two years. However, this is weighed against limitations of tax data such as the fact
that it is often not publically available, it has limited demographic information, and it does
not necessarily capture the low end of the distribution because many poor have frequent
non-filing episodes. Even with the possible shortcomings in the measurement of deduc-
tions and exemptions in the CPS, I obtain baseline estimates of the ETI of 0.22 for gross
income and 0.27 for taxable income, which are remarkably close to the midpoint estimate
of 0.25 from taxpayer panels as reported in Saez et al. (2012).
This baseline estimate, however, is cut in half by including the FICA payroll tax in
the definition of net of tax share. Although the tax reforms of the 1980s removed several
million households from the federal tax rolls, substantial expansions in the payroll tax base
caused a shift in tax burdens from income to payroll. The fraction of families with relatively
higher payroll tax burdens increased from forty-four percent in 1979 to nearly sixty-seven
percent in 1999 (Mitrusi and Poterba (2000)). Perhaps surprising, with the exception of
Heim (2009), the ETI literature using U.S. data has not explored the effects of payroll
taxes on the estimated elasticity. The finding of a dampened response with FICA included
1To my knowledge I am the first to use matched CPS panels to estimate the ETI. Singleton (2011) uses a
cross section of the CPS linked to administrative wage data from the IRSs Detailed Earnings. He attempts
to identify the ETI through the marriage penalty relief provision contained in the 2001 Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act.
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likely results from the payroll tax flattening the combined marginal tax rate schedule across
workers over time.
I next exploit the key advantage of the CPS over tax panels, which is the availability
of extensive demographic information. A common finding is that the ETI increases as one
moves up the income distribution, suggesting that it is high income taxpayers driving the re-
sponse. A concern raised in the literature, however, is that these estimates may be affected
by mean reversion, and thus may not capture more permanent responses to tax changes.
Alternatively, education attainment is well known in the labor supply and consumption
literatures to be a good proxy for permanent income (Blundell and MaCurdy (1999); At-
tanasio and Weber (2010)) and thus variation in the ETI by education attainment is less
likely to reflect mean reversion. I find a strong positive gradient in the ETI with respect
to educationthe ETI for a post-graduate is two-three times larger than a college graduate
– suggesting that identification of the ETI is driven by the highly skilled, i.e. those with
permanently higher incomes.
Another advantage of the demographic information in the CPS is it permits us to more
comprehensively examine how selection on observables and unobservables may affect the
ETI. Controlling for the influence of nonrandom selection into the labor market has been
a focal interest in the labor supply literature (Heckman (1979); Mroz (1987); Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999)), but has not received similar attention in the ETI literature. In ETI papers
it is standard to truncate low-income families from the sample, e.g. with incomes below
$20,000 in Auten and Carroll (1999), or $10,000 in Gruber and Saez (2002), under the
assumption that this truncation is likely to impart little bias in the ETI. While some authors
have examined how the elasticity changes when the truncation point changes, selection has
not been modeled formally. I examine how the ETI changes with controls for selection
on observables (i.e. expanded demographic controls) as well as on unobservables (i.e. a
Heckman (1979) type selection correction). I find that controlling for selection reduces the
ETI by about one-third. What matters though is whether one controls for selection, and
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not the form of selection. That is, whether I just include observed demographics, or model
formally selection on unobservables, the ETI falls by a similar amount.
I then turn to identification of the ETI via instrument selection. The canonical instru-
ment using the predicted (or synthetic) net-of-tax share differs from approaches commonly
found in the labor supply and taxation literature, which tends to either exploit the nonlin-
earity of the tax code, socioeconomic exclusion restrictions in the first stage, or time-series
restrictions on the model control variables and error term (Hausman (1981); MaCurdy et al.
(1990); Blundell et al. (1998); Ziliak and Kniesner (1999), Ziliak and Kniesner (2005);
Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000); Keane (2011)). Some have raised concerns about the standard
identification in ETI models (Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000); Blomquist and Selin (2010);
Weber (2011)). Because the CPS is primarily employed as a repeated cross-section, I ex-
amine the robustness of the ETI by adopting a Wald-type grouping instrumental variables
estimator akin to that found in Blundell et al. (1998). Specifically, I construct a series of
birth-year by education cohorts and impose the identification restriction that tax reforms
of the past several decades are sufficient to cause changes in the net-of-tax share to vary
differentially over a fixed cohort effect, a fixed time effect, and nonrandom changes in the
composition of the labor force. Here, identification breaks down in that the ETI estimates
are negative, unless I drop controls for time. This inconsistency with theory does not occur
when I estimate a parallel model for hours of work as a function of after-tax wages and vir-
tual incomes, suggesting that technological change and other factors affecting the pre-tax
wage structure differentially across cohorts provide an important source of variation not
present in the standard ETI framework. I conclude with a model that combines insights
from the canonical ETI framework with those from the grouping estimator for a plausibly
more exogenous instrument that yields larger elasticities in the range of 0.4-0.5.
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3.2 Estimation and Identification of the Elasticity of Taxable Income
The canonical approach to estimating the effect of taxation on labor supply is to assume that
a taxpayer maximizes a utility function over a composite consumption good c and hours of
work h, U(c, h), subject to a budget constraint of c = wh + V + NT (wh + N), where
V is nontaxable nonlabor income, N is taxable nonlabor income, w is the pre-tax hourly
wage rate, T (·) is the tax function, and the price of consumption has been normalized
to 1. Solving the optimization problem results in an optimal hours of work function of
h(w(1 − τ), N v), where τ is the marginal tax rate and N v is virtual nonlabor income
N + V + τwhT (·), which is that level of compensation needed to make the worker behave
as if they faced a constant marginal tax rate on all taxable income. In this framework, both
the after-tax wage and virtual nonlabor income are treated as endogenous in estimation
since the tax rate an individual faces is an implicit function of hours of work. Feldstein
(1995) argued that this approach missed other behavioral responses to tax law changes such
as shifting compensation from taxable to nontaxable income, or changes in the timing of
compensation. Instead, he posited that workers preferences were over consumption and an
income supply function, y, U(c, y), and solving the revised optimization problem resulted
in an income supply function of y(1− τ,N v) that depends on the net-of-tax share (1− τ)
and virtual nonlabor income. Like the labor supply predecessor, both the net-of-tax share
and virtual incomes are treated as endogenous in estimation.
Gruber and Saez (2002) extended the Feldstein approach by motivating the income
supply model within the context of the Slutsky equation in elasticity form, which relates
how income supply responds to infinitesimal changes in net-of-tax shares and captures
both substitution and income effects of tax law changes. For the empirical counterpart of
their model they replaced the continuous time derivative from the Slutsky equation with a
discrete time change from period t-1 to t:
(1) ∆lnyit = β∆ln(1− τit) + γ∆lnN vit + εit,
where ∆lnyit = lnyit− lnyit−1,∆ln(1− τit) = ln(1− τit)− ln(1− τit−1), and ∆lnN vit =
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lnN vit − lnN vit−1. 2
In log first difference form β is the compensated ETI. As Gruber and Saez found that γ
was near zero, or that income effects were small, most of the subsequent literature has ig-
nored income effects in their empirical applications and thus remain silent on distinguishing
whether the ETI reflects compensated or uncompensated effects. I follow the recent work
and ignore income effects for the ETI model, but return later to this issue when I present
labor supply estimates. The actual empirical model estimated in the literature is more akin
to
(2) ∆lnyit = β∆ln(1− τit) + δf(yit−1) + xitθ + µt + εit,
where f(yit−1) is some function of lagged income such as the log of income or a spline in
income to control for mean reversion in income growth as well as trends in inequality, xit is
a vector of demographics, and µt is a control for aggregate time effects such as a linear trend
or time dummies. Because the standard OLS assumption that E[∆ln(1 − τit)εit] = 0 is
likely to be violated it is necessary to instrument for the endogenous regressor. Gruber and
Saez (2002) propose an exactly identified model based on the instrument (∆ln ˆ(1− τit)) =
ln(1− τ̂it)−ln(1−τit−1), where τ̂it is the marginal tax rate that the individual would face in
year t if income in year t differed from its t− 1 value only by an inflation adjustment. This
synthetic marginal tax rate is valid provided that it only reflects changes in tax law and not
potentially endogenous behavioral responses to the tax law changes. I begin by estimating
equation (2) using a similar synthetic instrument in order to replicate tax panel estimates
of the ETI using matched panels in the CPS, and then consider a number of extensions as
described in the ensuing subsections.
3.3 Heterogeneity and Nonrandom Selection
Because taxpayer panels offer a parsimonious set of demographic controls, the ability to
examine heterogeneity in the response of income to tax changes has largely been limited
2The theoretical model of Gruber and Saez (2002) refers to virtual nonlabor income, but for the empirical
counterpart they use after-tax income.
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to differences across the base-year income distribution. The ETI literature has found that
the elasticity increases as one moves up the income distribution, suggesting that it is high
income taxpayers driving the results. A concern, however, is that these estimates may be
affected by mean reversion. As an alternative, the consumption and labor supply literatures
have frequently examined differences in spending and hours worked decisions across edu-
cation groups under the assumption that years of schooling is a better proxy for permanent
income than current income (Blundell and MaCurdy (1999); Attanasio and Weber (2010)).
Thus by examining how the ETI varies by education attainment I can potentially better
isolate the response of taxpayers with higher permanent incomes. In the models below I
augment equation (2) with (∆ln(1 − τit) × educ), where educ is a vector of dummy vari-
ables for different levels of education attainment. Although education decisions may be
affected by tax policy, with my sample of heads of household described below most formal
education is completed and not likely to be affected by contemporaneous tax policy.
More generally, I am interested in understanding the roles of selection on observables
and selection on unobservables on the ETI, i.e. situations in which the conditional mean
E[εit|∆ln(1 − τit), f(yit−1), xit, µt, ] 6= 0. The typical paper in the literature truncates the
data below some threshold – $20,000 in Auten and Carroll (1999), $10,000 in Gruber and
Saez (2002) – and assumes that the data below the threshold are missing (conditionally)
at random. This assumption precludes changes in labor force composition in response to
tax reforms, and also drops many low-income families whose incomes tend to be highly
volatile and increasingly so over the past three decades (Hardy and Ziliak (2012)). For
example, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) attributed upwards of sixty percent of the increase
in labor force participation of single mothers in the 1990s to expansions in the EITC. Many
of these women do not work full time, and yet are quite responsive to tax and transfer
policy, and thus could affect estimates of the ETI. To my knowledge this assumption has
not been tested formally in the literature (though some authors have tested the robustness
of results to alternative thresholds).
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I adopt the control function approach to examine the role of nonrandom selection
(Barnow et al. (1980)). Specifically, consider the function g(xit) that can be appended
to equation (2). For selection on observables g(xit) is some linear or possibly nonlinear
function of the observable demographics xit. In this case I include a broader set of demo-
graphic controls that are available in the CPS beyond the baseline control for martial status,
such as education and race. For selection on unobservables, I adopt the Heckman (1979)
approach and set ĝit = λ(mitη̂), where λit =
φ(·)
φ(·) is the inverse Mills ratio defined as the
ratio of the pdf to the cdf of the normal distribution, mit is a vector of demographics, η̂
are the first-stage probit coefficients of the regression that income exceeds a threshold (e.g.
$10,000 in real terms across two years). In this case, the Heckman selection term is identi-
fied both via nonlinearity of the function and exclusion restrictions of variables included in
mit but not xit as described below.
3.4 A Cohort-Based Approach to Estimating the ETI
Instead of approximating the continuous time Slutsky equation with its discrete time ana-
logue, an alternative to equation (1) is to specify a functional form for the static income
supply model from the utility maximization problem
(3) lny = βln(1− τ) + γlnN v + xitφ+ ε
where the income and tax variables are now in log levels. This specification is akin to the
typical static labor supply equation estimated in scores of papers, but with income replacing
hours of work and the net-of-tax share replacing the after-tax wage. Again ignoring income
effects, estimation of the model is complicated by the possible correlation of the net-of-tax
share and the model error term. However, with access to repeated cross-sectional data on
individuals i in time period t that can be grouped into cohorts c in time period t, I can invoke
assumptions similar to Blundell et al. (1998) in their application to married womens labor
supply:
(A.1) E[εit|c, t] = αc + µt
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(A.2) (E[ln(1− τit)|c, t]− E[ln(1− τit)|c]− E[ln(1− τit)]2) 6= 0
Here assumption A.1 implies the exclusion restrictions for identification are that unobserv-
able differences in average taxable income across cohorts can be summarized by a per-
manent cohort effect (αc) and an additive time effect (µt). Assumption A.2 states that the
net-of-tax share grows differentially across the cohorts and is equivalent to a rank condition
for identification. It requires that variation in the net-of-tax share remains after controlling
for time and cohort effects, and thus offers a set of exclusion restrictions for identification
via the full interaction of cohort and time effects.
With these assumptions, I implement the grouping estimator of Blundell et al. (1998)
in two steps. The first step is to estimate the reduced-form prediction equation for the log
of the net-of-tax share by regressing it on the demographics, cohort effects, time effects,
and their interactions as
(4) ln(1− τit) = xitρ+ αc + µt + αc ⊗ µt + uit
where uit is an error term assumed to be uncorrelated with the observed covariates and
latent heterogeneity. The equation is estimated via least squares on the sample of individ-
uals with income greater than some threshold, which in my case is income in excess of
$10,000. The fitted residual, ˆu1−τit , is saved for use in the second stage. Next I estimate the
income supply equation appending the saved residuals to control for the endogeneity of the
net-of-tax share as
(5) ln(yit) = βln(1− τit) + xitδ + αc + µt + ρ ˆu1−τit + εit.
While this approach requires the use of individual level repeated cross section data, the
same results can be obtained working with cohort means.3
Estimating equation (5) will provide consistent estimates of the ETI under A.1 and
A.2. However, as Blundell et al. (1998) were interested in identifying the after-tax wage
3An equivalent approach would be to apply weighted least squares to the transformed regression (ln(yct)) =
β(ln(1− τct)) + αc + µt + εct, where log income and log net-of-tax share variables are the cohort-year
specific means, and the weight in the regression is the number of observations in each cohort-year (Blundell
et al. (1998)). This is a standard within estimator but applied to cohort-mean data rather than individual
level data. I utilize the individual level data in the paper to maintain consistency across estimators, but
results reported are the same.
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elasticity of labor supply among married women, a focal concern was possible nonrandom
sample selection into work. Continuing with the cohort specification, I adopt their revised
assumptions A.1 and A.2 as
(A.1) E[εit|c, t, z] = αc + µt + ρλct
(A.2) (E[ln?(1− τit)|c, t, z]− E[ln(1− τit)|c, z]− E[ln(1− τit)|t, z]− ρλct)2 6= 0
where λct is the inverse mills ratio (λct =
φ(·)
(φ(·)) evaluated at φ
−1(Pct), Pct is the sample
proportion of a given cohort with incomes above the income threshold z, and φ−1 is the
inverse normal distribution. Identification of the ETI from (A.2) now requires that net-
of-tax shares change differentially across groups, over time, and over changes in sample
composition above the threshold z. Implementation of this estimator is straightforward. An
additional first stage equation for having income over the $10,000 threshold is estimated
via probit maximum likelihood using the full sample of individuals. The inverse Mills ratio,
λ̂ict , for individual i in cohort c in time t is constructed using the fitted values and appended
to the equation (5) to control for possible selection above the threshold.
3.5 Data
The primary economic and demographic information used in this paper comes from the
Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) for cal-
endar years 1979-2008 (interview years 1980-2009). The CPS contains rich data on labor
and non-labor income as well as detailed family demographics - including those relevant
for tax purposes (for example: marital status, dependents, etc.). I employ the data first
as a short panel by matching individuals across annual files, and then as a repeated cross-
section. My sample consists of family heads ages twenty-five to sixty, where a family is
defined as two or more persons related by birth, marriage, or adoption. The following con-
tains detailed information on the income and tax data used within this analysis as well as
the matching procedure.
65
3.5.1 Income and Tax Data
I use two variants of income for the dependent variable akin to those used in much of the
ETI literature. The first, broad (gross) income is defined as total family income less so-
cial security income. Total family income includes most components of income reported
on Form 1040 such as earnings of the head (and spouse if present) as well unemployment
compensation, worker compensation, social security, public assistance, retirement bene-
fits, survivor benefits, interest income, dividends, rents, child support, alimony, financial
assistance, and other income. Gruber and Saez (2002) exclude social security income and
capital gains owing to their differential tax treatment over the 1980s, and we do so as well.
The second, and more narrow, income definition is taxable income defined as broad income
less estimated exemptions and deductions which are obtained from NBERs TAXSIM pro-
gram. A disadvantage of CPS data relative to tax panel data is that information on many
deductions (e.g. home mortgage interest expense, moving expenses, charitable contribu-
tions, and medical expenses) used to arrive at Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) and taxable
income are not collected. While many of these are typically omitted in the literature in
order to achieve a consistent definition over the years, my measure of taxable income will
be less precise than those calculable from tax panel data. I therefore expect my estimates
for taxable income elasticities to be on the low end of the literature.4 My broad income
measures, however, should be quite comparable to those used in the past literature.
Prior to our matching across waves described below, I delete those observations with
imputed income as Bollinger and Hirsch (2006) show that such imputed data may impart
bias in regression coefficients. In addition, I adopt the consistent set of income top codes
constructed by Larrimore et al. (2009) to mitigate the influence of changes in Census top
4TAXSIM estimates whether the tax unit itemizes based on estimated state tax liability (which is
deductible for itemizers in the U.S.) and other deductions such as home mortgage interest pay-
ments, child care expenses, and charitable contributions. Because the CPS does not collect in-
formation on these other deductions, whether or not a family is estimated to itemize largely de-
pends on state tax liability. Across the sample period, I estimate that about one-fourth of the fam-
ilies itemize, which is 6-10 percentage points lower than reported by the IRS in a typical year (See
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=173 ).
66
code procedures starting in the mid 1990s. Burkhauser et al. (2012) find that using the
consistent top code method results in CPS measures of income inequality tracking those
from proprietary tax return data better than (unadjusted) public-use CPS data. Unless noted
otherwise, all income data are deflated by the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE)
deflator with 2008 base year. Following Gruber and Saez (2002), I drop observations with
real broad income less than $10,000.
Tax rates are estimated for each family in each year using the NBER TAXSIM program
in conjunction with basic information on labor income, taxable nonlabor income, and de-
pendents. I consider two marginal tax rate definitions: one is the sum of the federal and
state tax rate, and the second is the sum of the federal, state, and FICA payroll tax rate.
The federal and state taxes include the respective EITC code for each tax year and state,
thus allowing for the possibility of negative tax payments. The FICA tax rate is the sum
of the Social Security and Medicare payroll tax rates. Because the Social Security Wage
Base is limited, individuals with wage income exceeding the limit will face a Social Secu-
rity marginal tax rate of zero for this portion of the tax. Before 1991 the Medicare payroll
tax was applied to the same base as Social Security, but the 1990 budget act removed the
payroll tax base ceiling for the Medicare portion and thus it applies to all wage earnings. I
assume that the family bears only the employee share of the payroll tax rate.
3.5.2 Longitudinally Linking CPS Families
The CPS employs a rotating survey design so that a respondent is in sample for four
months, out eight months, and in another four months. This makes it possible to match
approximately one-half of the sample from one March interview to the next. Following the
recommended Census procedure I perform an initial match of individuals on the basis of
five variables: month in sample (months one-four for year one, months five-eight for year
two); gender; line number (unique person identifier); household identifier; and household
number. I then cross check the initial match on three additional criteria: race, state of res-
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idence, and age of the individual. If the race or state of residence of the person changed
we delete that observation, and if the age of the person falls or increases by more than two
years (owing to the staggered timing of the initial and final interviews), then I delete those
observations on the assumption that they were bad matches. These additional criteria were
very important prior to the 1986 survey year, but thereafter the five base criteria match most
observations. Lastly, in accordance with the literature, I exclude individuals whose marital
status changes from one year to the next as large changes in income unrelated to tax policy
are expected for this group. There were major survey redesigns in the 1980s and 1990s so it
is not possible to match across the 1985-1986 waves and the 1995-1996 waves. This yields
a matched time series across twenty-nine years with gaps in calendar years 1984-1985 and
1994-1995.
Declining match rates occur after the mid 1990s reflecting in part a rise in imputation
within the CPS after adoption of computer-assisted (CATI-CAPI) interviewing. A possible
concern with declining match rates is with sample attrition affecting our income series.
Under the assumption that the probability of attrition is unobserved and time invariant
(i.e., a fixed effect), then differencing the variable will remove the latent effect (Ziliak
and Kniesner (1998); Wooldridge (2002)). If there is a time-varying factor loading on the
unobserved heterogeneity then differencing will not eliminate potential attrition bias. A
conservative interpretation, then, is that data from matched CPS provides estimates of the
elasticity of taxable income among the population of non-movers.5 Over the full period,
1979-2008, I obtain 198,428 two-year longitudinally matched observations when broad
income is the dependent variable, and 196,486 observations for taxable income.6
Because the change in net-of-tax rates is endogenous to the change in income, I instru-
ment the actual change in tax rates with a predicted tax change,(∆ln( ̂1− τit). To obtain
5It should be noted that I am using one year differences rather than three-year differences used in some
studies. The use of one year differences may result in elasticities reflecting more income shifting behavior,
but given the structure of the CPS design it is not possible to examine three-year differences.
6These observations only include individuals with broad income exceeding $10,000 in year one. Sample
sizes fall as the income definition narrows due to missing data or income values for which I cannot take logs
(i.e. zeros or negatives).
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τit, I inflate each individuals year one income by the increase in the PCE and run it through
TAXSIM as year two income. Lastly when allowing for non-random selection, I require
additional control variables (exclusion restrictions) to predict the probability of having in-
come over $10,000. The set of variables selected for this purpose are state-level variables
that change over time including employment per capita, the poverty rate, minimum wage,
gross state product, personal income per capita, and the welfare (TANF) and food stamp
(SNAP) benefits for a family of three. These are obtained from the University of Kentuckys
Center for Poverty Research Welfare Database.7 Summary statistics for the matched CPS
data are shown in Appendix Table A2.1.1.
3.5.3 Constructing Cohort Data
For the cohort analysis of equations (4) and (5), I return to the initial cross-sectional CPS
data set, but in addition to dropping observations with imputed incomes and using the con-
sistent top code series of Larrimore et al. (2009), I also drop individuals whose month
in sample is greater than four to ensure there are no repeat observations. This results in
a repeated cross-section of over 400,000 individuals who are then grouped into thirteen
five-year birth cohorts and three education levels (less than high school, high school only,
and more than high school) for a total of thirty-nine five-year birth by education cohorts.
Because the consistency of the grouping estimator is based in part on the number of obser-
vations per cell being large, I follow Blundell et al. (1998) and drop cohort-education cells
with fewer than fifty observations.
Figure 3.1 shows the life-cycle net of tax rates plotted for the thirteen different birth
cohorts by education level. It is clear that cohorts in the lowest education level have the
highest net of tax shares (i.e. face the lowest marginal tax rates), while cohorts in the
highest education group face the lowest after-tax shares. This is consistent with progressive
taxation assuming income is rising with education attainment. Evidence of variation within
7See http://www.ukcpr.org/EconomicData/UKCPR National Data Set 12 14 11.xlsx
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the education groups is also present, which is necessary for identification of the grouping
estimator. For example, among birth cohorts with more than high school (3rd panel in
Figure 1), at age forty the more recent cohorts face a higher net-of-tax share, which is
consistent with tax reforms reducing marginal tax rates. Moreover, there appears to be a
life-cycle trend of rising net of tax shares, which in this case appears more pronounced for
the older cohorts. Summary statistics for the repeated cross-sectional CPS data are shown
in Appendix Table A2.1.2.
3.6 Results
My first objective is to use matched two-year samples from the CPS along with the canon-
ical ETI specification and identification strategy in equation (2) to attempt to replicate the
baseline results from Gruber and Saez (2002). All instrumental variables regressions con-
trol for marital status and time dummies for initial year, and are weighted by year one broad
income.8
Table 3.1 contains the baseline estimates where for ease of presentation I report only
the elasticity of taxable income. The table has two rows corresponding to the control for
mean reversion: one with a 10 piece spline in year-one log income, and the other with the
level of year-one log income. For each of the income definitions (broad income and taxable
income), I estimate the model with the two different marginal tax rates, one with and one
without FICA.
The baseline broad-income estimate of 0.217 for the model with the net of tax share
based on the federal and state tax rate is remarkably similar to, and indeed slightly higher
than, the one-year difference estimate of 0.192 in Gruber and Saez (2002, Table 4). It is
also quite close to the modal tax-panel estimate of 0.25 reported in Saez et al. (2012). The
corresponding taxable income estimate of 0.272 is higher than the broad income ETI as
expected, but lower than the 0.410 estimate in Gruber and Saez. The latter is not surprising
8Following Gruber and Saez (2002) I censor the level of broad income at $1 million in constructing weights.
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because the taxpayer panel has more information on deductions than in the CPS. While we
have greatest confidence in the broad-income estimates of the ETI from the CPS, collec-
tively the baseline results suggest that matched panels from the CPS can produce estimates
of the ETI in line with those from taxpayer panels.9
The second column under each income measure in Table 3.1 shows the corresponding
estimate of the ETI with the inclusion of the FICA payroll tax. Here we see the estimate
fall by about one half from the baseline. Mitrusi and Poterba (2000) document a substantial
rise in the burden of payroll taxes, and a practical implication of that is seen in Appendix
Table A2.1 where the average net of tax share is about 5.5 percentage points lower with
FICA than without, and this gap rose from 3.7 percentage points in 1979 to 6.25 percentage
points in 2007. In effect, the expansion of the payroll tax base over time (and rates were
increased until 1991) partially negated the federal income tax changes associated with the
tax reforms in recent decades. This resulted in reduced variation in the combined tax rate
across workers over time, and in turn the potential variation used to identify the ETI.
Before proceeding with the discussion of selection and heterogeneity, I note that the
ETI literature has conducted a number of specification checks on the canonical model.
These tests often center on the role of weighting the regression model, the sample period,
and whether and how one controls for regression to the mean effects. I conduct several
of these tests and report them for completeness in Appendix Table A2.2.1. Similar to
others I find that income weighting the regression model is important for identifying the
ETI. While there is in general a lack of agreement on the merits of weighting regression
models (Hoem (1989); Deaton (1997)), the argument to weight the ETI by income is model
driven. Specifically, for optimal tax calculations the income response to changes in the
marginal tax rate is proportional to the ETI times income and thus by income weighting
we explicitly allow the ETI to vary with income (Gruber and Saez (2002)). Because of
9I note that the first stage regression of the actual change in log net of tax share on the change in the synthetic
log net of tax share (controlling for the other factors) is very strong. The adjusted R-squared is 0.2, the Wald
test of joint significance is in excess of 1000 (p-value< 0.000), and the size and significance of the synthetic
tax rate is large.
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the coherence with the underlying optimal tax model, I proceed with income weighting
for the remainder of the analysis. I also examine my estimates restricting attention to the
Gruber and Saez sample period, where the estimates of the ETI are a bit smaller owing
to the fewer tax reforms to identify the effect. Last, in addition to using the 10-decile
spline of log income, I examine a less parametric version of the spline by including dummy
variables for each decile of the initial year income distribution. Similar to others in the
literature I find identification of the ETI is sensitive to the specification of regression to
the mean effects, whereby more flexible parameterizations can absorb the variation needed
to estimate the ETI. I focus our remaining discussion on the 10-piece spline, and note in
passing that a full set of results with the initial income deciles are available upon request.
3.6.1 Selection and Heterogeneity in the ETI
I extend the parsimonious benchmark model of equation (2) by examining the roles of se-
lection and heterogeneity in the response of the ETI. I first append additional demographics
to more completely control for selection on observables. This includes a quadratic in age,
education attainment (dummies for high school, some college, college, and graduate de-
gree, with less than high school the omitted group), indicators for children under the age
of 6 and under 18, race (indicators for African American, Other , with white as the omit-
ted group), and gender. I also include a complete set of state fixed effects to control for
time-invariant factors across states that may affect income. I then examine heterogeneity
in the ETI by interacting the change in log net of tax share with indicators for education
attainment at the some college, college, and graduate levels.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 3.2 show that the ETI falls by one-third for broad income
and over forty percent for taxable income relative to the benchmark models in Table 1. In
results not tabulated I re-estimated the models by only adding state fixed effects and not
the other demographics and the ETI fell only by about five percent, suggesting that most
of the reduction owes to selection on observable demographics. In columns (2) and (4) of
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Table 3.2 I find a very strong positive gradient on the ETI based on education. Specifically,
relative to a household head with a high school diploma, a head with a college degree has
an ETI twice as high (0.588 versus 0.207 for broad income and no FICA tax), and a head
with a graduate degree has yet again an ETI over twice as high as the college graduate.
These estimates suggest that identification of the ETI is driven by the highly skilled, i.e.
those with permanently higher incomes.
In Table 3.3 I go a step further to examine the role of selection on unobservables. The
top panel simply appends the inverse Mills ratio to the base model reported in Table 3.1,
while the second panel also includes the additional observed demographics and state fixed
effects that control more comprehensively for selection on observables. In the first step, I
estimate a probit model of the probability that income exceeds $10,000 in both years, and
construct the inverse Mills ratio using the index function from the estimated probit. I use
both individual-level demographics and state-level socioeconomic variables described in
the Data section as exclusion restrictions to assist in identifying the selection term in the
top panel, and just state-level variables in the bottom panel (since those individual-level de-
mographics are entered directly in the regression model in the lower panel). The estimates
indicate that there is strong evidence of nonrandom selection on unobservables, again with
the estimated ETI between thirty and forty percent lower than the base case depending on
whether we examine broad income or taxable income. Perhaps surprising, though, Table
3.3 indicates that what matters for the ETI is whether one controls for selection, and not the
form of selection. That is, comparing Tables 3.2-3.3 shows that I get similar estimates for
the ETI whether I just include observed demographics (selection on observables) or model
formally selection on unobservables.
In Table 3.4 I explore further which of the demographics have the most influence on
ETI estimates. Column (1) presents the elasticity estimate for broad income when control-
ling only for marital status and time effects. In column (2) the set of controls is expanded to
include gender, age, and controls for children which results in a reduction of the ETI esti-
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mate of roughly twelve percent. Parameter estimates fall another 25 percent once education
and race are included in the set of controls as shown in column (3). Parallel estimates for
the elasticity of taxable income are presented in columns 4-6 and display a similar pattern.
Because estimates can vary depending on whether education and race are added in before
age/gender/state effects instead of after as reported in Table 3. 4, in results not tabulated
I reversed the order of operation and obtained similar results that race and education have
the largest effects. Overall, the results indicate that race and education, which are generally
not available in taxpayer panel data, are the demographic characteristics that exert the most
influence on ETI estimates.
3.6.2 Repeated Cross-Section Cohort Models
Next I examine the robustness of the ETI to the alternative identification scheme of cohorts
applied to the repeated cross-section samples of the CPS. This involves invoking assump-
tions (A.1) and (A.2) for the estimation of equation (5), and assumptions (A.1) and (A.2)
with the addition of the inverse Mills ratio, λ̂ict , to control for selection on unobservables.
Table 3.5 presents the results weighted by broad income, while Table 3.6 presents
weighted estimates that also control for lagged cohort income. In the repeated cross section
model I do not follow the same person over time, but I do follow cohorts. Thus, in a bid
to control for changes in income inequality akin to the matched panel models, I include a
control for the log of lagged cohort mean income (Verbeek and Vella (2005)). In column
(1) of Tables 3.5 and 3.6 labeled “baseline” I present estimates of equation (5) with the
most parsimonious set of controls (single, married). The second column contains estimates
when the set of demographic control variables is augmented to include race, gender, indi-
cators for children under age six and under age eighteen, and state fixed effects.10 The third
column appends the inverse Mills ratio.
The ETI estimates presented in columns (1) to (3) of Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are overwhelm-
10Age and educational indicators are omitted from the set of controls as they used to construct the cohort
groupings.
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ingly negative, both quantitatively and statistically, suggesting that the model is not robust
to this alternative identification strategy. The inclusion of additional demographics and
the inverse Mills ratio reduces the absolute value of the coefficients but estimates remain
negative. Likewise, controlling for the lagged cohort mean income in Table 3.6 brings the
estimates closer to zero (except when FICA is included), but they are still inconsistent with
theory. These results are surprising, but column (4) in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 provides some
clarity. Recall that the cohort model is identified via the first-stage exclusion restrictions
of the interactions of cohort effects and time effects in equation (4). Again the require-
ment is that the change in log net of tax share grow differentially over cohort and time. In
column (4) I drop controls for time effects in the second-stage equation (5), so I weaken
the requirement that variation grow differentially over cohort. Positive ETI estimates are
now obtained when time effects are omitted from the model. This suggests that there is
not adequate variation across birth-year by education cohorts over time in net-of-tax shares
over and above the generic time effect.
To explore identification of the cohort model further, I turn to the familiar labor supply
model where the dependent variable is annual hours of work and the focal regressors are the
after-tax wage rate and virtual nonlabor income. I do so because the grouping estimator for
the ETI in equation (5) requires variation in the net-of-tax share over and above the fixed
cohort and time effects, whereas the labor supply model makes use of variation arising from
the same tax reforms, but also gets implicit variation in the pre-tax wage structure owing
to technological change and other factors across cohorts and time. To my knowledge the
Blundell et al. (1998) labor supply model has not been applied to samples of men and
women in the U.S. (their data was married women in the U.K.), and thus it is instructive to
examine whether the surprising negative ETI estimates we obtained from the cohort model
carry over to the labor supply case.
Specifically, estimation of the hours worked model requires two steps. The first step
is to estimate the reduced-form prediction equations for net wages (inclusive of FICA),
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virtual income, labor force participation, and having an income greater than $10,000.11 Let
the vector of first stage dependent variables be denoted by drit = [lnwit, N
v
it, Pit, Iit], and
the vector of covariates as Zrit. Then the reduced-form equations are
(6) drit = Z
r
itρ+ α
r
c + µ
r
t + α
r
c ⊗ µrt + ϑrit,
where r denotes the equation being estimated (i.e. net wage, virtual income, participa-
tion, income greater than $10,000), αrc is a cohort effect, µ
r
t is a time effect, α
r
c ⊗ µrt are
interactions of cohort and time effects, and ϑrit is an error term assumed to be uncorrelated
with the observed covariates and latent heterogeneity (I also include state fixed effects in
the first and second stages).
Following Blundell et al. (1998), I estimate the equations for the after-tax wage and
virtual income via least squares on the sample of workers only, saving the fitted residuals
ϑ̂wit and ϑ̂
Nv
it . These residuals will be included in the hours worked equation to control for
the endogeneity of the after tax wage and virtual income. The reduced form equations
for employment and income greater than $10,000 are estimated via probit maximum like-
lihood on the sample of workers and non-workers for all income levels, and those with
income greater than $10,000, respectively.12 The parameters of these equations are used to
construct sample selection correction terms. I then estimate the conditional hours worked
equation via OLS for workers only with broad incomes of $10,000 or more, appending the
various controls for selection and endogeneity,
(7) hit = α + βlnwit + γN vit +Xit + αc + µt + θwϑ̂
w
it + θN ϑ̂
Nv
it + δλ̂it + εit.
Table 3.7 contains the results for the hours worked equation separately for men and
women, where I include selection corrections for the decision to work and for broad income
in excess of $10,000. There are three specifications for each of men and women that vary
11A prediction equation for income greater than $10,000 is not typical in the labor supply literature. It is
included here to keep the labor supply analysis as parallel as possible to the ETI analysis.
12Variables needed for the estimation of the labor supply models are constructed as follows. Wages are
constructed as the ratio of annual earnings to annual hours of work (annual weeks worked times usual
hours per week). The earnings variable includes income from self-employment. I retain self-employed
individuals to keep the samples used across the ETI and labor supply analyses consistent. The after-tax
wage is constructed using the marginal tax rates described above. Observations with wages exceeding $500
per hour are dropped from the sample.
76
based on how virtual nonlabor income is defined. In column (1) virtual income is family
income less own workers earnings and family tax payments, plus an adjustment based on
the mtr times own worker earnings; column (2) defines virtual income as family income less
own workers earnings and family tax payments, plus an adjustment based on the mtr times
family earnings; column (3) defines virtual income as family income less family earnings
and family tax payments, plus an adjustment based on the mtr times family earnings. The
latter specification flows out of a joint model of labor supply where spouses earnings are
not included in nonlabor income. Each specification controls for marital status, the number
of kids under age 6, the number of kids under age 18, race, and cohort, year, and state fixed
effects.
All models produce positive uncompensated and compensated wage effects, while vir-
tual non-labor income effects are negative and significant for men and statistically zero for
women. There is substantial evidence that it is important to control both for the endogene-
ity of wages and virtual income, as well as nonrandom selection into work and for broad
incomes in excess of $10,000. The bottom panel contains the corresponding wage and in-
come elasticities evaluated at the mean of hours. For males I obtain uncompensated wage
elasticities between 0.04-0.06 and compensated wage elasticities between 0.08-0.35. For
women, uncompensated wage elasticities are about 0.12, and given the near zero income
effects, the compensated elasticities are similar in magnitude. Both sets of estimates are
well within the range found in the survey on labor supply and taxation by Keane (2011).
These significant work disincentive effects of taxation in Table 7 suggest that the additional
variation in the pre-tax wage structure provides much needed power to identify the model
that is not available in the standard ETI model relying on tax reforms alone.
3.6.3 Combining Matched Panel with Cohort Identification
An attraction of the canonical first-difference ETI model in equation (2) based on matched
panels over the cohort model in equation (5) is that the first difference model nets out
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person-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity in the log levels of income, whereas the
cohort model assumes that unobserved preferences are homogeneous within cohorts and
only vary across cohorts. If the latter assumption is violated then the cohort estimates are
not consistent and the Gruber-Saez framework of equation (2) is preferred. At the same to-
ken, the synthetic tax rate instrument proposed by Gruber and Saez (2002) and used in most
of the ETI literature has not gone without criticism (Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000); Blomquist
and Selin (2010); Weber (2011)). It is well recognized that this instrument, which is a func-
tion of income in year t-1, (yit−1), may be correlated with the error term. Researchers have
attempted to remedy this problem by including different controls for f(yit−1). However,
Weber (2011) presents evidence that the instrument remains endogenous regardless of the
additional income controls. She instead suggests using further lags of ln(yit−1) to construct
the predicted tax rate instrument akin to some panel-based labor supply models (Ziliak and
Kniesner (1999), (2005)).
With only two years of individual level data in the matched CPS I cannot use further
lags as instruments; however, I utilize an alternative approach by replacing the synthetic tax
rate instrument, ln{(1− τ̂it)/(1− τit−1)}, with an instrument based on my cohort grouping
strategy. Specifically, I first instrumented the change in an individuals net-of-tax share
with the cohort-year mean change in the log net-of-tax share, ln{(1− τ̂it)/(1− τit−1)}ct.
This resulted in highly variable and nonsensical estimates ranging from 0.4 to 4 and with
standard errors ranging from one to two, or thirty times larger than those in the baseline
models of Table 3.1. This likely stems from inadequate variation in the net of tax share
across cohorts and years akin to that described in the last section. Instead, I take advantage
of the fact that I identify the state of residence and that tax rates vary across states and
time and thus construct an instrument based on state-cohort-year mean change in the log
net-of-tax share, ln{(1− τit)/(1− τit−1)}sct. This instrument is plausibly more exogenous
because the correlation between the group mean tax rate and the idiosyncratic error term
is likely to be negligible. Results are shown in Table 3.8. My preferred estimates, which
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include FICA in the tax rate and control for selection on observables and unobservables,
yield an ETI in the range of 0.4-0.5. This suggests that using state-cohort-year variation
in conjunction with panel data offers a potentially fruitful identification strategy for ETI
models, even in taxpayer panels.13 I note that because tax panels may not contain measures
of education, it is not possible to implement the estimator in the same way. Thus, as an
additional check I re-estimated the model where instead of interacting year-of-birth with
education to define a cohort I just used the thirteen year-of-birth cohorts interacted with
state and year. The ETI using the synthetic net-of-tax share instrument at the state-birth
cohort-year level was quite similar, in the range of 0.35-0.5.
3.7 Conclusion
I present new estimates of the elasticity of taxable income using matched panels and re-
peated cross sectional data from the Current Population Survey. With few exceptions the
literature has relied upon taxpayer panel data, and this is the first use of matched panels of
the CPS to the ETI literature. Using the canonical specification and identification strategy I
find estimates of the ETI of 0.22-0.27, which surround the midpoint estimate from taxpayer
panels reported in the survey by Saez et al. (2012). This suggests that publically available
data like the CPS in conjunction with tax data from TAXSIM are fruitful alternatives for
tax-related research. This is underscored by the access to education attainment in the CPS
that permitted us to document a strong positive education gradient in the ETI, implying
that estimates of the ETI are driven by the highly skilled who have tend to possess high
permanent incomes.
The estimates also showed the importance of controlling for the payroll tax and for se-
13I note that about twenty percent of the sample is in state-cohort-year cells with fewer than ten observations
per cell, and eighty percent of the sample has fifty or fewer observations per cell. It is the prevalence of
these more sparse cells that steered us away from implementing the grouping estimator in equation (5) by
state-cohort-year instead of cohort-year. However, in results not tabulated we re-estimated the grouping
model on state-cohort-year and found negative estimates of the ETI akin to those in Table 3.5. These
sparse cells are less problematic for the state-cohort-year synthetic instrument in Table 3.8 provided that
any measurement error in the instrument is uncorrelated with the model error (Wooldridge (2002)).
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lection. When I include the payroll tax in the net-of-tax share I find that the ETI falls by
about one-half. Given that the Social Security portion of FICA captures at least 80 percent
of the family income distribution today, and the uncapped portion of the Medicare tax even
more, the results suggest that the expanding scope of the payroll tax makes the tax structure
more proportional, which has the effect of attenuating variation over workers and time in
the net of tax share and thus the implicit variation used to identify the ETI. Likewise, non-
random selection attenuates the ETI by about thirty percent. However, the results show that
it does not matter whether one simply controls for selection on observables via inclusion of
a wider set of demographics, or whether one controls formally for selection on unobserv-
ables. Because taxpayer panels often contain some demographics beyond marital status
such as age, gender, number of dependents, and filing status, the estimates suggest that
controlling flexibly for these confounding factors is important. However, tax panels gen-
erally do not contain information on race and education, and I found these to be the most
important demographics affecting the ETI. Potentially more troubling is my finding that the
identification of the ETI is fragile. Specifically, several authors have raised concerns that
the synthetic net of tax share may be correlated with the model error term, and if true, this
renders the typical estimates inconsistent. Because this is a just identifying assumption it
is not testable. I find that if I use an alternative identification strategy based on a grouping
estimator adopted from the labor supply literature, the estimated ETI is negative, contrary
to theory. The same grouping estimator yields theory-consistent compensated wage elastic-
ities of labor supply for men and women in the range of 0.08-0.35. The difference between
the two stems from the fact that the wage elasticity of labor supply model is identified not
only from differential effects of tax policy across cohorts, but also from differential changes
in the pre-tax wage structure owing to other factors such as technological change. At first
blush this suggests that the labor supply framework might provide a more robust approach
to welfare analysis. In a bid to improve the robustness of ETI identification I combined in-
sights from both the ETI and grouping approaches to construct a synthetic instrument that
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varies by state, cohort, and year. This more aggregate instrument is plausibly more exoge-
nous and yields an ETI in the range of 0.4-0.5. Because it is possible to construct a similar
state-cohort-year instrument in large taxpayer panels, my results suggest that this could be a
fruitful alternative for identification for future research on the elasticity of taxable income.
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Figure 3.1 Life-Cycle Net of Tax Rate by Education 
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Table 3.1  Baseline Estimates of the Elasticity of Taxable Income with Synthetic Tax Rate Instrument 
 
Broad Income Taxable Income 
 
 
Fed + State Fed +State+ Fica Fed + State Fed +State+ Fica 
 
      Spline of ln(income) 
     Elasticity 0.217*** 0.113*** 0.272*** 0.139*** 
 
 
(0.037) (0.028) (0.045) (0.035) 
 
      ln(income) 
     Elasticity 0.202*** 0.098*** 0.224*** 0.108*** 
 
 
(0.034) (0.027) (0.040) (0.032) 
 
      Observations 198428 198427 196486 196485   
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All regressions are weighted by income and 
include controls for marital status and time effects for initial year. Income range is broad income greater than 
$10,000. 
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Table 3.2 Demographics and Heterogeneity in the Elasticity of Taxable Income 
 
Broad Income 
 
Taxable Income 
 
Fed + State Fed + State + Fica 
 
Fed + State Fed + State + Fica 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Elasticity 0.144*** -0.202*** 0.075*** -0.136***  0.159*** -0.276*** 0.084** -0.179*** 
 
(0.035) (0.045) (0.027) (0.035)  (0.043) (0.057) (0.034) (0.046) 
 
         
Elasticity* Some College  0.207***  0.145**   0.302***  0.199*** 
 
 -0.075  (0.060)   -0.091  (0.073) 
Elasticity*College  0.588***  0.368***   0.752***  0.469*** 
 
 -0.099  (0.079)   -0.114  (0.092) 
Elasticity*Graduate Degree  1.181***  0.717***   1.368***  0.831*** 
 
 -0.111  (0.089)   -0.127  (0.102) 
 
         
Observations 198428 198428 198428 198428  196486 196486 196486 196486 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions are weighted, include a 10 piece income spline, marital status, and time 
effects for initial year.  The additional demographic controls are age, age squared, gender (female), race (controls for African American and other, with white as 
the omitted group), education (high school, some college, college, and graduate degree with less than high school as the omitted group), indicators for children 
under age 6 and 18, and state fixed effects. Income range is broad income over $10,000. 
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Table 3.3  Estimates of the Elasticity of Taxable Income with Control for Non-random Sample Selection 
 
Broad Income 
 
Taxable Income 
 
Fed+State Fed+State+Fica   Fed+State Fed+State+Fica 
With Selection 
    
     Elasticity 0.160*** 0.066** 
 
0.216*** 0.094*** 
 
(0.036) (0.028) 
 
(0.044) (0.034) 
      Inverse Mills Ratio -1.246*** -1.227*** 
 
-1.303*** -1.281*** 
 
(0.033) (0.032) 
 
(0.051) (0.049) 
      With Selection & Controlling for Additional Demographics 
   
     Elasticity 0.145*** 0.076*** 
 
0.160*** 0.085** 
 
(0.035) (0.027) 
 
(0.043) (0.034) 
      Inverse Mills Ratio 0.079 0.076 
 
0.054 0.049 
 
(0.051) (0.051) 
 
(0.085) (0.084) 
      Observations 198428 198427   196486 196485 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All regressions are weighted, include a 10 
piece income spline and controls for marital status and time effects for initial year. Additional demographics 
include age, age squared, gender (female), race (controls for African American and other, with white as the 
omitted group), education (high school, some college, college, and graduate degree with less than high school as 
the omitted group), indicators for children under age 6 and 18, and state fixed effects.  Income range is broad 
income greater than $10,000. 
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Table 3. 4  The impact of demographics on ETI estimates 
 
Broad Income 
 
Taxable income 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
                
Elasticity 0.217*** 0.191*** 0.144*** 
 
0.272*** 0.224*** 0.159*** 
 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.035) 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.043) 
Controls include: 
          marital status yes yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
   state effects no yes yes  no yes yes 
   gender, age and children no yes yes 
 
no yes yes 
   race, education no no yes 
 
no no yes 
        
Observations 198428 198428 198428 
 
196486 196486 196486 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The net of tax share is federal+state. All 
regressions are weighted, include a 10 piece income spline, marital status, and time effects for initial year.  The 
additional demographic controls are age, age squared, gender (female), race (controls for African American and 
other, with white as the omitted group), education (high school, some college, college, and graduate degree with 
less than high school as the omitted group), indicators for children under age 6 and 18, and state fixed effects. 
Income range is broad income over $10,000. 
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Table 3.5 Cohort-Based  Estimates of the Elasticity of Taxable Income  
 
Broad Income 
 
Taxable Income 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
 
 
Baseline 
(2) 
 
Additional 
demographics 
(3)  
Additional 
demographics 
and selection 
(4) 
 
 
no time 
 
(1) 
 
 
Baseline 
(2) 
 
Additional 
demographics 
(3)  
Additional 
demographics 
and selection 
(4) 
 
 
no time 
Fed + State:         
 
        
Elasticity -2.631*** -2.721*** -2.686*** 1.052*** 
 
-2.593*** -3.075*** -3.005*** 1.019*** 
 
(0.055) (0.053) (0.054) (0.042) 
 
(0.061) (0.056) (0.058) (0.044) 
          Inverse Mills Ratio 
  
-0.091*** 
    
-0.180*** 
 
   
(0.027) 
    
(0.031) 
 Fed + State + FICA: 
        Elasticity -2.490*** -0.560*** -0.516*** 1.085*** 
 
-2.462*** -0.616*** -0.580*** 1.010*** 
 
(0.073) (0.116) (0.114) (0.044) 
 
(0.080) (0.128) (0.127) (0.046) 
         Inverse Mills Ratio 
  
0.171*** 
    
0.140*** 
 
   
(0.038) 
    
(0.042) 
 Observations 462864 462864 462864 462864   458441 458441 458441 458441 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions are weighted by broad income and include controls for marital status.  
Income range is broad income greater than $10,000.  Additional demographics include gender (female), race (controls for African American and other, with 
white as the omitted group), indicators for children under age 6 and 18, and state fixed effects.   
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Table 3.6 Cohort-Based Estimates of the Elasticity of Taxable Income with Control for Lagged Cohort Mean Income 
  Broad Income   Taxable Income 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
 
 
Baseline 
(2) 
 
Additional 
demographics 
(3)  
Additional 
demographics 
and selection 
(4) 
 
 
no time 
 
(1) 
 
 
Baseline 
(2) 
 
Additional 
demographics 
(3)  
Additional 
demographics 
and selection 
(4) 
 
 
no time 
Fed + State:         
 
        
Elasticity -1.408*** -1.447*** -1.469*** 0.245*** 
 
-2.646*** -3.134*** -3.070*** 0.933*** 
 
(0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.039) 
 
(0.063) (0.058) (0.060) (0.044) 
          Inverse Mills Ratio 
  
0.151*** 
    
-0.153*** 
 
   
(0.034) 
    
(0.031) 
 Fed + State + FICA: 
         Elasticity -1.283*** -1.351*** -1.387*** 0.157*** 
 
-1.423*** -1.774*** -1.812*** 0.107** 
 
(0.085) (0.083) (0.084) (0.041) 
 
(0.092) (0.088) (0.089) (0.043) 
          Inverse Mills Ratio 
  
0.258*** 
    
0.214*** 
 
   
(0.037) 
    
(0.040) 
 
          Observations 462864 462864 462864 462864 
 
458441 458441 458441 458441 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions are weighted by broad income and include controls for marital 
status and  lagged cohort income.  Income range is broad income greater than $10,000.  Additional demographics include gender (female), race 
(controls for African American and other, with white as the omitted group), indicators for children under age 6 and 18, and state fixed effects.   
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Table 3.7  A Cohort-Based Model of the Effects of Taxes on the Labor Supply of Men and Women 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
After-Tax Wage 54.871** 40.074* 86.821*** 
 
89.559*** 84.838*** 94.178*** 
 
(21.823) (21.727) (22.084) 
 
(28.151) (28.216) (27.759) 
Virtual Non-Labor Income -7.157*** -3.283*** -18.693*** 
 
0.606 0.847 -3.475 
 
(0.817) (0.592) (1.508) 
 
(0.906) (0.597) (2.140) 
Wage Residual -145.144*** -130.886*** -177.959*** 
 
-120.413*** -116.274*** -123.479*** 
 
(21.890) (21.797) (22.151) 
 
(28.177) (28.242) (27.811) 
Virtual Income Residual 6.496*** 2.999*** 18.663*** 
 
-2.970*** -2.145*** -0.020 
 
(0.818) (0.594) (1.509) 
 
(0.907) (0.598) (2.142) 
Lambda (work) -586.663*** -574.550*** -514.632*** 
 
-91.285*** -80.945** -42.810 
 
(31.354) (32.018) (30.338) 
 
(32.559) (32.708) (31.903) 
lambda2 (income > $10k) 409.779*** 410.753*** 371.269*** 
 
-83.594*** -95.275*** -163.605*** 
 
(31.584) (31.655) (31.551) 
 
(29.717) (29.785) (29.668) 
        Uncompensated Wage 
Elasticity 0.04 0.03 0.06 
 
0.12 0.11 0.12 
Compensated Wage Elasticity 0.15 0.08 0.35 
 
0.11 0.10 0.16 
Income Elasticity -0.11 -0.05 -0.29 
 
0.01 0.01 -0.04 
        Observations 295310 289010 289010   141136 132747 132747 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The mtr and tax payments include FICA.  Each specification 
controls for marital status, children under age 6 and 18, race, and cohort, year, and state fixed effects. Column (1) defines virtual 
income as family income less own workers earnings plus an adjustment based on the mtr times worker earnings; column (2) defines 
virtual income as family income less own workers earnings plus an adjustment based on the mtr times family earnings; column (3) 
defines virtual income as family income less family earnings plus an adjustment based on the mtr times family earnings. 
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Table 3.8 Estimates of the Elasticity of Taxable Income Using a Cohort-Mean Synthetic Instrument 
 
Broad Income 
 
Taxable Income 
 
Fed + State Fed + State + Fica Fed + State Fed + State + Fica 
Baseline 
           Elasticity 0.680*** 0.569*** 
 
0.884*** 0.724*** 
 
(0.238) (0.128) 
 
(0.303) (0.170) 
      
With Selection & Controlling for Additional Demographics  
 Elasticity 0.456** 0.408*** 
 
0.569** 0.515*** 
 
(0.193) (0.111) 
 
(0.244) (0.147) 
      Observations 197939 197938  196020 196019 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions are weighted, include a 10 
piece income spline and controls for marital status and initial year. Income range is broad income greater than 
$10,000.  Standard errors are clustered by cohort.  Additional demographics include gender (female), race 
(controls for African and other, with white as the omitted group), indicators for children under age 6 and 18, and 
state fixed effects. 
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4 Estate Tax Competition and Migration: Examining Responses to the Repeal of the State
Death Tax Credit
4.1 Introduction
On the eve of the fiscal cliff negotiations, the federal estate tax was among the many tax
provisions being debated that was set to automatically revert to the 2001 policy rule in
the absence of an agreement. The stakes for those with sizable estates were quite large
given that failure to reach a compromise would result in the generous five million dollar
exemption dropping to only one million dollars and the currently reduced top marginal
tax rate of thirty-five percent climbing to fifty-five percent. On the other hand, estimates
suggested that maintaining the current policy would cost the federal government over $335
million in revenue for the 2013 fiscal year and nearly $370 billion dollars over the next
ten years.14 Interestingly, the state governments also had much wrapped up in the fate of
the federal estate tax - approximately three billion dollars for the 2013 fiscal year alone
(Francis (2012)).
Historically, estate taxes have been imposed at both the federal and state level. And
through most of recent history, they have been linked together through a federal credit
initially implemented in 1924 to help counter the pressures of interstate competition.15 The
credit, known as the state death tax credit, directly offset one’s federal estate tax burden
by the amount paid to states up to a set maximum. The portion of the tax equal to the
maximum federal credit became known as the pick-up or soak-up tax because it allowed
the states to capture a share of the federal revenue without imposing any additional tax
liability.
Over time the majority of states repealed their stand alone estate taxes in favor of re-
liance on the pick-up tax as their sole source of revenue from the taxation of estates. Con-
14The estimates were produce by the Joint Committee on Taxation in a document entitled “Estimated Revenue
Effects of the Revenue Provisions Contained in an Amendment in the Nature of A Substitute to h.R.8, the
“American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012” as passed by the Senate on January 1, 2012”
15See section 4.3.1 for further discussion.
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way and Rork (2004) investigated this phenomenon over the period 1976-1999 and found
strong evidence suggesting interstate competition was the force behind this trend. By 2000,
only twelve states imposed any tax liability in excess of the pick-up tax. Then, on the heels
of nearly a century of growing uniformity in estate tax policy, Congress passed the Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001 which contained
legislation fundamentally altering the estate tax landscape. Specifically, EGTRRA gradu-
ally phased out the federal estate tax and in the process of doing so, repealed the state death
tax credit.16 Interestingly, many states responded to the loss of their pick-up tax revenue by
breaking ties with the federal government and retaining their taxes in a process known as
“decoupling”. Within just four years of its passage, EGTRRA had left the nation divided -
with approximately half of the states imposing some form of estate tax while the other half
did not.
This new divide in state level estate tax policy has rekindled fears of tax-induced migra-
tion and breathed new life into an almost dormant form of interstate competition. One need
not look far for evidence of concern over the newly differentiated state estate tax policies.
Headlines reading “Don’t Die in New Jersey,” “Reasons to Relocate” or “Where Not to Die
in 2013” are easily found and highlight two questions of great interest regarding state estate
taxation.17 First, will states wishing to retain their estate taxes feel pressure from those that
no longer impose any form of estate taxation? History, as well as recent policy decisions
would suggest yes.18 And second, will the affluent elderly begin to flow out of states with
relatively unfavorable policies? In this regard, the evidence produced by a growing empiri-
cal literature examining tax-induced migration by the elderly seems to weigh more heavily
towards no – though subtle differences in the more recent state estate tax landscape may
make the reward to such behavior greater than in the past.
16The 2001 EGTRRA is part of the legislation commonly referred to as the “Bush tax cuts.” These provisions
were initially set to sunset in 2011 but have since been extended as part of the 2010 Tax Relief, Unemploy-
ment Insurance Reauthorization and Creation Act and the more recent American Taxpayer Relief Act of
2012.
17Skinner (2011), Pane (1995), Forbes (2013)
18For instance both Kansas and Oklahoma repealed their estate taxes in 2010, while Ohio is slated to follow.
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To address these intertwined questions, I empirically investigate spatial patterns in state
estate tax policy for the decade following the 2001 reform. However, rather than relying on
the commonly applied tax reaction function model, I begin with a structural simultaneous
equation framework in which the estate tax base and estate tax rate are simultaneously
determined. Specifically, I model the estate tax base as a function of a state’s own estate
tax rate and the estate tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions while the estate tax rate is
modeled as a function of the state’s available base and the policies being implemented
in neighboring jurisdictions.19 The advantage of such an approach is that it provides the
researcher the ability to directly consider how a state’s tax base may influence the selected
tax policy through its size, political influence, and most importantly, its mobility - the factor
presumed to be the causal influence behind the alleged tax competition behavior among
states.
Results indicate a state’s estate tax base is negatively influenced by its own tax rate and
positively influenced by the tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions.20 A state’s estate tax rate
is also positively influenced by the rates set in neighboring jurisdiction - consistent strategic
policy behavior. Finally, some evidence is found suggesting a growing estate tax base may
lead to a decline in the state’s effective tax rate. The finding that states react to the tax
policies set in neighboring jurisdictions combined with the responsiveness of the estate tax
base provide strong support of estate tax competition. However, a state’s estimated reaction
to a ten percent cut in the tax rate of their neighbors is fairly large (an own tax cut ranging
somewhere between 4-7.8 percent, depending on the definition of neighbors), while the
reaction of the tax base seems much smaller. Specifically, a ten percent increase in a state’s
own estate tax rate is estimated to lead to a reduction in their estate tax base of only .3-1.5
percent suggesting the tax base mobility does not fully explain the observed tax reactions.
19Similar applications of simultaneous equation models include Shroder (1995) who studied the simultaneous
determination of state welfare populations and benefit levels and Brett and Pinkse (2000) which examined
the simultaneous determination of the municipal tax bases and rates in British Columbia.
20For the purpose of this analysis, two definitions of a state’s ”neighbors” are considered. The first is simply
geographic neighbors (or boarding states) while the second is based on migration flows. More detail is
provided section 4.4.1.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two briefly reviews the lit-
erature on interjurisdictional competition and base mobility with a focus on estate taxes
and the elderly while section three provides the reader with some historical context on the
taxation of estates and a detailed description of the recent policy landscape. Section four
presents the empirical framework and econometric methods. Section five describes the data
and measurement issues, section six presents the results, and section seven concludes and
provides a discussion of future research.
4.2 Existing Literature
Fiscal reaction functions, in which one state’s policies are a function of those selected by
their neighbors, have been used extensively in the literature investigating the strategic pol-
icy setting behavior of decentralized governments. For instance, corporate, sales, excise,
and property taxes have all been the subject of both theoretical and empirical investigations
of strategic tax competition (Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Devereux et al. (2002), Rork
(2003), among others). Similarly, strategic policy setting over welfare benefits, state per
capita expenditures, and expenditures on categories such as education and pollution abate-
ment have also been examined (Figlio et. al (1999), Saavedra (2000b), Case et al. (1993),
Baicker (2005), Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) among others). These studies typically
turn up significant empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that state governments are
engaged in strategic policy setting though it is often unclear as to which channel explains
this behavior (competition, yardstick competition, mimicking, common intellectual trend,
etc.). To address this matter, researchers develop compelling arguments which favor com-
petition as the driving factor behind their results. For instance, Figlio et al. (1999) present
evidence of response asymmetries in a state’s reaction to changes in their neighbors’ wel-
fare benefits (i.e. states respond stronger when neighbors cut benefits than when they in-
crease them) and argue such findings are more consistent with a story of competition than
the alternative explanations. Similarly, in a study of strategic tax competition, Devereux
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et al. (2002) show evidence that strategic interactions are only found for open economies
(i.e. those without capital controls in place). Conway and Rork (2004) extended the empir-
ical literature to include estimates of strategic reactions among states in the setting of their
estate tax policies over the period 1967-1999. Strong evidence indicating states set estate
tax policies interdependently is detected. To demonstrate the results were likely explained
by tax competition rather than some other factor or spurious correlation, the authors split
their sample into three periods - the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s - and reestimate the model to
confirm their hypothesis that competition should decline over time as more and more states
hit the “bottom” created by the state death tax credit and could no longer manipulate their
tax rates.
An alternative strategy for identifying competition is to directly estimate the mobility
of the base that jurisdictions are assumed to be competing over. For instance, a volumi-
nous empirical literature has investigated “welfare migration” or whether or not the poor
gravitate towards states with more generous social programs (Gramlich and Laren (1984),
Blank (1988), Levine and Zimmerman (1995), Walker (1994), McKinnish (2005, 2007),
and Gelbach (2004)). Another growing literature has examined the locational decisions of
seniors and whether they are influenced by estate taxes and other fiscal policies such as
income tax breaks for the elderly (Bakija and Slemrod (2004), Conway and Rork (2006,
2008, 2011), Brülhart and Parchet (2010)). Locational decisions of individuals based on
state income taxes and millionaire taxes have also recently been examined (Coomes and
Hoyt (2008), Young and Varner (2011). Finally, Buettner (2003), Brett and Pinske (2000),
and Riedl and Rocha-Akis (2009) examine the mobility of bases in the context of capital
taxation.
Interestingly, the empirical findings of the fiscal reaction function based literatures and
the approaches that directly investigate the mobility of the base are often seemingly self-
contradictory - especially when the base consists of mobile individuals. For instance, there
is ample empirical evidence of welfare competition (Figlio et. al (1999), Saavedra (2000))
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and yet the evidence of welfare migration is typically minimal.21 As previously discussed,
regarding estate taxes, Conway and Rork (2004) documented strong evidence supporting
the presence of interstate competition. However, in subsequent work these authors find
no statistical evidence that the elderly react to state estate tax policies in making their mi-
gration decisions - in fact, they instead present evidence that the causality may run the
other way (Conway and Rork (2006)), a possibility that will be considered in my empirical
framework. Specifically they find that higher levels of elderly in-migration and especially
net in-migration contribute to a higher probability of a state repealing or reducing its es-
tate tax. An important caveat acknowledged by the authors is that residence choices of
the very rich elderly may be impacted by estate taxes while overall elderly migration in
the population aged sixty-five and up is not. This conclusion is supported by Bakija and
Slemrod (2004) who find that high state estate taxes have a statistically significant, though
small, negative impact on the number of federal estate returns filed. Additional evidence
supporting the mobility of the wealthy elderly comes from Young and Varner (20011) who
use a difference in difference strategy to study the response of the affluent to a millionaires
tax enacted in the state of New Jersey. Though their results do not indicate much respon-
siveness in the overall millionaire tax base, two subgroups - rich people of retirement age,
and those who earn their income from investments - are found to be responsive. Finally,
in a study of bequest tax reforms in Swiss cantons, Brülhart and Parchet (2010) find that
changing tax rates have essentially no effect on the relevant estate tax base.22 What they
do find is that inheritance tax revenues are increasing in inheritance tax rates even over
the long run leading them to conclude that the alleged pressures of tax competition did not
manifest in reality.
A third strategy for identifying competition over a mobile base combines these two
approaches into one by considering the simultaneous determination of a jurisdiction’s fiscal
21See for example Southwick (1981), Gramlich and Laren (1984), Blank (1988), Levine and Zimmerman
(1995), Walker (1994), McKinnish (2005), McKinnish (2007b), and Gelbach (2004).
22Though negative tax rate effects are obtained in eighteen out of twenty specifications, the results are only
weakly statistically significant in two cases when the most narrow definition of the tax base is used.
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policy and the affected base. For instance, such an approach has been applied several
times in the literature investigating strategic behavior in the determination of state welfare
benefits and the migration of the poor (Shroder (1995), Berry et al. (2003)). Similarly, Brett
and Pinske (2000) applied this strategy in their study of the determinants of municipal
tax rates in British Columbia. By first developing a model in which a jurisdiction’s tax
rate and base are simultaneously determined and following it with an estimation of the
system’s reduced-form tax equation, the authors are able to decompose the reduced-form
tax effect (how a jurisdiction responds to its neighbors taxes) into two components. Their
analysis reveals the observed reduced-form result is explained largely by the influence of
a jurisdiction’s own tax base on the rate rather than the impact of neighbors’ tax rates on
the base. These methods can be advantageous as they provide the researcher the ability to
identify both spatial patterns in tax policies, and more importantly, the mechanisms that
explain them. Applying these methods to estate taxes is particularly appropriate given the
commonly invoked argument that the rich will flee high tax states and the emerging spatial
patterns in the post-EGTRAA estate tax landscape. Before proceeding to the empirical
framework the following section offers background on the use of estate taxation in U.S.
and a detailed description of the recent policy changes.
4.3 Estate Taxes
Estate taxes have existed in the United States for over 200 years. During the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, federal estate taxes were actually enacted and subsequently re-
pealed three times. Though each round of taxation took a different form, all were spawned
from above ordinary revenue needs due to military activity and all were repealed upon the
conflict’s end.23 State estate taxes have a history all their own which began in 1826 when
Pennsylvania became the first state to impose an inheritance tax. Like their federal counter-
23See Gale and Slemrod (2000), and Cooper (2004) for more detailed histories of the federal estate tax.
Cooper 2004 also provides a detailed history of state estate taxes. Unless otherwise noted, much of the
following information is drawn from this source.
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parts, state estate taxes were also initially in a state of flux. Over the first 65 years of their
history, only a modest number of states enacted such taxes and those that did frequently
amended or repealed them after a short while.24 At the turn of the century however, a new
pattern emerged in state death taxation. Between 1892 and 1916 thirty-four states enacted
estate taxes. And unlike the initial set of state estate taxes, the taxes created by newer leg-
islation adopted more progressive rate structures and were of greater fiscal consequence.
However, by 1916, the year the federal estate tax returned due to wartime pressures, state
estate taxes had begun to slide into a period of relative decline. While the encroachment by
the federal government into the estate tax arena played some role in this new trend, many
felt the real reason laid elsewhere, specifically, tax havens such as Florida.
4.3.1 Interstate Competition and the Federal Solution
A few rogue states had strategically failed to adopt any form of estate taxation in the pursuit
of tax haven status. As a result, the fear of estate tax-induced migration by wealthy popu-
lations had begun to sweep the nation. Florida, the original tax haven, was soon joined by
Alabama, while Nevada and California were preparing to follow suit. State policy makers
felt they would soon be faced with a choice - repeal your estate tax or lose some wealthy
residents. Congress attempted to intervene in 1924 by enacting a state death tax credit but
its cap at twenty-five percent of the federal tax made it too low to have a significant impact.
Between 1924 and 1926 three national conferences were held to address the matter, but
it soon became clear that the states could not solve the problem alone. Finally at the last
convention a compromise was reached: Congress would continue to impose a federal estate
tax with approval of the states but the state death tax credit would be expanded to grant the
states eighty percent of this revenue. As long as Congress continued to impose a federal
estate tax, states would have an incentive to impose their own estate taxes approximately
24 For example Massachusetts imposed an estate tax in1841 which was repealed only two years later. Wis-
consin’s 1868 estate tax lasted only four years. Alabama’s 1848 estate tax was amended at least five times
before its repeal in 1867.
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equal to the federal credit.
4.3.2 Interstate Competition Returns
Over time all states eventually adopted the pick-up tax discussed above. However, prior
to 1960, only four states chose to collect only the pick up portion of this tax -Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, and Georgia (Conway and Rork (2004)). The creation of the state death
tax credit had allowed states to retain their traditional estate taxes and thus the remaining
state legislators chose to levy additional estate taxes over and above those covered by the
state death tax credit leaving a modest level of variation in state estate tax rates. Then in
1976, New Mexico became the first state to eliminate their traditional estate tax in favor of
sole reliance on the pick-up tax. This move was quickly followed by the bordering states
Utah, Arizona, and Colorado along with Vermont, Virginia and North Dakota.25 By the
year 2000, thirty-eight states imposed only the pick up tax and several more were slated
to adopt this policy in the near future. Uniform estate taxation across the states seemed to
be just around the corner. And then came EGTRRA followed by a string of state moves to
“decouple” from the federal government. The story is illustrated graphically by Figure 1
which documents the coefficient of variation for estate tax revenues as a percentage of total
state revenues over the past forty years. One can see an increase in variability corresponding
perfectly with the start of the pick-up tax revolution in 1976. This trend turns downward by
the late eighties as more and more states became pick-up only states. Then, right around
2002 - the year in which states would first feel the impact of EGTRRA, the trend begins to
climb.
4.3.3 Post EGTRRA Landscape
Following the passage of EGTRRA, the federal estate tax was gradually phased out through
a scheduled series of increases in the exclusion amount and marginal tax rate reductions
25See Conway and Rork (2004) for a chronology of state actions to remove their estate inheritance and gift
taxes over the period of 1976-2003.
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until its full repeal in 2010.26 The credit for state death taxes faced a much quicker phase
out. Specifically, the credit was reduced by twenty-five percent each year beginning in
2002. Full elimination of the credit took effect in 2005 at which point a deduction became
available to those living (or owning property) in states that continued to impose some form
of estate taxation.27 Figure 2 shows the gradual phase out of the federal estate tax with the
schedule for the exclusion amounts and top marginal rates from 2001 through the current
year. Figure 3 illustrates the changing state and federal revenue shares of a hypothetical
estate worth three million dollars in a state imposing only the pick-up tax as the tax cuts
were phased in. As one can see, the loss of pick-up tax revenue was quickly felt by states
taking no action to retain their estate taxes. This point is further illustrated by Figure 4
which plots the federal net estate tax collected against the revenue transferred to the states
through the state death tax credit and deduction that took effect in 2005. From the the
figure one can see the revenue hit to the states was immediate while the federal revenue
stayed somewhat level (in part due to the pick-up tax revenue no longer transferred to the
states) until the exclusion amount increased into the higher two and three and one half
million dollar range.28 After the year 2005, the revenue transferred to the states due to the
deduction rose for a period and then began declining around 2008. This is likely explained
by the movement of many states to “decouple” from the federal government.
Decoupling refers to a process through which states can sever ties with the federal
26 Under EGTRRA’s sunset provision, these tax reductions were set to expire at the end of 2010 with the
estate tax reverting back to its pre-EGTRRA schedule for 2011. However subsequent legislation extended
the tax cuts by reinstating the estate tax with a five million dollar exclusion and top rate of thirty-five
percent through 2012. In the absence of this change, the exclusion amount would have returned to one
million dollars with a top rate of fifty-five percent.The legislation extending the cuts was known as the Tax
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010. Subsequent legislation
created as part of the 2013 Fiscal Cliff negotiations has set a new four million dollar exclusion with a top
rate of forty percent.
27On December 1, 2005, twenty-three states and the District of Columbia has some form of estate, gift, or
inheritance tax in place (Cooper (2004))
28Graetz and Shapiro (2005) provide an interesting discussion of the political maneuvering that went into
obtaining a full (though temporary) repeal of the federal estate tax. They highlight that initial legislation
provided for “equal treatment of the states” meaning their revenue would be reduced at the same rate as
the federal government. However, as the bill made its way through the Senate Finance Committee the state
revenue phase out was accelerated to keep the total revenue cost of the tax bill down. State lawmakers took
action to oppose this change but were unsuccessful.
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government’s estate tax code. Doing so allows a state to retain their estate tax revenues
which would have otherwise been phased out and fully eliminated with the pick-up tax in
2005. Rather than creating new estate tax systems, most states decoupled through simply
referencing the federal estate code (specifically the maximum credit for state death taxes)
at a pre-EGTRRA date.29 Three states including Connecticut, Nebraska, and Washington
opted to enact their own stand alone estate taxes (McNichol et. al (2003), McNichol (2006),
Conway and Rork (2004)). Figure 5 shows the percentage of states collecting only the pick-
up tax over the last decade. In 2001, roughly seventy percent of states relied fully on the
pick-up tax. By 2005, the percentage had dropped close to 50 percent and then began to
creep back up as several states that had initially retained their taxes moved to repeal them.30
As discussed above, the majority of decoupled states simply continued to impose an
estate tax equal to what the tax would have been under the old federal schedule for the
maximum credit for state death taxes. This schedule had a progressive marginal tax rate
structure with a minimum rate of eight-tenths of a percent (for adjusted taxable estates val-
ued $40,000 or more) and a top rate of sixteen percent (for adjusted taxable estates valued
at $10,040,000 or more).31 However, most decoupled states chose their own exemption
amounts which differed from the exemption amount schedule being followed by the fed-
eral government. For instance, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
York, Oregon, Tennessee, and the District of Columbia chose to keep their exemption equal
to $1,000,000 while the federal exemption amount climbed to $1,500,000; $2,000,000;
$3,500,000; and $5,000,000. Only North Carolina and Delaware allowed their state thresh-
olds to climb all the way to the $5,000,000 federal exemption level. Ohio had the lowest
29The laws in some states -Kansas, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, and the District of
Columbia - already reference pre-EGTRAA law and thus decoupling occurred automatically if lawmakers
failed to update the reference. Other states –Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin – had to take
action to decouple which involved passing legislation linking their estate law to the pre-EGTRRA federal
law.
30 Appendix Figure 1 provides a timeline of legislative changes made to estate tax policy following the
passage of EGTRRA.
31See appendix Figure A2 for schedule.
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estate tax exemption followed by New Jersey with respective thresholds of $338,330 and
$675,000. States imposing inheritance taxes had even lower thresholds. This resulted in a
tax gap where estates of certain values could be subject to a state tax without being subject
to the federal tax. This gap between the value of the estate subject to state taxation but
not federal taxation is depicted in Figure 6 which plots both the mean and maximum tax
gap. One can see the gap rose quickly over the past years as some state chose to retain low
exemption levels.
The previous discussion highlights the fact that considerable variation continues to exist
in the estate tax policies set by state governments. Furthermore, by tracing out the recent
changes in state estate tax policy one can see that these policies appear to be continuing in
a state of fluctuation. To gain a deeper understanding in the factors determining state estate
tax policies, I now turn to my empirical investigation. The following section describes the
empirical framework.
4.4 Empirical Framework
Much of the recent policy debate surrounding state level estate taxes is based upon two
notions. At the individual level, tax differentials can hypothetically induce an exodus of
wealthy taxpayers from high tax states to a growing number of low or no tax states. Simi-
larly, at the state level, concern over this outcome can lead states to reduce or abandon their
estate taxes. The hypotheses surrounding the situation can be described with the setup put
forth here. Assume there is a country made up of 2 states, state i and state j. Let mi denote
the proportion of millionaire retirees residing in state i and ti the estate tax they face. The
estate tax rate in the other state is denoted by tj while Xi and Zi denotes the vectors of
other relevant state characteristics determining the locational decisions and tax rates. Then
mi = f(ti, tj;Xi),
∂mi
∂ti
< 0 and
∂mi
∂t−i
> 0 (13)
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ti = f(tj,mi;Zi),
∂ti
∂t−i
> 0 and
∂ti
∂mi
< or > 0 (14)
Here we can see estate tax base, mi is a function of the estate tax base in a state’s own
jurisdiction as well as the alternative location and the estate tax rate is a function of the
available base. All else equal we expect an increase in a state i’s tax rate to have a negative
influence on its tax base and increase the tax rate set in state j to have a positive influence
on the base in state i. A positive relationship between a states own tax rate and the tax
rate set in neighboring jurisdictions would also be expected under the tax tax competition
scenario. Finally, we would also expect the available tax base to have an influence on the
selected estate tax rate. However, this relationship is less clear. For instance, the fact that
many states in New England (including New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) chose to
retain their estate taxes may well be explained by the fact that these states have relatively
large potential estate tax bases which would make abandoning the tax more costly than
in states like Wyoming or West Virginia. In this case we might expect a growing base to
have a positive influence on the rate. Alternatively, if the citizens composing the tax base
have political influence then we might expect the base to negatively influence the tax rate.
As previously discussed, support for this hypothesis was presented in Conway and Rork
(2006). Finally, it is possible that a growing tax base could also produce enough revenue
to allow for a lower state tax rate or higher exclusion amount. Before introducing the
empirical methodologies used to estimate this simultaneous equation model, I must first
discuss the concept of neighborhood.
4.4.1 Defining Neighbors
In the analysis, I seek to determined whether and to what extent a state’s estate tax base
depends on their own estate tax rate as well as the estate tax rates prevailing in competing
103
states. In addition, I also investigate the extent to which a state’s own estate tax rate is
influenced by the estate tax rates in these competing states. The estimation of such models
therefore requires one to specify in advance which states constitute competitors or “neigh-
bors.” Here I implement two intuitively appealing definitions of neighbors – one based sim-
ply on geography, the other on more complicated economic considerations. The first, WI,
is a basic contiguity weighting scheme. Under this specification a state’s competitors are
simply their immediate geographic neighbors or the states with which they share a border.
Specifically, states that do not share a common border with state i are signed are assigned
zero weight, (ωij = 0), while equal weights (ωij = 1/ni) are given to bordering states
where ni is the number of states contiguous to i. While it is possible for individuals fleeing
an unfavorable tax environment to consider only the closest states as alternative locations,
this assumption is generally hard to palate given the historical population flows of the el-
derly and the fact that the mobile population under consideration is one of great financial
means. And because states know that they do not only lose and receive elderly residents
from their geographic neighbors, they too likely consider a wider set of states when setting
their own estate tax rates. To address this matter I use data from the 2000 census to con-
struct a second set of weights based on population flows of the elderly between 1995 and
2000. With this scheme state i assigns each state j a weight of ωij = ejt/
∑n
j=1 ejt where
eij is the number of elderly migrants to state i that lived in state j five years ago. I focus
on migrations flows of the whole elderly population rather than a certain income class to
avoid introducing additional endogeneity issues.
4.4.2 Econometric Methodology
The econometric model for the simultaneously determined estate tax base and estate tax
rate is given below.
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mit = φtit + ρ
48∑
i 6=j
ωijtjt +Xitθ + αi + δt + µit
tit = ηmit + ψ
48∑
i 6=j
ωijtjt + Zitβ + ζi + λt + vit, (15)
Here the tax base for state i in time t is given by mit while tit is the states’s own tax rate
and
∑48
i 6=j ωijtjt is the tax rate in neighboring jurisdictions. The set of control variables
included in the tax base equations are given Xit while αi and δt denote state and time fixed
effects. Likewise, for the tax rate equation, Zit denotes the set of controls while ζi and
λt denote state and time fixed effects. Lastly, µit and vit represent the disturbance terms
for the base and rate equations respectively. The coefficent, φ, represents how a state’s tax
base responds to changes in their own state estate tax rate while, ρ represents changes in a
state’s estate tax base due to changes in their neighbor’s tax policy. In the tax rate equation,
η, represents the influence of the tax base on the tax rate while, ψ, represents the response
of a state’s tax rate to the tax rates set in neighboring jurisdictions.
4.4.3 Estimation Issues
To obtain the most efficient estimates, the tax base and rate equations are estimated jointly
using a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique. More specifically
I use the two-step GMM estimator with heteroskedacticity robust standard errors. In esti-
mating the models given by equation (3), one must address the endogeneity of several of
the regressors included in the model. To begin, the structure of the economic model implies
that the tax rate is endogenously determined in the tax base equation while the tax base is
endogenously determined in the tax rate equation. Furthermore, the inclusion of neighbor’s
tax policy introduces a second source of endogeneity to the model. Instruments are there-
fore required for the estimation of the system given by (3). A brief discussion of instrument
choice is presented below followed by a more detailed account of all the model’s variables
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contained in the data section.
The identification strategy adopted here is based on isolating a set of exclusion re-
strictions or factors expected to exogenously shift the tax rate (tax base) without directly
influencing the tax base (tax rate) to serve as instruments in base equation (rate equation).
Instruments for the estate tax rate in the base equation, or those factors excluded from the
base equation include last year’s state per capita debt, last years state per capita federal
transfers, political variables including indicators for a republican majority and the polit-
ical party of the governor, the percentage of the population age sixty-five and older and
eighty-five and older, and several other factors believed to exogenously influence the tax
rate. These instrument choices were influence in part by, Conway and Rork (2006) who
included similar measures as exogenous controls for the estate tax rate in their model of
estate tax competition.32 An additional instrument selected for the estate tax rate is an indi-
cator for states imposing only the pick up tax. While these variables could potentially have
some influence on the tax base, the reasons are less apparent than their impact through the
tax rate. Of these potential exclusion restrictions, the political variables, age variables, and
the pick-up tax indicator are commonly statistically significant across specifications and
thus identify the model. Instruments for the estate tax base include state spending on health
and hospitals, welfare, education, and highways along with a set of variables that proxy
for amenities (the percentage of the working age population in the top five percent of the
income distribution, and the death rate) or disamenities (cost of living, crime and unem-
ployment rates). These variables are commonly included in studies of elderly migration
(Conway and Rork (2004), Bakija and Slemrod (2004), Conway and Rork). Within this
set of exclusion restrictions, several of the expenditure variables, the crime rate, death rate,
and the percentage of the working population in the top five percent of the income distri-
32Other exogenous predictors of the estate tax rate included in Conway and Rork (2006) were omitted from
my instrument set as they would likely have a direct effect on the tax base (i.e. the income and sales tax
measures).
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bution are statistically significant. Finally, the tax rate set by neighboring jurisdictions is
instrumented with the weighted set of neighbor characteristics (
∑48
i 6=j ωijtXjt) as suggested
in Kelijan and Prucha (1998) - a common approach in the literature (see Figlio et al 1999,
Beasley and Case 1995, and Conway and Rork (2004) for single equation applications and
Brett and Pinske 2000 for a simultaneous equation application).
4.5 Data
To estimate the model given by equation 3, I assemble a ten year panel for the forty-eight
contiguous states covering the period 2001 through 2010. The following section details
the data strategy used to measure the estate tax base (Mit), the estate tax rate (Tit), and all
covariates included in the model.
4.5.1 Measuring the Tax Base
Measuring the estate tax base with complete accuracy is not feasible. As noted in (Brulhart
and Parchen 2010), taxpayers themselves cannot know the incidence of the estate tax as it
depends on both the timing of their death and the value of their assets at that time. The
literature has gotten around this hurdle by focusing on measures of the elderly (Conway
and Houtenvill 2003, Conway and Rork 2006,) the wealthy elderly (Brulhart and Parchen
2010, Conway and Rork 2012), or the number of estates filed (Bakija and Slemrod (2004))
as the tax bases most likely to respond to changing estate tax policies. Along these lines, I
implement three alternative measures of the tax base (M)
(M1) The number of estate tax returns filed in each state over the number of adult
deaths in the state (population age forty-five and older).
(M2) The share of the state population age sixty-five and older in the top five percent
of the income distribution
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(M3) The share of the state population age sixty-five and older in the top twenty
percent of the income distribution
Measure (M1) is constructed from estate tax filing data provided by the Statistics of Income
division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). I select the return data tabulated by filing
year rather than year to death because it is available every year rather than in three year
intervals.33 In order to obtained a scaled measure of this base, I divide the number of re-
turns filed in each state by the number of deaths occurring in the population aged forty-five
and older. Measure M2 and M3 are stock measures of the elderly population belonging
to different income classes constructed from the American Community Survey.34 Measure
(M2) captures the stock of elderly residents with the highest income, and presumably, the
highest probability of paying estate taxes. However, because it is possible for retired in-
dividuals to have substantial wealth without having income in the top five percent of the
income distribution, I also consider elderly individuals with income in the top twenty per-
cent of the income distribution.35 I would expect to find this base the least responsive to
the estate tax rate given that most are not impacted by the tax. They could however, as an
important political base, have an impact on the estate tax policy selected by the state.
4.5.2 Tax Rate Definition
Because of the progressive nature of state estate tax schedules, the varying exemption levels
across states, and the fact that rate schedules can vary by the relationship of the heir to the
decedent, it is hard to arrive at one measure of a state’s estate tax rate. While one might be
inclined towards a measure like the top statutory rate for its visibility, such a measure would
33Federal estate tax returns are required to be filed within nine months of a decedent’s death. However, 6-
month extensions are commonly requested and granted. According to the IRS over ninety-nine percent of
returns are filed within the second calendar year following the death.
34In an earlier version of this analysis, measure M2 and M3 were constructed from the Annual Social and
Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The move to the American Community
Survey was motivated by the larger sample size. Results for the variables constructed from both sources
were very similar.
35Income limits for the top twenty and top five percent are pulled form historical income tables produced by
the Census and are available online at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/
.
108
not capture the large variations in the exemption levels set by states. Also, of the states that
chose to decouple from federal law, most still follow the the old credit for state death taxes
schedule which implements a top rate of sixteen percent.36 The literature has addressed
the measurement of state estate tax burdens in several ways. Conway and Rork (2004)
implemented a measure based on estate tax revenue as their main measure of the estate
tax while several others (Bakija and Slemrod 2004, Conway and Rork (2006), Brülhart
and Parchet (2010)) have relied on some kind of estimated average or effective tax rate.
For my analysis I choose to adopt an effective tax rate measure constructed for each state
using the sum of the state and federal estate (and inheritance) tax burden that would result
for a hypothetical taxable estate worth five million dollars in 2001. These calculations
are made taking into consideration the deductibility of state estate taxes from the federal
taxable estate introduced in 2005. For states imposing inheritance taxes, the exemption
and marginal tax rates are a function of the heirs relationship to the decedent (spouse,
lineal decedent, sibling, nephew, etc). When relevant, I make all inheritance calculations
assuming the estate was left equally divided between two children.
Control variables
The control variables selected for the tax base and tax rate equations attempt to control
for the economic, fiscal, demographic, and political factors which influence the locational
decisions of seniors (in the case of the base equation) and a state’s estate tax policy (in the
case of the rate equation).
4.5.3 Estate Tax Base Equation
Certain amenities such as low rates of crime and unemployment, generous state spending
on health and hospitals, and a low cost of living are generally believed to attract mobile se-
36States imposing top statutory rates other than sixteen percent include Tennessee, Washington, Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Connecticut, Nebraska, and Kansas.
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niors and are thus controlled for in the tax base equation. Similarly, seniors are thought to
be deterred from locating in states with high taxes or spending on public goods that they are
unlikely to consume (education for instance). More specifically, the fiscal variables con-
trolled for in the model include last year’s state per capita spending on welfare, education,
health and hospitals, and highways as well as last year’s revenue reliance on the sales, in-
come, property and corporate tax bases (defined as the revenue generated from each source
over general revenue). These variables are constructed from data obtained from the Census
of Governments (COG) database. They are included in their lagged form to avoid possible
endogeneity concerns.
A last fiscal variable that warrants discussion is a variable developed to capture the
income tax breaks that many states offer to their senior residents. States often choose to
grant age related tax benefits to the elderly. These benefits are typically applied to those
aged sixty-five and older and come in several forms including the exemption of social
security benefits or pension income from taxation and additional standard deductions or
exemptions.37 Because these tax advantages can be quite valuable to elderly households,
especially wealthy ones, it is important to include a measure that reflects these state specific
tax breaks. To obtain such a measure I use the NBER’s TAXSIM calculator and data from
the Current Population Survey (CPS) to construct the tax liability faced by a representative
“high income” senior and non-senior household with the same total income. A variable
I call “senior burden” is then constructed as the ratio of the senior tax burden to the non-
senior tax burden. This ratio will be lower in states granting more favorable treatment tax
treatment to seniors. The methodology used to construct the state by year panels of income
data for the representative senior and non-senior households along with the methodology
for obtaining their tax burdens is outlined in detail in Appendix A3.
Because states with a large populations of elderly will have high death rates, this vari-
able is also included to help control for factors that make certain states more attractive to
37See Conway and Rork (2008) for a detailed discussion of these tax provisions and their evolution over the
past several decades.
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the elderly. A final demographic variable controls for the share of the state’s working age
population with income in the top five percent of the national income distribution. As noted
in Bakija and Slemrod (2004), this variable will represent the prevalence of wealthy peo-
ple in a state (or the potential estate tax base) and also capture unobserved amenities that
draw the high-income to particular states. Last, state fixed effects are included to capture
potentially important time invariant state specific factors such as climate.
4.5.4 Estate Tax Rate Equation
To isolate the impact of a state’s own tax base and tax competition on the state’s policy
choice, I include controls for a state’s political, economic, and demographic factors also
suspected to exert influence estate tax policy. Because wealthier states will likely have
larger potential estate tax bases, I include state per capita personal income in the model.
Employment per capita is also included. With the political divide over estate tax policy
being so partisan in nature, one would suspect the political makeup of the state to also be
quite important in the determination of estate tax policy. To account for these factors I
include two political controls, the first is an indicator for having a Democratic governor
and the second is an indicator for a Republican majority in both the state senate and house.
For demographics I follow Conway and Rork (2004) and include the percentage of the
population age sixty-five and older and age eighty and older. This division is motivated
in part because the young seniors may be both more geographically mobile and politically
active and thus able to exert more influence on estate tax policy. Alternatively, the older
seniors are more closely related to the true estate tax base.
The fiscal climate in a state is captured by the state debt per capita, per capita federal
transfers received by the state, and the same basic set of tax variables included in the tax
base equation (revenue reliance on the sales, income, property and corporate tax bases).
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for all variables included in the analysis.
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4.6 Empirical Findings
Table 4.2 contains the estimation results for two equation model given by (3) when the
definition of “neighbor” is based on geography. The results for the tax base equation are
presented in the top panel of the table with the corresponding tax rate equation results pre-
sented beneath them. Each of the three columns contains estimates for one of the three
alternative state estate tax base measures (estates filed, percentage of the senior population
in the top five percent, and the percentage of the senior population in the top twenty per-
cent). The Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions is also presented for each model.
Appendix table A.3.2 contains the first-stage F-tests for instrument validity. The null hy-
pothesis that the instruments are jointly equal to zero is rejected for all but one specification.
Table 4.3 maintains the same setup but presents the results when the definition of neighbors
is changed to the migration based weighting scheme.
Under the first weighting scheme, when the estate tax base is defined using the measure
based on estates filed (M1), I find that a state’s own tax rate has a small negative effect
on the size of its tax base while the tax rates in neighboring states have a small positive
effect. Specifically, a 10 percent increase in a state’s own tax rate will lead to a reduction of
the estate tax base by roughly 1.5 percent. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in the average
tax rate imposed by a state’s neighbors will lead to an increase in that state’s own tax
base of roughly 1.4 percent. The results for these same parameters when the tax base is
defined as the percentage of state’s senior population with income in the top five percent of
the national income distribution, (M2), parallel these findings though their magnitudes are
reduced. A 10 percent increase in a state’s own tax rate now leads to a reduction of the estate
tax base by roughly .5 percent while an increase in the average tax rates set in surrounding
states will lead to an increase in the own state tax base of roughly 1.7 percent. Together,
these results are consistent with the predictions laid out in the empirical framework and
support the notion that a state’s estate tax base is responsive to both its own state policy and
the policies employed in surrounding states. Last, when moving to the broadest measure of
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the potential estate tax base - seniors with income in the top twenty percent - no evidence
is detected to suggest this base responds to its own state’s estate tax policy. This finding
is not surprising given that under 2 percent of households actually leave taxable estates.
Nevertheless, investigating this measure of the base has value in that it provides a chance
to capture any households that will likely have taxable estates but were missed with the
first two measures. More importantly, the finding that this base is unresponsive also helps
rule out the possibility that the previous finding were spurious. Interestingly, there is some
evidence suggesting that a state surrounded by high tax neighbors may experience some
growth in their tax base. When switching to the migration weighting scheme (see top panel
of Table 4.3), similar patterns are detected with some key differences. Specifically, a states
own estate tax rate still appears to have a negative influence on the first two measures of its
own estate tax base with very similar parameter magnitudes. However, a positive response
by a state’s own tax base is no longer detected as “neighbor’s” increase their tax rates. This
finding could be explained by the fact that migration based neighbors are not necessarily
the surrounding states making it less likely that the tax base leaving these neighbors will
spill into a state’s own borders .
As expected, the size of a state’s working population in the top five percent of the in-
come distribution and a state’s death rate have a positive influence on the size of the estate
tax base. This reflects the fact that states offering certain amenities and opportunities that
appeal to the high income or elderly will naturally have a larger estate tax base. When it
comes to government expenditures, results are a bit more mixed. Spending on education
and highways was sometimes found to have a positive relationship with the size of the es-
tate tax base. Though one might expect the elderly to avoid states with relatively higher
spending on education, this finding cold be explained by the fact that the high income
elderly continue to value a higher level of public goods or that they are not as sensitive
to government spending considerations compared to the general elderly population. This
conjecture is supported by the fact that the coefficients on these variables are only signifi-
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cant for the first two more narrowly defined measures of the estate tax base and sometime
flip signs for the third measure (M3). In some cases expenditure on welfare was found to
have its expected negative effect on the size of the estate tax base though a positive impact
was detected in one instance. In the case of additional taxes, it appears a state’s estate tax
base is negatively influence by reliance on income taxation and positively influenced by
reliance on sales and property taxation while reliance on corporate taxation appears to have
no discernible impact. Lastly, the variable capturing income tax breaks granted to seniors
takes its expected negative sign across the different specifications though it is not statisti-
cally significant. This is not surprising giving that past research has not been able to detect
an impact of these fiscal policies on the location of seniors (see Conway and Rork (2008,
2012).)
When moving to the corresponding tax rate equation, some evidence is found suggest-
ing a state’s estate tax base has a negative influence on the state’s tax rate. As in the case
of the tax base equation, this finding only holds up under the first and second definition of
the tax base. Specifically It appears that a one percent increase in a states estate tax base
results in a drop in the estate tax rate of roughly . 4-.6 percent, depending on the base def-
inition. Though these findings are only marginally significant they do provide support for
the hypothesis that a growing estate tax base may be able to exert more political influence
to achieve policy goals. Alternatively, a growing estate tax base could allow a state to cut
its effective tax rate (through either a cut in the marginal tax rate or and increase in the
exclusion amount) and still maintain a given revenue level.
When considering how a state’s estate tax rate reacts to those set in neighboring ju-
risdictions, I find a 10 percent cut in the estate tax rate in neighboring states leads to a
5.2 percent cut in the own state rate when the base definition is estates filed. Similar re-
sponses of 4.6 percent and 4 percent are detected under the two alternative estate tax base
definitions. The results presented in Table 4.3 (when neighbors are based on the migration
definition) again tell a similar story though their coefficients are slightly larger. Specifi-
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cally, I now find a 10 percent cut in the estate tax rate of neighboring states leads to a 7.8
percent cut in the own state rate. The pattern that the coefficients diminish in magnitude as
the base definition is made broader also continues to hold. The estimated magnitude of a
states response to it’s neighbors estate tax rate falls within the range of estimates produced
by Conway and Rork (2004) in their study of estate tax competition and also display the
same patter that the response is stronger under the migration based weighting scheme.
As one would expect, states with democratic governors were found to have higher estate
tax rates while states with republican majorities in both the house and senate were found to
have lower tax rates. States with larger “young” elderly populations (those aged sixty-five
and up) were found to have higher estate tax rates while states with larger “old” elderly
populations (aged eighty and up) were found to have lower rates. Tax rates were also lower
in states that relied on only pick portion of the tax as opposed to those that implemented
stand alone tax systems. States relying more heavily on sales and property taxes also had
larger tax rates.
4.7 Conclusion
The aging of the population has spurred a new interest in the fiscally induced migration of
retirees, especially with respect to estate/inheritance tax policy. This interest in state estate
and inheritance taxes has been augmented by the numerous estate tax policy changes oc-
curring over the last decade. In the past, evidence that the states strategically set their estate
taxes in a manner consistent with tax competition has been clearly documented, both em-
pirically and anecdotally. Interestingly though, evidence that the estate tax bases actually
responds to any interstate differentials in these tax policies has been much more fleeting.
The 2001 EGTRRA legislation which repealed the state death tax credit thus exacerbating
interstate differentials and inducing a string of policy changes in estate taxation has created
a unique opportunity to reinvestigate these matters.
Using a new framework which allows for the simultaneous determination of a state’s
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tax base and rate while also considering the influence of neighbor states policies, I provide
new evidence on both strategic state behavior and the mobility and influence of the estate
tax base. When the estate tax base is fairly narrowly defined by focusing on actual estates
filed in a state or the senior population with income in the top five percent of the income
distribution, evidence is found suggesting that the estate tax base is mildly responsive to
both changes in own state tax policy and the tax policy of neighbors. This result goes
away once a wider potential estate tax base, such as seniors with income in the top twenty
percent of the income distribution or all seniors. These findings line up with the findings of
Bakija and Slemrod (2004) who demonstrated that high state estate and inheritance taxes
have a modest negative impact on estates filed within a state as well as the findings of
Conway and Rork (2006, 2012) who found high state estate and inheritance taxes did not
have an impact of the migration of the broader elderly population or those falling into the
top twenty-five percent of the income distribution. The responsiveness of the estate tax
base documented here also helps confirm that tax competition is a true factor behind the
observed strategic estate tax policy setting behavior. However, the small mobility effects
documented here are not enough to explain strong tax cutting responses of states to changes
in their neighbor’s estate tax policies and the decisions of many states to abandon this tax
base entirely. Political factors must also surely play an important role in a states estate tax
policy choice and some evidence found here suggests a growing estate tax base may be
able to apply downward pressure to taxes they find unfavorable.
While the past decade has witnessed both the inception and repeal of state estate taxes,
the trend emerging towards the end of the period appears in favor of repeal. There are of
course several exceptions such as Hawaii, who chose to enact a new tax in the year that
the federal estate tax was temporarily repealed and Connecticut who recently retroactively
lowered their exemption level. The future may yet hold even more action in the state estate
tax arena given that the ARTA (2012) legislation has settled any uncertainty surrounding
the return of the state death tax credit. This news apparently surprised several states includ-
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ing California, Colorado, and New Mexico who had included pick-up tax revenue in their
multi- year budget estimates. Whether these revenue hungry states will react by reinstat-
ing their estate taxes remains to be seen as does the behavior of the remaining states with
estate taxes still intact. What does seem clear is that these policy decisions will be influ-
enced by the relevant tax bases and will not be made in isolation from the policy choices in
neighboring states.
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Figure 4.2 Federal Estate Tax Schedule 
Year Exclusion Amount Top Tax Rate 
2001 $675,000 55% 
2002 $1 million 50% 
2003 $1 million 49% 
2004 $1.5 million 48% 
2005 $1.5 million 47% 
2006 $2 million 46% 
2007 $2 million 45% 
2008 $2 million 45% 
2009 $3.5 million 45% 
2010          repealed 
2011 $5 million 35% 
2012 $5.12 million 35% 
2013 $5.25 million 40% 
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Figure 4.3 Estate Tax Payable by a $3,000,000  Estate in Pick-Up Only 
State 
Year Total Estate Tax State Share Federal Share 
2001 1,070,250 182,000 888,250 
2002 930,000 136,500 793,500 
2003 925,000 91,000 834,000 
2004 705,000 45,500 659,000 
2005 695,000 0 695,000 
2006 460,000 0 460,000 
2007 450,000 0 450,000 
2008 450,000 0 450,000 
2009 0 0 0 
2010 0 0 0 
2011 0 0 0 
This table is adopted from Cooper et al. (2004) and is updated cover 2011 law. 
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Figure 4.4 Federal Net Estate Tax Collected vs. State Death Tax Cedit/Deduction 
Paid   
net federal revenue (left scale) state credit/deduction revenue(right scale)
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Figure 4.6 Federal and State Estate Tax Gap 
mean max
Table note: for 2010 the federal exclusion amount was unlimited. I therefore do not calculate 
the federal-state gap for that year. 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics (2001-2010) 
Economic and Demographic Variables Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
State employment 0.482 0.034 0.384 0.553 
Per capita personal  income 38.144 5.677 27.696 58.831 
Population (in thousands) 6136.291 6571.439 494.657 37349.360 
Percent of  Population 
    Age 65 & older 0.126 0.016 0.082 0.174 
Age 80 & older 0.034 0.007 0.019 0.053 
Political Variables     
Democratic governor (yes=1) 0.513 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Republican majority (yes=1) 0.327 0.470 0.000 1.000 
Amenities 
    Crime rate (per 100 residents) 3.656 0.909 1.946 6.404 
% of working population in top 5%  0.059 0.026 0.023 0.141 
Median home price index ($1000s) 157.83 65.29 73.11 479.66 
Unemployment rate 5.66 2.009 2.7 14.9 
Death rate 0.008 0.001 0.005 0.011 
Senior Tax Burden 0.905 0.016 0.851 0.935 
Fiscal Variables 
    State per capita debt 6.923 2.200 3.087 15.473 
State per capita transfers 1.654 0.488 0.755 4.297 
State and Local Government Per Capita Expenditures by  
 
Category (in $1000s) 
Health  & Hospital 0.595 0.274 0.143 2.276 
Welfare 1.248 0.351 0.317 2.476 
Education 2.558 0.38 1.76 4.461 
Highway 0.549 0.166 0.295 1.349 
Other Taxes as  Share of General Revenue 
    Property tax share 0.159 0.057 0.062 0.359 
Sales tax share 0.124 0.054 0 0.267 
Income tax share 0.111 0.061 0 0.248 
Corporate tax share 0.018 0.012 0 0.07 
Estate Tax Base Variables 
    Percentage of seniors with income in top 5 % 0.027 0.011 0.003 0.06 
Percentage of seniors with  income  in top 20% 0.089 0.026 0.034 0.172 
Estates filed to adult deaths 0.023 0.015 0.002 0.095 
Estate Tax Rate Variables 
    Total state and federal effective rate for 5 million dollar estate 0.296 0.104 0 0.452 
Top state rate 0.099 0.076 0 0.19 
Pickup only state 0.569 0.496 0 1 
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Table 4.2 Estimation Results for Estate Tax Base and Rate Equation, Weight Matrix is WI 
Tax base equation:                 
Tax base measure  is: Base M1  Base M2  Base M3 
effective tax rate -0.152*** (0.028)  -0.050** (0.023)  -0.006 (0.032) 
neighbor's tax rate 0.147* (0.089)  0.172** (0.070)  0.181* (0.098) 
crime rate (per 100 residents) 0.002** (0.001)  0.002** (0.001)  -0.000 (0.002) 
% of working population in top 5%  -0.073 (0.072)  0.234*** (0.072)  0.383*** (0.116) 
unemployment rate -0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  -0.001** (0.001) 
death rate 0.865 (2.072)  4.194** (1.891)  6.111* (3.188) 
median home price -0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  -0.000 (0.000) 
senior tax burden -0.043 (0.081)  0.007 (0.077)  -0.128 (0.120) 
last year's expenditure on health  -0.013*** (0.005)  -0.003 (0.004)  0.004 (0.006) 
last year's expenditures on welfare  -0.010*** (0.002)  0.004* (0.002)  0.003 (0.004) 
last year's expenditure on education  0.003 (0.002)  0.005* (0.003)  0.002 (0.004) 
last year's expenditure on highways  0.008** (0.004)  0.007* (0.004)  -0.007 (0.006) 
last year's property tax share  -0.037 (0.037)  0.057* (0.031)  0.121*** (0.044) 
last year's sales tax share  0.039 (0.042)  0.099** (0.042)  0.188*** (0.051) 
last year's income tax share -0.114*** (0.037)  0.042 (0.026)  0.055 (0.039) 
last year's corporate tax share 0.039 (0.073)  0.026 (0.061)  0.103 (0.092) 
Tax rate equation:         
tax base -0.436* (0.254)  -0.559* (0.299)  -0.161 (0.305) 
neighbor's tax rate 0.522** (0.228)  0.458** (0.227)  0.395* (0.225) 
state per capita debt 0.000 (0.001)  -0.000 (0.002)  -0.000 (0.001) 
state per capita transfers 0.000 (0.003)  -0.000 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.003) 
state employment 0.063 (0.111)  0.025 (0.112)  0.028 (0.117) 
per capita personal  income 0.001 (0.001)  0.001 (0.001)  0.001 (0.001) 
democratic governor (yes=1) 0.003 (0.002)  0.002 (0.002)  0.004* (0.002) 
republican majority -0.004* (0.002)  -0.001 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.003) 
% population 65 & up 0.800** (0.337)  0.941*** (0.365)  0.821** (0.377) 
% population 80 & up -1.260** (0.505)  -1.017* (0.524)  -1.018* (0.557) 
Pickup tax only (yes =1) -0.040*** (0.005)  -0.042*** (0.005)  -0.046*** (0.005) 
population 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
last year's property tax share  0.166* (0.090)  0.091 (0.086)  0.120 (0.085) 
last year's sales tax share  0.141 (0.089)  0.233** (0.105)  0.192* (0.114) 
last year's income tax share  -0.094 (0.093)  -0.043 (0.096)  -0.021 (0.094) 
last year's corporate tax share  -0.069 (0.183)  0.012 (0.190)  -0.089 (0.198) 
         
Hansen's J-test 61.429   48.966   43.281  
p-value 0.037   0.214   0.416  
Observations 480   480   480  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Table 4.3 Estimation Results for Estate Tax Base and Rate Equation, Weight Matrix is WII 
Tax base equation:                 
Tax base measure  is: Base M1  Base M2  Base M3 
effective tax rate -0.153*** (0.025) 
 
-0.038** (0.019) 
 
0.016 (0.031) 
neighbor's tax rate 0.138 (0.153) 
 
-0.011 (0.133) 
 
0.220 (0.205) 
crime rate (per 100 residents) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
0.002** (0.001) 
 
0.000 (0.002) 
% of working population in top 5%  -0.008 (0.070) 
 
0.255*** (0.073) 
 
0.428*** (0.108) 
unemployment rate 0.000 (0.000) 
 
0.000 (0.000) 
 
-0.001 (0.001) 
death rate -0.001 (1.733) 
 
2.041 (1.747) 
 
3.769 (2.907) 
median home price -0.000 (0.000) 
 
0.000** (0.000) 
 
-0.000 (0.000) 
senior tax burden -0.006 (0.064) 
 
-0.061 (0.056) 
 
-0.060 (0.085) 
last year's expenditure on health  -0.014*** (0.004) 
 
-0.004 (0.004) 
 
0.001 (0.005) 
last year's expenditures on welfare  -0.011*** (0.002) 
 
0.003 (0.002) 
 
0.001 (0.004) 
last year's expenditure on education  0.003 (0.002) 
 
0.007*** (0.003) 
 
0.003 (0.004) 
last year's expenditure on highways  0.007** (0.004) 
 
0.006 (0.004) 
 
-0.007 (0.006) 
last year's property tax share  -0.065* (0.039) 
 
0.046 (0.033) 
 
0.066 (0.044) 
last year's sales tax share  0.051 (0.040) 
 
0.111*** (0.039) 
 
0.195*** (0.051) 
last year's income tax share -0.123*** (0.035) 
 
0.016 (0.028) 
 
0.015 (0.040) 
last year's corporate tax share -0.016 (0.067) 
 
0.048 (0.059) 
 
0.111 (0.092) 
Tax rate equation:         
tax base -0.740*** (0.208) 
 
-0.491 (0.322) 
 
0.172 (0.313) 
neighbor's tax rate 0.782** (0.379) 
 
0.545 (0.389) 
 
0.654* (0.370) 
state per capita debt 0.000 (0.001) 
 
0.000 (0.001) 
 
-0.000 (0.002) 
state per capita transfers -0.000 (0.003) 
 
-0.001 (0.003) 
 
-0.000 (0.003) 
state employment -0.007 (0.103) 
 
-0.047 (0.113) 
 
-0.106 (0.114) 
per capita personal  income 0.001 (0.001) 
 
0.002** (0.001) 
 
0.001** (0.001) 
democratic governor (yes=1) 0.001 (0.002) 
 
0.002 (0.002) 
 
0.003 (0.002) 
republican majority -0.001 (0.002) 
 
-0.001 (0.003) 
 
-0.001 (0.003) 
% population 65 & up 0.529 (0.331) 
 
0.867** (0.366) 
 
0.605 (0.384) 
% population 80 & up -0.543 (0.485) 
 
-0.661  (0.516) 
 
-0.452 (0.547) 
Pickup tax only (yes =1) -0.037*** (0.005) 
 
-0.044*** (0.005) 
 
-0.046*** (0.005) 
population 0.000 (0.000) 
 
0.000* (0.000) 
 
0.000 (0.000) 
last year's property tax share  0.146 (0.094) 
 
0.157* (0.090) 
 
0.131 (0.090) 
last year's sales tax share  0.163* (0.093) 
 
0.264** (0.104) 
 
0.165 (0.109) 
last year's income tax share  -0.047 (0.098) 
 
-0.014 (0.098) 
 
-0.010 (0.094) 
last year's corporate tax share  -0.112 (0.178) 
 
-0.126 (0.178) 
 
-0.260 (0.186) 
         
Hansen's J-test 102.85   69.389   62.375  
p-value 0.000   0.049   0.022  
Observations 480   480   480  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All models include state and year fixed effects. 
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5 Conclusion
The three essays contained within this dissertation have sought to contribute to the body
of knowledge examining how economic agents strategically respond to changes in both
federal and state tax policy. While essays one and three focused on identifying strategic
responses related to inter-state competition following federal reforms, essay 2 contributed
to the literature examining how individuals change their income in response to changing
marginal income tax rates.
The results from Essay 1 demonstrate that states appear highly responsive to multiple
dimensions of welfare policy set in surrounding jurisdictions. More interestingly, evidence
suggests that this strategic behavior associated with a ‘race to the bottom’ intensified in the
wake of the 1996 reform. Additionally, the results demonstrate the methodological impor-
tance of considering policy dynamics when modeling interstate competition. Overall, the
analysis paired recent state policy changes suggest we will likely see a continued reduction
in the generosity of state welfare programs. This finding should be of interest to both those
concerned with the TANF program and those studying other transfer programs considered
possible candidates for further decentralization such as Medicaid and the SNAP program.
Essay 3 also studied interstate competition over policies aimed at redistribution, though
for a very different population of people – the wealthy elderly. An interesting theme I
found across my studies of both welfare competition and estate tax competition was the
notion that states were seeming to react to the policy changes of their neighbors as if their
populations were highly mobile even though a growing body of empirical evidence suggests
otherwise. To more fully explore both inter-state estate tax competition and the mechanisms
behind it, I developed a model in which the estate tax rate and base were simultaneously
determined. This innovation helped to shed light on both the strategic policy behavior of
states and the mobility of the estate tax base. The results indicating a states estate tax base
is negatively influenced by its own tax rate and positively influenced by the tax rate set in
neighboring jurisdictions may begin to build a small consensus in the literature that the very
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rich elderly are in fact sensitive to estate taxes though additional research will be required.
Lastly, Essay 2 provides an interesting set of results in which the elasticity of taxable
income is subject to a new set of sensitivity analysis relating to heterogeneity across educa-
tion attainment levels, selection on both observables and unobservables, identification, and
tax rate definition. These analyses are made possible by the use of survey data (matched
CPS panels) which contain richer demographic information than the standard tax-panel
typically used in the ETI literature. The analysis concludes with a model in which a new
arguablely more exogenous instrument is implemented. These preferred estimates put the
ETI in a range of .4-.5, much higher than estimates obtained with the standard instrument
strategy.
While the essays contained within this dissertation have each touched upon different as-
pects of the tax and transfer system ranging all the way from the TANF program serving the
very poor to estates taxes impacting only the very wealthy, they have been tied together by
the theme of working to better understand strategic responses to changes in tax and transfer
policies. Enhancing our knowledge on the policy responses of both state governments and
individuals can help contribute to the design of a more effective tax and transfer system.
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A Appendix
A.1 Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1.1 Data Appendix
To obtain state level estimates of the effective tax rates and effective benefit guarantees,
I implement the reduced-form methodology of Ziliak (2007). This study used micro data
from the AFDC Quality Control System (AFDC-QC) as well as the National TANF Data
Reporting System (NTDS) to estimate effective tax rates and benefit guarantees for all
states over the period 1983-2002. I simply extend his analysis to obtain results through
2008. The basic estimation equation is as follows
Bijt = α
0
jt + α
1
jtK2ijt + α
2
jtK3ijt − tejtEijt − tnjtNijt + εijt (16)
where Bijt is the actual monthly benefit amount received by individual i, in state j, at time
t. The right hand side variables consist of controls for family size and income as these
determine a recipients benefit level. Specifically, K2 is an indicator for the presence of
two or more children and K3 equals the number of additional children present. E and N
represent earned and unearned income respectively. Earned income is defined to be the
sum of reported wages and salaries, self employment income, and any reported refunds
from the Earned Income Tax Credit. Unearned income is defined to be the sum of income
from social security, railroad retirement, Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, un-
employment insurance, workers compensation, veterans benefits, child support, general
assistance, housing assistance, education grants, and any other reported income.
As explained by Ziliak, the state-specific and time-varying intercepts α0jt reflect the
effective benefit guarantee for a family of two while the sum α0jt +α
1
jt reflects the effective
guarantee for a family of three and so on. The coefficients tejt and t
n
jt are the estimates
of the effective tax rates. Rather than estimating the above equation with ordinary least
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squares (OLS), I follow Ziliak and use a truncated maximum likelihood estimator due to
the truncated sample which results from the minimum statutory benefit. See Ziliak 2007
for more detail on estimation and selection criterion. Sample sizes were lowest in 1996
and 1997 during the transition from the AFDC-QC and NTDS. During this time and the
next two years there were an increased number of states with missing data or data with
insufficient variation to estimate the model parameters. To obtain a full time series for each
state I use linear interpolation to fill in 16 missing parameter values.
A.1.2 Additional Sensitivity Analysis
As previously discussed, the finite sample size of this analysis requires one to restrict the
potential instrument set. Baseline estimates were obtained by instrumenting the spatial
variable with its second through fourth lags collapsed. As a robustness check, Table A1
presents estimates for the full period static and dynamic models obtained with several al-
ternative instrument choices (these include using more lags and starting with the third lag
rather than the second). The top panel of the table contains to static spatial coefficient es-
timates while the the bottom panel contains the short run (SR) spatial coefficient estimates
from the dynamic model as well as the calculated corresponding long run (LR) estimates.
Point estimates appear fairly robust to alternative lag structures. The efficiency of different
instrument sets appears to be more variable specific.
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Table A1.2.1 Sensitivity analysis of  spatial coefficient to alternative instrument lag 
structures  (full period ) 
Static Model 
  
Maximum Benefit 
 
Effective Benefit 
 
ETR on Earned 
Income 
2nd through 3rd lags 0.928** 
 
.775** 
 
0.758*** 
  
(0.462) 
 
(0.342) 
 
(0.271) 
2nd through 4th lags  0.926** 
 
.745** 
 
0.779*** 
 
 
(0.420) 
 
(0.290) 
 
(0.241) 
2nd through 6th lags  0.949** 
 
.761*** 
 
0.661** 
  
(0.390) 
 
(0.270) 
 
(0.260) 
3rd through 5th lags  0.965** 
 
1.037** 
 
0.702* 
  
(0.391) 
 
(0.426) 
 
(0.355) 
3rd through 7th lags  0.880** 
 
1.016** 
 
0.678* 
  
(0.342) 
 
(0.430) 
 
(0.341) 
4th through 6th lags  1.040** 
 
1.066 
 
0.683** 
  
(0.408) 
 
(0.783) 
 
(0.326) 
4th through 8th lags  0.976** 
 
1.049 
 
0.682** 
  
(0.389) 
 
(0.658) 
 
(0.327) 
Dynamic Model 
 
  
 SR LR  SR LR  SR LR 
2nd through 3rd lags  0.084 .620 
 
0.241* .797** 
 
0.308* .606* 
  
(0.112) (.653) 
 
(0.131) (.315) 
 
(0.169) (.316) 
2nd through 4th lags  0.095 .667 
 
0.234* .777*** 
 
0.320** .622** 
  
(0.110) (.588) 
 
(0.119) (.292) 
 
(0.165) (.406) 
2nd through 6th lags  0.083 .542 
 
0.281** .920*** 
 
0.397*** .732*** 
  
(0.428) (2.373) 
 
(0.136) (.316) 
 
(0.144) (.264) 
3rd through 5th lags  0.021 .202 
 
0.421* 1.02*** 
 
0.349*** .677** 
  
(0.110) (.991) 
 
(0.214) (.354) 
 
(0.171) (.333) 
3rd through 7th lags  0.0622 .491 
 
0.439* 1.086*** 
 
0.445** .823** 
  
(.113) (.697) 
 
(0.229) (.375) 
 
(0.169) (.329) 
4th through 6th lags  0.150 .883 
 
0.465* 1.208*** 
 
0.449*** .813*** 
  
(0.117) (.613) 
 
(0.236) (.318) 
 
(0.153) (.289) 
4th through 8th lags  0.132 .894 
 
.434 1.243*** 
 
0.446** .803*** 
  
(0.126) (.744) 
 
(0.243) (.375) 
 
(0.154) (.286) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **P<0.05, *p<0.1. Only spatial coefficients are 
reported. SR denotes short run coefficients and LR denotes long run coefficients. 
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A.2 Appendix for Chapter 3 
A.2.1 Summary Statistics for Matched and Repeated Cross Sections of CPS 
 
Table A2.1.1 Summary Statistics for Matched CPS data, 1979-2008 
  
Mean Std. Dev 
Demographics 
  Single 
 
0.18 0.39 
Female 
 
0.30 0.46 
White 
 
0.87 0.33 
African American 0.08 0.28 
Other 
 
0.04 0.20 
Age 
 
41.44 9.42 
Less than High School 0.12 0.33 
High School Graduate 0.34 0.48 
More than High School 0.53 0.50 
Child under 6 0.22 0.41 
Child under 18 0.41 0.49 
Income and Tax Rates 
  Broad Income (Year 1) 70429.79 56460.08 
Taxable Income (Year 1) 61157.47 54311.57 
 Net-of-Tax Share (Federal+State)  73.52 11.84 
 Net of Tax Share (Federal+State+FICA) 67.92 10.58 
Observations 198,447. Sample is individuals with broad income greater 
than $10,000 
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Table A2.1.2 Summary Statistics for Repeated Cross Section CPS 
data, 1979-2008 
 
Mean Std. Dev 
Demographics 
  Single 0.20 0.40 
Female 0.34 0.47 
White 0.85 0.36 
African American 0.10 0.30 
Other 0.05 0.22 
Age 40.95 9.71 
Child Under 6 0.22 0.42 
Child Under 18 0.41 0.49 
Less than High School 0.14 0.34 
High School Graduate 0.33 0.47 
More than High School 0.53 0.50 
Income and Tax Rates 
   Broad income 67944.51 58839.23 
 Taxable income 58734.21 56655.03 
 Net-of-Tax Share (Federal+State)  75.02 13.27 
 Net of Tax Share (Federal+State+FICA) 69.16 12.14 
Labor Variables 
  Hours 1907.62 847.29 
Worker 0.91 0.28 
Before-Tax Wage 20.42 44.34 
After-Tax Wage 13.34 27.51 
    Non Labor Income ($1000s) 26.60 39.19 
Virtual Non Labor Income ($1000s) 32.68 40.41 
462,869 observations. Sample is broad income greater than 10,000. 
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A.2.2 Benchmark Specification Tests on Baseline ETI Model 
 
 
Table A2.2.1 Benchmark Specification Tests on Baseline ETI Model 
      
 
 
Unweighted 
Time period  
1979-1990 
Deciles for Initial 
Income Controls 
  Broad Income         
 Fed + State 0.003 0.168** -0.009 
 
 
(0.023) (0.067) (0.035) 
 
    Fed +State+ Fica 0.010 0.085 -0.088*** 
 
 
(0.019) (0.052) (0.027) 
 
     Taxable Income 
    Fed + State 0.044 0.214*** -0.020 
 
 
(0.036) (0.081) (0.043) 
 
     Fed +State+ Fica 0.044 0.083 -0.115*** 
 
 
(0.030) (0.062) (0.034) 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
regressions include controls for marital status and time effects for initial year. 
Income range is broad income greater than $10,000. 
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Figure A3.1 Time line of estate tax policy changes, 2001-present 
 
 
38 states impose pick-up tax only. EGTRRA signed into law. Set to 
phase out pick-up tax  with repeal fully effective in 2005. 
11 states and the District of Columbia took legislative action to offset 
all or part of the impact of the tax credit phase out. The states include 
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Maryland, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. 
 
Connecticut responds to revenue loss by enacting a 
temporary estate tax. Illinois also decouples from federal 
changes to state death tax credit 
The state death tax credit is fully phased out and replaced with a deduction. 
States relying solely on pick-up tax no longer collect revenue. Connecticut enacts 
a new estate tax. Washington enacts a new stand-alone estate tax. 
Kansas and Oklahoma pass legislation regarding stand-alone estate 
taxes. Arizona passed legislation to permanently repeal the estate tax 
provisions of the Arizona statutes. 
Nebraska repeals its stand-alone estate tax. 
Virginia repeals tax. 
Wisconsin Estate tax repealed. 
20
01
 
20
02
 
Delaware reenacts estate tax with 3.5 million dollar 
exemption. Connecticut raises the estate tax exemption, 
restructures rates and removes the tax cliff. Vermont 
legislation lowered estate tax exemption to 2 million. 
No federal estate tax for 2010. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance 
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act: Estate tax cuts extended through 2013 
with a 35% rate and 5 million dollar exemption. Hawaii enacts new estate tax. 
Estate taxes repealed permanently in Kansas and Oklahoma and for 2010 only 
in Illinois and North Carolina. Rhode Island increases the exemption level 
         
20
03
 
20
06
 
20
05
 
Illinois’s estate tax 
reinstated. Separate 
legislation increased 
exemption for 2012 and 
2013. Ohio’s estate tax is 
eliminated effective 2013. 
Connecticut’s exemption 
was lowered to 2 million 
while Vermont’s 
increased to 2.75 million. 
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
Tennessee repealed its state gift tax 
effective 2012 and began phasing out the 
estate tax (to be fully repealed by 2016). 
20
12
 
20
11  
20
10
 
20
09
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 Figure A3.2 Maximum Credit for State Death Taxes  
Adjusted taxable estate equal 
to or more than 
Adjusted taxable 
estate less than 
Credit on amount in 
column (1) 
Rate of credit on excess over 
amount in column (1) 
per (cent) 
    0 40000 0 0 
40000 90000 0 0.8 
90000 140000 400 1.6 
140000 240000 1200 2.4 
240000 440000 3600 3.2 
440000 640000 10000 4 
640000 840000 18000 4.8 
840000 1040000 27600 5.6 
1040000 1540000 38800 6.4 
1540000 2040000 70800 7.2 
2040000 2540000 106800 8 
2540000 3040000 146800 8.8 
3040000 3540000 190800 9.6 
3540000 4040000 238800 10.4 
4040000 5040000 290800 11.2 
5040000 6040000 402800 12 
6040000 7040000 522800 12.8 
7040000 8040000 650800 13.6 
8040000 9040000 786800 14.4 
9040000 10040000 930800 15.2 
10040000 and up 1082800 16 
Source:  Internal Revenue Code 
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Appendix A3.3 TAXSIM9 Estimated Senior Tax Break Appendix  
Step 1: I extract data from the 2000 March CPS and create a senior sample 
(married households aged 65 and older) and a non-senior sample (married 
households aged 35 to 55). Each sample is then split into income quintiles and 
only the top quintile for each sample is retained (those with income over $113,476 
for the non-elderly sample and those with incomes over $66,600 for the elderly 
sample). 
Step 2: I then construct the mean income for each sample by the component 
categories needed by the TAXSIM calculator – earnings of the household head 
and their spouse, dividend income, interest and rent, pensions, social security 
benefits, unemployment compensation, and other income (which is treated as non-
taxable). I use the mean values of the different income components in 
combination with the mean total sample income to construct estimates of the 
proportion of income the representative household in each sample receives from 
the various sources. 
Step 4: Next I multiply $150,000 by the sample specific proportions so that each 
sample’s representative high income household will have the same amount of 
total income but apportioned differently across the income components. See table 
A3.1. 
Step 3: I then inflate the income values obtained for each sample from year 2000 
data using the Personal Consumption Expenditure Index (PCE) to obtain income 
values for the same representative households for 2001-2011 (assuming income 
only grew at the rate of inflation). 
Step 4: State by year panels of the senior and non-senior representative 
households are then constructed and run through the TAXSIM calculator. I enter 
zero for the number of taxpayers over 65 for the non-senior sample and two for 
the senior sample. The TAXSIM calculator will apply the age related tax breaks 
in the calculation of federal, and more importantly, state tax burdens. TAXSIM 
provides output on the estimated federal, state, and FICA tax burdens for each 
state-year observation for both the senior and non-senior samples.  
Step 5: I then obtain the combined federal, state, and FICA estimate tax burdens 
for each state-year observation and sample and define my final variable, 
Estimated Senior Tax Break, as the total senior tax burden over the total non-
senior tax burden.1 
1 The individual is assumed to only bear the employee’s share of the FICA tax. 
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Table A3.1 Construction of representative high-income senior and non-senior household 
 Senior Sample Sample mean proportion proportion*150,000 
Total Income 119028.80 
  Income from: 
   Earnings 56101.87 0.471 70699.5 
Social Security 16542.07 0.139 20846.3 
Pensions 17113.12 0.144 21565.9 
Unemployment Compensation 33.78 0.000 42.6 
Dividends 7757.75 0.065 9776.3 
Interest or Rent 18653.95 0.157 23507.7 
Other 2826.31 0.024 3561.7 
  
1.000 150000.0 
Non-senior Sample 
   
    Total Income 190108.00 
  Income from: 
   Earnings 175363.00 0.922 138365.8 
Social Security 460.73 0.002 363.5 
pensions 1146.54 0.006 904.7 
Unemployment Compensation 97.60 0.001 77.0 
Dividends 4232.91 0.022 3339.9 
Interest or Rent 6784.32 0.036 5353.0 
Other 2022.91 0.011 1596.1 
  
 
1.000 150000.0 
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Table A3.4 First-Stage F-Tests 
Equation: Tax Rate Base M1 Base M2 Base M3 
     First Stage F-test 13.83 3.59 4.12 1.23 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 
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